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INTRODUCTION
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
1
Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”) authorized the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) to impose civil penalties in proceedings before
an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) against any person who violated
any provision of the federal securities laws or any rule promulgated
under those statutes. Prior to Dodd-Frank, the SEC’s authority to
impose civil penalties in an administrative proceeding (“AP”) was limited to registered entities and persons associated with registered entities—primarily broker-dealers and investment advisers. For all other
defendants the SEC was required to file a civil enforcement action in
federal court. One consequence of this limitation was that the SEC
2
historically commenced only 60% of its new cases as APs. Subsequent to Dodd-Frank that percentage has increased significantly.
More than 80% of the SEC’s new enforcement actions in the first
three quarters of fiscal year 2016 were filed as administrative proceed3
4
ings and this was consistent with the pattern in 2015 and 2014. The
trend is even more dramatic with respect to public company defendants. The proportion of SEC enforcement actions commenced as
APs against such defendants more than tripled from 21% in fiscal
5
year 2010 to 76% in fiscal year 2015. In the first half of fiscal year
1
2

3

4
5

Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
Sara Gilley, Heather Lazur & Alberto Vargas, SEC Focus on Administrative Proceedings: Midyear Checkup, LAW360 (May 27, 2015, 10:25 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/
659945/sec-focus-on-administrative-proceedings-midyear-checkup (citing SEC data showing the use of administrative APs for 63-64% of enforcement actions in fiscal years 20102012, 69% in 2013, and a sharp increase to 81% and 82% in fiscal years 2014 and 2015,
respectively).
CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY DIPS IN 2016 (2016),
https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Research/SEC-Enforcement-Activity-Dips-in2016 (showing that 81% of SEC enforcement actions filed in the first three quarters of
fiscal year 2016 were filed as APs).
Gilley, Lazur & Vargas, supra note 2.
Stephen Choi, Sara E. Gilley & David F. Marcus, SEC Enforcement Activity Against Public
Company Defendants: Fiscal Years 2010–2015, N.Y.U. POLLACK CTR. FOR LAW & BUS. &
CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, at 6 (2016), https://www.cornerstone.com/GetAttachment/
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2016, the SEC commenced 88% of its enforcement actions against
public company defendants and related subsidiary defendants as ad6
ministrative proceedings. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) has announced that it too will pursue an increasing
7
number of enforcement actions in administrative proceedings.
SEC ALJs are SEC employees and are paid by the agency. They
are hired by the SEC’s Office of Administrative Law Judges, with input from the Chief Administrative Law Judge, human resource functions, and the Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”), rather
than by the President, a court of law, or the head of a federal department. SEC ALJs—like other federal ALJs—arguably are insulated
from the President by dual layers of for-cause removal protection. If
an SEC enforcement action is assigned to an ALJ, rather than to a
federal judge, there are major adverse procedural consequences for
respondents. There is very limited discovery, neither the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure nor the Federal Rules of Evidence apply,
there is no opportunity to assert counterclaims, there is no right to a
jury trial on any issue, and the time frame for completion of the administrative proceeding is both rigid and truncated.
Coincidentally or not, the SEC has been much more successful in
administrative proceedings conducted on its home court than it has
been in federal court. During the time period October 2010 to September 2015 the SEC prevailed against 86% of respondents in con8
tested cases heard by ALJs. During the same period the SEC had a
9
considerably lower success rate of 70% in federal court. The statis-

6

7

8

9

5c823caf-b6b7-47b5-ba2f-1c991fef68c7/SEC-Enforcement-Activity-Against-PublicCompany-Defendants.pdf (presenting data showing that 21% of the thirty-eight SEC actions against public companies in 2010 were administrative proceedings, increasing to
76% of thirty-four enforcement actions in 2015).
Stephen Choi et al., SEC Enforcement Activity Against Public Companies and Their Subsidiaries:
Midyear FY 2016 Update, at 4 (2016), N.Y.U. POLLACK CTR. FOR LAW & BUS. &
CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, https://www.cornerstone.com/GetAttachment/1a6f93a7-38594e7e-841f-65241c49c123/SEC-Enforcement-Activity-against-Public-Companies.pdf (showing that 88% of the forty-three SEC actions against public companies and related subsidiaries in the first half of fiscal year 2016 were brought as administrative proceedings).
See Jimmy Hoover, CFTC Closer to In-House Enforcement Actions, Official Says, LAW360 (Mar.
12, 2015, 7:03 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/630881/cftc-closer-to-in-houseenforcement-actions-official-says (“CFTC Enforcement Director Aitan Goelman said the
agency will ‘very soon’ follow the SEC’s shift to litigating enforcement actions in-house
. . . .”).
Jean Eaglesham, Fairness of SEC Judges Is in Spotlight, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 22, 2015, 9:25 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/fairness-of-sec-judges-is-in-spotlight-1448236970 (“The SEC
won against 86% of defendants in contested cases in its own courts from October 2010
through September 2015 . . . significantly higher than the agency’s 70% win rate in federal court.”).
Id.

48

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 19:1

tics concerning appeals are even starker. The first level of appeal in
an SEC administrative proceeding is to the five SEC Commissioners,
10
who also authorize the initiation of enforcement proceedings. The
Commissioners decided in the agency’s favor concerning 95% of ap11
peals taken during the period October 2010 to March 2015.
The foregoing picture has prompted numerous respondents to
12
file constitutional challenges to SEC administrative proceedings.
Many of those cases were filed in 2014 and 2015, and by April 2016
13
appeals were pending in multiple federal circuits. In 2016 the Su14
preme Court denied certiorari in two such cases, but the Court is
widely expected to ultimately resolve one or more of the constitu15
tional issues.

10

11

12

13

14

15

See Daniel R. Walfish, The Real Problem with SEC Administrative Proceedings, and How to Fix it,
FORBES (July 20, 2015, 7:55 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2015/07/
20/the-real-problem-with-sec-administrative-proceedings-and-how-to-fix-it/ (noting that
“[t]he Commissioners insist on authorizing all enforcement proceedings, whether filed in
district court or administratively”).
Jean Eaglesham, SEC Wins with In-House Judges, WALL ST. J. (May 6, 2015, 10:30 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-wins-with-in-house-judges-1430965803
(highlighting
that “the commissioners decided in their own agency’s favor concerning 53 out of 56 defendants in appeals—or 95%—from January 2010 through [March 2015].”).
Carmen Germaine, 11th Circ. Won’t Lift Order Blocking SEC In-House Suit, LAW360 (Oct. 7,
2015, 9:02 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/711691/11th-circ-won-t-lift-orderblocking-sec-in-house-suit (noting that approximately a dozen defendants have asserted
constitutional challenges in federal court).
See Carmen Germaine, Justices Reject Another Challenge to SEC In-House Court, LAW360 (Apr.
25, 2016, 9:49 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/788362/justices-reject-anotherchallenge-to-sec-in-house-court. By September 2016, all four federal circuits to have ruled
on the issue agreed that federal courts have no subject matter jurisdiction to hear constitutional claims raised by respondents in on-going administrative proceedings, and review
of such claims can only be provided on appeal from final decisions by the SEC. See Hill v.
SEC, 825 F.3d 1236, 1252 (11th Cir. 2016); Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276, 291 (2d Cir.
2016); Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 29 (D.C. Cir. 2015); and Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765, 775
(7th Cir. 2015). An examination of the jurisdictional issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
Pierce v. SEC, 786 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 84 U.S.L.W. 3416 (U.S. Apr. 25,
2016) (No. 15-901); Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 84 U.S.L.W.
3438 (U.S. Mar. 28, 2016) (No. 15-997).
See, e.g., Jason M. Halper, Robert M. Loeb, Kelsi Corkran & Marc R. Shapiro, SEC In-House
Forum
Is
Constitutionally
Uncertain,
NAT’L
L.J.,
May
30,
2016,
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202758804344/SEC-InHouse-Forum-IsConstitutionally-Uncertain?slreturn=20160817064919 (“[E]ventual resolution by the Supreme Court seems likely.”); Ed Beeson, SEC’s 7th Circ. Win Won’t End War on Admin
Courts, LAW360 (Aug. 31, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/696738/sec-s-7th-circwin-won-t-end-war-on-admin-courts (citing Andrew Vollmer, Professor, University of Virginia School of Law, for the proposition that the Supreme Court is likely to take up a
constitutional challenge to the SEC’s use of ALJs, even if no circuit split on the issue
emerges).
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This Article examines five of the most common constitutional arguments asserted by respondents: denial of due process, denial of
equal protection, violation of the Seventh Amendment, and two distinct violations of Article II of the U.S. Constitution. It then examines two common normative arguments concerning the use by the
SEC and CFTC of administrative proceedings—the process impedes
the balanced development of the federal securities laws and even if
the process is constitutional it is fundamentally unfair, or at least raises a substantial perception of unfairness. Finally, this Article examines four potential solutions to the multiple problems that have been
identified. This Article concludes that (1) SEC and CFTC administrative proceedings likely are constitutional in most, but not all, respects and (2) there is a sound normative basis for reforming the
process. The Article recommends that the SEC modify its practices
for hiring ALJs and that the SEC and CFTC make major revisions to
their respective Rules of Practice.
I. ADMINISTRATIVE CREEP AT THE SEC AND CFTC
The first Part of this Article examines what prominent United
States District Judge Jed S. Rakoff has described as a classic case of
16
administrative creep —the recent trend for the SEC to utilize an
administrative forum for enforcement actions. As will be seen, this
trend is unmistakable at the SEC and the CFTC has declared its intent to follow suit. This Part also will examine the SEC’s home court
success and key aspects of the administrative process at the SEC and
CFTC.
A. The SEC Shift
The federal ALJ position was created by the Administrative Proce17
dure Act of 1946 (“APA”) and in the seven decades since then has
16

17

Judge Jed S. Rakoff, PLI Securities Regulation Institute Keynote Address, Is the S.E.C. Becoming a
Law Unto Itself?, at 6 (Nov. 11, 2014), https://securitiesdiary.files.wordpress.com/2014/
11/rakoff-pli-speech.pdf (“[I]t is hard to find a better example of what is sometimes disparagingly called ‘administrative creep’ than this expansion of the S.E.C.’s internal enforcement power.”).
Pub. L. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946). When the APA was enacted ALJs were called “hearing
examiners.” The title was changed by Congress to “Administrative Law Judge” in 1978.
See Pub. L. 95-251, 92 Stat. 183 (1978); United States Government Accountability Office,
GAO-10-14, Results-Oriented Cultures: Office of Personnel Management Should Review Administrative Law Judge Program to Improve Hiring and Performance Management 4 n.9 (Jan. 2010),
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-14 (stating that the APA established the position
of hearing examiner, which was changed to administrative law judge in 1978).
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become extraordinarily important. The more than 1600 federal ALJs
significantly outnumber Article III judges, preside over all formal adjudications within the executive branch, and annually decide more
18
than 250,000 cases. Many of these cases are decided by SEC ALJs.
The SEC has been using administrative proceedings for more than
forty years—even before its Division of Enforcement (“Division”) was
19
created in August 1972. But their use was limited. Prior to the enactment of Dodd-Frank in 2010 the SEC was restricted in both the
types of cases it could bring administratively and in the remedies it
20
could obtain in such proceedings. In large part as a function of these restrictions the SEC annually commenced only approximately 60%
21
of its new enforcement cases as administrative proceedings. During
fiscal years 1998–2009 this proportion remained relatively stable,
22
ranging between 47% and 62%.
Dodd-Frank § 929P(a) authorized the SEC to obtain in administrative proceedings remedies that are essentially identical to those it
23
can obtain in federal district court actions. This was the most signif18

19

20

21

22

23

Kent Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary, 66 VAND. L. REV. 797, 799, 852 (2013) (noting
that the number of ALJs is almost double the 874 Article III judges, that these ALJs decide more than 250,000 cases each year, and that they “hear evidence, decide factual issues, and apply legal principles in all formal administrative adjudications under the
[APA]”).
Andrew Ceresney, Remarks to the American Bar Association’s Business Law Section Fall Meeting
3 (Nov. 21, 2014) [hereinafter, Ceresney Remarks], http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/
Detail/Speech/1370543515297 (“[W]e have been using administrative proceedings
throughout the 42-year history of the Division of Enforcement, and the Commission used
them even before its enforcement activities were consolidated in one division.”).
This Article refers to administrative proceedings and cease-and-desist proceedings collectively as “administrative proceedings,” but they are distinct enforcement actions. In a majority of cases, an SEC enforcement action is commenced as both forms. Douglas Davison, Mathew Martens, Nicole Rabner, John Valentine & Natalie Rastin, Litigating with—
and at—the SEC, 48 REV. SEC. & COMMOD. REG. 103, 104–105 (2015) (explaining that
there are two kinds of enforcement actions, administrative proceedings and cease-anddesist proceedings, collectively known as administrative proceedings, and that most enforcement actions are initiated as both).
Gilley, Lazur & Vargas, supra note 2; cf. Sonia A. Steinway, Comment, SEC “Monetary Penalties Speak Very Loudly,” But What Do They Say? A Critical Analysis of the SEC’s New Enforcement
Approach, 124 YALE L.J. 209, 226 (2014) (noting that SEC civil cases “outnumbered administrative proceedings as recently as 2005”).
MARC B. DORFMAN & KENNETH B. WINER, SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT: COUNSELING AND
DEFENSE § 19.01 (2014) (“During fiscal years 1998 through 2009, the number of administrative proceedings as a percentage of total enforcement actions initiated remained relatively stable, ranging between 47% and 62%”). Cf. Urska Velikonja, Reporting Agency Performance: Behind the SEC’s Enforcement Statistics, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 964 (2016)
(stating that during the last fifteen years the SEC commenced approximately half of its
enforcement actions as APs).
15 U.S.C. § 78d-5 (2012). One remaining difference is that if the SEC seeks an order issued pursuant to Section 21(d)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act prohibiting a person
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icant expansion of the SEC’s authority to use administrative en24
forcement in its more than eighty-year history. Why did Congress
include § 929P(a) in the statute? The scant legislative history indicates that the SEC and Congress primarily hoped to enhance the Di25
vision’s efficiency —and administrative enforcement generally is
26
27
both quicker and less expensive —but Congress devoted little or no
time to considering the multiple ramifications of § 929P(a) when
Dodd-Frank was being shaped. Neither the House nor the Senate
28
debated the inclusion of this section.
The SEC has taken advantage of its new authority, although it did
not do so right away. Post-Dodd-Frank, the percentage of new enforcement actions the SEC has commenced administratively increased from 63% in fiscal year 2010 to 69% in fiscal year 2013, 81%

24

25
26

27

28

from serving as an office or director of a public company it can only obtain that order
from a federal judge. GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, The Dodd-Frank Act Reinforces and
Expands SEC Enforcement Powers (July 21, 2010), http://www.gibsondunn.com/
publications/pages/Dodd-FrankActReinforcesAndExpandsSECEnforcementPowers.aspx.
Chris Cox, The Growing Use of SEC Administrative Proceedings: An Historical Perspective from
Congress and the Agency, at 3, Speech Presented at Securities Enforcement Forum West
(May 13, 2015), http://www.securitiesdocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/201505-13-Speech-to-Securities-Enforcement-Forum-West-San-Francisco.pdf (noting that “the
most significant expansion of AP authority in the SEC’s 81-year history” was § 929P(a)).
Rakoff, supra note 16 (observing that SEC enforcement actions brought internally are
more efficient because discovery is much more limited).
See Cox, supra note 24, at 6 (“In an AP, the whole thing normally does get wrapped up
within 300 days, which would be very difficult to achieve in a civil trial.”); Peter J. Henning, Choosing the Battlefield in S.E.C. Cases, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (May 11, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/12/business/dealbook/choosing-the-battlefield-insec-cases.html?_r=0 (“The benefit of an administrative proceeding is a quicker resolution
because the S.E.C.’s rules generally mandate an initial decision within no more than 300
days of filing, far quicker than federal court cases that can take years to resolve.”). But see
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness, Examining U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission Enforcement: Recommendations on Current Processes and
Practices 16 (July 2015), http://www.centerforcapitalmarkets.com/wp-content/uploads/
2015/07/021882_SEC_Reform_FIN1.pdf (“[T]he overall period for completion of an
administrative proceeding is likely slower than the time required to complete a trial in
district court.”).
See Andrew Ceresney, Director, SEC Division of Enforcement, Keynote Speech at New
York City Bar 4th Annual White Collar Institute (May 12, 2015) [hereinafter, Ceresney Keynote Speech], http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ceresney-nyc-bar-4th-white-collar-keynote.html (noting that the SEC expends fewer resources in administrative proceedings
than it does in judicial proceedings).
Cox, supra note 24, at 3 (noting that § 929P(a) “was not even debated in either the House
or the Senate consideration of the bill”). Cf. QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN,
LLP, Circuit Courts Align to Shield SEC Administrative Proceedings from Collateral Attack (Aug.
2016), http://www.quinnemanuel.com/the-firm/news-events/article-august-2016-circuitcourts-align-to-shield-sec-administrative-proceedings-from-collateral-constitutional-attack/
(“The intent was clear—make the SEC’s authority in administrative proceedings ‘coextensive with its authority to seek penalties in Federal court.’”).
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in fiscal year 2014, and 81% in the first three quarters of fiscal year
29
2016. These percentages translate to hundreds of new administrative proceedings each year—in fiscal year 2015 the SEC commenced a
total of 807 new enforcement actions, up from 755 new actions in
30
2014.
The SEC’s shift to an administrative forum has been reflected in
three areas that it has designated as high priority for enforcement:
insider trading, violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(“FCPA”), and financial reporting fraud. The SEC announced its de31
cision in 2014 to increase its use of APs in insider trading cases soon
32
after it lost two such cases in federal district court. In fiscal year
2013 the SEC filed only 2% of its insider trading cases in-house, but
this figure increased to 23% in fiscal year 2014 and 35% in the first
33
half of fiscal year 2015. This translates to dozens of in-house proceedings—in fiscal year 2015 the SEC brought a total of eighty-seven
34
insider trading cases. The SEC’s preference to litigate insider trad29

30

31

32

33

34

CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY DIPS IN 2016 (Aug. 2016),
https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Research/SEC-Enforcement-Activity-Dips-in2016;
Gilley, Lazur & Vargas, supra note 2.
Jimmy Hoover, SEC Predicts Record Enforcement Levels Will Continue in 2016, LAW360 (Mar.
10, 2016, 3:10 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/769941/sec-predicts-recordenforcement-levels-will-continue-in-2016 (observing that the 807 new enforcement actions in 2015 topped the prior record high of 755 such actions in 2014).
Sarah N. Lynch, SEC to File Some Insider Trading Cases in its In-House Court, REUTERS (June
11, 2014, 4:12 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/11/us-sec-insidertradingidUSKBN0EM2DI20140611 (“The SEC’s planned shift follows a string of recent trial losses involving insider trading.”).
Michael S. Piwowar, Commissioner, Securities and Exchange Commission, Remarks at the
“SEC Speaks” Conference 2015: A Fair, Orderly, and Efficient SEC (Feb. 20, 2015),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/022015-spchcmsp.html
(commenting
that
“[a]nnouncement of this plan to increase the use of administrative proceedings in insider
trading cases followed the Commission’s loss in two insider trading cases in federal
court”).
Gilley, Lazur & Vargas, supra note 2. The statistics are less compelling if one considers
the venue for litigated insider trading cases. Since the beginning of fiscal year 2014 approximately 90% of the SEC’s litigated insider trading cases have been filed in federal
court. Ceresney Keynote Speech, supra note 25 (noting that, beginning in fiscal year 2014,
approximately 90% of the SEC’s litigated insider trading cases were filed in federal
court).
John C. Wander, New Records in SEC Enforcement Actions, HARV. LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORP.
GOV. & FIN. REG. (Nov. 14, 2015), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/11/14/newrecords-in-sec-enforcement-actions/. See also Robert Anello, Addressing the SEC’s Administrative “Home Court” Advantage in Enforcement Proceedings, FORBES (Sept. 7, 2015, 4:40 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2015/09/07/addressing-the-secs-administrativehome-court-advantage-in-enforcement-proceedings/ (“[I]nsider trading cases, traditionally heard by federal district judges, now routinely are brought before SEC administrative
law judges (ALJs).”).
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ing in-house is understandable. Such cases “are virtually the only cases that the SEC frequently litigates based simply on circumstantial ev35
idence.” The Division probably assumes, correctly, that an SEC ALJ
will be more receptive to such evidence than would a federal jury.
Indeed, from June 2013 to August 2014, twenty-one individuals prevailed against the SEC in thirteen insider trading cases commenced
36
in federal court, either on summary judgment or at trial. During
the same period, the SEC had only one trial win and prevailed only
37
once on summary judgment in insider trading cases.
The SEC’s preference to litigate insider trading in-house was wide38
ly expected to intensify following the Second Circuit’s 2014 decision
39
in Newman v. United States, which raised the bar for the government
40
to prove that an offense occurred.
In recent years enforcement of the FCPA has been a priority for
41
both the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the SEC, but the
35

36

37
38

39
40

41

Stephen J. Crimmins, Insider Trading: Where is the Line?, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 330,
362–63 (2013). Accord Joel M. Cohen, Mary Kay Dunning & Darcy Harris, SEC Plans to
Play Insider-Trading Cases on Home Court, NAT’L L.J. (Sept. 16, 2014) (“The SEC rarely has
the type of ‘smoking gun’ evidence presented in criminal insider-trading prosecutions;
there generally are no cooperating witnesses and no wiretaps or other directly incriminating evidence.”).
MORRISON & FOERSTER, LLP, 2014 Insider Trading Annual Review (Jan. 2015),
http://www.mofo.com/~/media/Files/ClientAlert/2015/02/150211InsiderTradingAnn
ualReview.pdf (contrasting wins against the SEC by twenty-one individuals in thirteen insider trading cases in federal court with the SEC’s one trial victory and one summary
judgment victory).
Id.
See, e.g., Michael R. McPhail & Daniel R. Kelley, Life After Newman: The SEC May Shift Toward Administrative Proceedings in Insider-Trading Cases, 47 BLOOMBERG BNA SEC. REG. & L.
REP. 2238 (Nov. 23, 2015), (anticipating increase in SEC use of administrative proceedings to litigate insider trading).
773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), abrogated by Salman v. United States, No. 15-628, 2016 WL
7078448 (U.S. Dec. 6, 2016).
Newman held that in order to sustain a conviction for insider trading, the government
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the tippee knew that an insider disclosed inside information and that he did so in exchange for personal benefit. Id. at 450. To
prove personal benefit the government must prove “a meaningfully close personal relationship that generates an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at
least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.” Id. at 452.
SHEARMAN & STERLING, LLP, Recent Trends and Patterns in FCPA Enforcement, FCPA DIGEST,
Jan. 2016, at iv, http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/NewsInsights/Publications/
2016/01/FCPA-Digest.pdf (“DOJ and SEC officials have made clear that the FCPA will
remain a priority for both agencies and we see no reason to question those officials’ sincerity.”). In 2015 the number of resolved FCPA enforcement actions dropped to its lowest level since 2006, but this decline appears to have been an outlier. The pace of enforcement activity increased sharply in 2016. Marc Alain Bohn & Michael Skopets, Uptick
in FCPA Enforcement Suggests 2015 Drop Was Outlier, LAW360 (May 18, 2016, 11:25 AM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/795489/uptick-in-fcpa-enforcement-suggests-2015-dropwas-outlier.
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Commission rarely utilized administrative proceedings in such cases
prior to the enactment of Dodd-Frank. Because it lacked authority to
impose civil monetary penalties in administrative actions, the SEC not
infrequently utilized a bifurcated approach, suing in federal court for
civil penalties while simultaneously seeking both disgorgement and a
42
cease-and-desist order from an in-house ALJ. Post-Dodd-Frank the
landscape has changed. In fiscal year 2011 the SEC filed only 20% of
its FCPA cases in-house, but this figure increased to 57% in fiscal year
43
2014 and 89% in the first half of fiscal year 2015. Many of the recent FCPA administrative proceedings exceed prior proceedings in
44
both size and scope. The SEC has described its use of administrative
45
proceedings in FCPA cases as “the new normal.”
The situation regarding financial reporting fraud is similar. Financial reporting has long been one of the SEC’s core focus areas.
But after a period of extensive enforcement activity in the early 2000s,
46
and a brief resurgence featuring stock option backdating cases, the
SEC’s focus in this area began to wane. During the period 2006–2012
the number of open SEC investigations concerning financial reporting or disclosure dropped from 304 to 124, while the number of cases
filed by the SEC in this subject area plummeted almost 70%, from
47
219 in 2007 to sixty-eight in 2013. The tide turned again in 2013,

42

43

44

45

46

47

Bruce E. Yannett, Andrew M. Levine & Steven S. Michaels, The Total S.A. Action: Are Administrative Orders the SEC’s FCPA Resolution of Choice for the Future?, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON,
LLP, 4 FCPA UPDATE, July 2013, at 1–2, 5–6, http://www.debevoise.com/~/
media/files/insights/publications/2013/07/fcpa%20update/files/view%20fcpa%20
update/fileattachment/fcpa_update_july_2013.pdf.
Gilley et al., supra note 2. See also SHEARMAN & STERLING, LLP, supra note 41, at v (“[T]he
majority of the SEC’s FCPA enforcement actions have been resolved using administrative
proceedings . . . .”).
Marc Alain Bohn, Are Administrative Proceedings the New Civil Complaint?, FCPA BLOG (May
6, 2014, 7:28 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2014/5/6/are-administrativeproceedings-the-new-civil-complaints.html#.
COVINGTON & BURLING, LLP, TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTI-CORRUPTION
ENFORCEMENT, 12 (Winter, 2015), https://www.cov.com/~/media/files/corporate/
publications/2015/01/trends_and_developments_in_anti-corruption_enforcement_
winter_2015.ashx.
See Quinn Curtis & Minor Myers, Do the Merits Matter? Empirical Evidence on Shareholder
Suits from Options Backdating Litigation, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 291, 306–10 (2016) (describing
the backdating scandal).
Randall J. Fons, SEC Investigations and Enforcement Related to Financial Reporting and Accounting, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOV’T AND FIN. REG. (Feb. 16, 2014),
http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/02/16/sec-investigations-and-enforcementrelated-to-financial-reporting-and-accounting/; MORRISON & FOERSTER, LLP, Annual Review 2013, FIN. REPORTING + ACCT., Jan. 2014, at 1, http://media.mofo.com/files/
Uploads/Images/140123-Financial-Reporting-Accounting-Enforcement-AnnualReview.pdf.
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when Mary Jo White became SEC chairwoman and the agency established a twelve-member Financial Reporting and Audit Task Force
dedicated to proactively detecting fraudulent or improper financial
48
reporting. The SEC doubled the number of its financial reporting
49
and disclosure enforcement actions between 2013 and 2015. In fiscal year 2015 these often complex actions represented 20% of the
SEC’s enforcement docket—the largest percentage in many years and
50
the single largest component of the agency’s 2015 docket.
The
SEC’s renewed focus in this area—no doubt aided by new technology
that enables the agency to “review terabytes of information in finan51
cial statements almost simultaneously” —has been accompanied by a
shift toward the use of administrative proceedings. Whereas during
the period 2011–2013 the SEC filed only 57% of its enforcement actions for financial reporting fraud and issuer disclosure violations as
administrative proceedings, this figure increased to 88% in fiscal year
52
53
2014 and the trend continued in 2015.
For multiple reasons the foregoing raw numbers overstate the
case. First, the SEC continues to try many cases in federal court. Indeed, in fiscal year 2014 the SEC tried more cases (thirty) in federal
54
court than in any of the prior ten years. The agency is likely to continue pursuing numerous enforcement actions in federal court, because such actions are more visible and function as an important de-

48

49

50
51

52
53

54

See William R. McLucas et al., Update: SEC’s Financial Reporting and Audit Task Force,
WILMER
CUTLER
PICKERING
HALE
&
DORR,
LLP
(Feb.
20,
2014),
https://www.wilmerhale.com/pages/publicationsandnewsdetail.aspx?
NewsPubId=10737423412 (describing the objectives, operations, and initiatives of the
Task Force); Marc J. Fagel & Courtney M. Brown, SEC Picks Up the Pace on Financial Reporting Fraud Efforts, LAW360 (Oct. 26, 2015, 11:03 AM), http://www.law360.com/
articles/717743/sec-picks-up-the-pace-on-financial-reporting-fraud-efforts (“The SEC’s
recent wave of filings should leave little doubt that the Division of Enforcement is intensely focused on identifying and bringing financial reporting cases.”).
Stewart Bishop, SEC Official Talks Up Sharp Accounting Fraud Focus, LAW360 (June 3, 2016,
9:25 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/803600/sec-official-talks-up-sharp-accounting
-fraud-focus.
Marc J. Fagel, SEC Enforcement by the Numbers, LAW360 (Mar. 8, 2016, 10:05 AM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/768287/sec-enforcement-by-the-numbers.
Robert F. Carangelo, Paul A. Ferrillo & Andrew Cauchi, Guest Post: The SEC’s Renewed Focus
on Financial Reporting and Financial Fraud, D&O DIARY (May 19, 2016),
http://www.dandodiary.com/2016/05/articles/securities-laws/the-secs-renewed-focuson-financial-reporting-and-financial-fraud/.
Gilley et al., supra note 2.
The SEC’s accounting and auditing enforcement releases (“AAERs”) serve as a prime indicator of enforcement activity in this area. In the first half of fiscal year 2015, 93% of the
SEC’s AAERs were filed as administrative proceedings, compared with 74% in the first six
months of fiscal year 2014 and 63% in the first six months of fiscal year 2013. Id.
Ceresney Remarks, supra note 19.
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terrent. Second, contrary to claims by some critics that the SEC has
shifted to administrative enforcement partly because it keeps losing
55
in federal district court, by May 2015 the SEC had won twelve of its
56
fourteen most recent jury trials. In fiscal year 2015 the SEC won all
57
six of its jury or bench trials.
Third, many SEC administrative proceedings are routine—they
include, for example, actions to suspend trading in companies whose
filings are not current, as well as follow-on actions to sanction brokers
or investment advisers previously found liable for securities laws viola58
tions.
A 2015 report concluded that the large number of these
mostly ministerial APs “has an enormous distorting impact on annual
59
statistics,” and it is difficult to quibble with that conclusion. In calendar year 2014 SEC ALJs issued 183 initial decisions. Of these, 119
terminated the registration of public companies for failure to file periodic reports (113 of which were resolved by a default order), and
forty-four were follow-on APs (all of which were resolved without a
hearing, in the form of default judgments or motions for summary
60
disposition). More recently, the percentage of SEC enforcement actions filed as follow-on actions declined significantly in fiscal year
61
2015, but so did the percentage of contested cases sent in-house by
the SEC. In fiscal year 2015, the SEC used its home court for 28% of
62
its contested cases, compared with 43% in 2014.
Fourth, the bulk of the post-Dodd-Frank increase in administrative
enforcement by the SEC is explained by an uptick in cases that are
63
filed as settled. This is true generally and with respect to the high
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56
57
58

59
60
61

62
63

See, e.g., Eaglesham, supra note 11 (quoting Joseph Grundfest, Professor, Stanford Law
School, for the proposition that by shifting to in-house enforcement the SEC “is not only
increasing its chances of winning but giving itself greater control over the future evolution of legal doctrine”).
Ceresney Keynote Speech, supra note 27.
Wander, supra note 34.
Henry Engler, SEC’s “Administrative Proceedings” Enforcements Dwarf Court Cases in 2015,
REUTERS (July 9, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatory-forum/2015/07/
09/secs-administrative-proceedings-enforcements-dwarf-court-cases-in-2015/.
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness, supra note 26,
at 12.
Id. at 13.
Ed Beeson, SEC Enforcement Surged to Record High in Fiscal Year 2015, LAW360 (Oct. 22,
2015, 3:13 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/717586/sec-enforcement-surged-torecord-high-in-fiscal-year-2015.
Jean Eaglesham, SEC Trims Use of Its In-House Judges, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 11, 2015, 9:00 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-trims-use-of-in-house-judges-1444611604.
Ceresney Keynote Speech, supra note 27 (“The vast majority of the uptick in the numbers of
actions we have brought as administrative proceedings are settled actions.”).
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priority subject areas of insider trading and FCPA violations. Indeed, in the first half of fiscal year 2016, 98% of public company and
related subsidiary defendants resolved their SEC enforcement actions
65
on the same day they were initiated, compared with 78% in 2010.
Resolving actions by filing them on the SEC’s home turf as settled
yields clear advantages for respondents. The dual risks that a federal
judge will reject the settlement or that a downstream contempt proceeding will stem from a federal injunction are negated, and there is
a public relations benefit arising from the perception that an administrative settlement is a less severe sanction than the settlement of
66
67
federal litigation. The SEC also benefits from enhanced efficiency
and negation of the risk that a federal judge will demand changes to
negotiated settlements, dismiss charges, or otherwise limit claims.
Moreover, the imposition of a cease-and-desist order in an FCPA administrative proceeding requires only that the SEC establish a likelihood that respondent will violate federal securities laws, as opposed
to the more stringent “reasonable likelihood” standard applicable to
68
issuance of an injunction. It is no surprise that “the settled action is
69
the SEC’s preferred technique in enforcement matters,” and during
the period 2002–2014 the SEC’s settlement rate remained constant at
70
about 98%.
While the raw numbers of administrative proceedings may overstate the case, the SEC has undeniably shifted enforcement to its
home court, and it has done so in areas it has designated as high pri71
ority for enforcement. The Division has almost unlimited discretion
64

65
66
67
68
69

70
71

Of the six insider trading cases filed by the SEC in the first half of fiscal year 2015, five
settled on the same day they were filed, whereas only five of the eleven cases commenced
in federal court during the same period settled on the same day. Gilley et al., supra note
2. Similarly, all of the FCPA cases commenced by the SEC as administrative proceedings
in 2013, 2014, and the first half of 2015 settled on the same day they were filed. Id.
Stephen Choi et al., supra note 6, at 5.
COVINGTON & BURLING, LLP, supra note 45.
See Ceresney Remarks, supra note 19 (“For settled matters, we often, but not always, choose
to file in an administrative forum, largely because of efficiency.”).
Yannett et al., supra note 42, at 3–5.
Cox, supra note 24, at 6. See also U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Center for Capital Markets
Competitiveness, supra note 26, at 24 (“Historically, the overwhelming majority of SEC
enforcement actions have been settled prior to filing.”).
Priyah Kaul, Note, Admit or Deny: A Call for Reform of the SEC’s “Neither-Admit-Nor-Deny” Policy, 48 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 535, 536 (2015).
But cf. Stephen J. Choi & Adam C. Pritchard, The SEC’s Shift to Administrative Proceedings:
An Empirical Assessment 1 (NYU Ctr. For Law, Econ. and Org., Working Paper No. 16-10,
2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2737105 (“[I]t does appear
that the SEC is using administrative proceedings to expand its enforcement efforts
against public companies. Post-Dodd Frank, the SEC has shifted toward costlier-toprosecute actions that may reflect weaker and/or less salient cases relative to pre-Dodd
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to choose where to litigate a case, subject to approval by the Commis72
sion. No provision of Dodd-Frank, the federal securities laws, or the
SEC’s Rules of Practice identifies the circumstances in which the SEC
73
“must, should or may select one forum or the other.” How does the
SEC exercise its discretion? Prior to 2015 the SEC provided few public clues about its choice of venue. In May 2015 the Division provided
the first formal guidance when its staff issued a four-page memorandum that outlines the Division’s approach to forum selection in con74
tested matters.
The widely criticized memorandum, which was not issued by the
75
Commission and thus does not represent Commission-level policy,
identifies four broad factors that the Division may consider in deciding whether to pursue an enforcement action in federal district court
or as an administrative proceeding before an SEC ALJ. The four factors are: (1) the “availability of the desired claims, legal theories, and
forms of relief in each forum”; (2) whether “any charged party is a
registered entity or an individual associated with a registered entity”;
(3) the “cost-, resource-, and time-effectiveness of litigation in each
forum”; and (4) the “fair, consistent, and effective resolution of secu76
rities law issues and matters.”
For multiple reasons the 2015 memorandum is of limited guidance to parties seeking clarity about the choice of forum. The Divi-

72

73

74

75
76

Frank administrative proceedings.”). See also Shaswat Das & Samuel Wolff, The Trump Administration’s Impact on Financial Regulation, LAW360 (Nov. 23, 2016, 9:58 AM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/865105/the-trump-administration-s-impact-on-financialregulation (speculating that use of SEC administrative enforcement will decline during
the Trump presidency).
Ceresney Keynote Speech, supra note 27 (noting that “there is no rigid formula dictating the
choice of appropriate forum” and that the Division “recommends a choice of forum in
each case but the Division’s recommendations are in all cases subject to review and approval by the Commission”).
Sarah S. Gold & Richard L. Spinogatti, Constitutional Challenges to SEC Administrative Proceedings, N.Y. L.J. (Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=
1202722840733/Constitutional-Challenges-to-SEC-Administrative-Proceedings?slreturn=
20150827215456. Accord Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276, 278 (2d Cir. 2016) (observing that
the choice of forum “belongs to the SEC without express statutory constraint”).
SEC, DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT, DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT APPROACH TO FORUM
SELECTION IN CONTESTED ACTIONS (May 8, 2015) [hereinafter, SEC Approach],
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcement-approach-forum-selectioncontested-actions.pdf. The SEC’s guidance does not apply in settled enforcement actions. Randall J. Fons, Administrative Proceedings vs. Federal Court: The SEC Provides Limited
Transparency into Its Choice of Forum, MORRISON & FOERSTER, LLP 1 n.1 (May 11, 2015),
http://www.mofo.com/~/media/Files/ClientAlert/2015/05/150511SECChoiceofForum
.pdf.
Cox, supra note 24, at 4.
SEC Approach, supra note 74.
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sion has indicated that the foregoing factors are not exhaustive, some
or all of them may be considered in a particular instance, and a single
77
factor may be dispositive. Accordingly, the document establishes no
78
fundamental limitations on the SEC’s exercise of discretion. Professor Joseph Grundfest noted the plasticity of the four factors and concluded that “the Commission could, as a practical matter, bring many
cases in either the administrative or federal forum while citing the
79
same four factors as support for its decision.”
The memorandum has sparked some controversy on additional
grounds. The fourth factor, which refers to the Commission’s “ex80
pertise” in securities matters, is a clear allusion to the SEC’s expectation that its rulings interpreting the federal securities laws are entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
81
Council, Inc. The Supreme Court held in Chevron that courts must
82
defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes,
and the post-Dodd-Frank SEC intends to take full advantage of Chevron by commencing enforcement actions as administrative proceedings which result in in-house rulings interpreting the federal securities laws. Public statements by the Division’s Director have confirmed
83
this intention.
77

78

79

80
81
82
83

See Ceresney Keynote Speech, supra note 27 (explaining the new guidance); Thomas A.
Hanusik, What’s Missing from the SEC’s Forum Selection Guidance, LAW360 (May 21, 2015,
10:34
AM),
http://www.crowell.com/files/Whats-Missing-From-The-SECs-ForumSelection-Guidance.pdf (describing the factors as non-exhaustive, non-mandatory, and
un-weighted); Cox, supra note 24, at 9 (“[T]he listing of some factors doesn’t exclude
other factors which aren’t listed. So the actual factors that matter most in your case
might not appear in this guidance at all.”).
See, e.g., LATHAM & WATKINS, LLP, Client Alert: SEC Enforcement Division Issues Guidance on
Venue Selection, (May 18, 2015), https://www.lw.com/thoughtleadership/lw-sec-guidancechoice-of-venue (“The Division’s Guidance does not appear to constrain meaningfully the
scope of the Division’s discretion in seeking—or the full Commission’s prerogative in deciding upon—a particular venue.”); Fons, supra note 74, at 1 (“The guidance, however,
ultimately provides the Division with virtually complete discretion in choosing the playing
field that will be most advantageous to its case and to its view of the ‘proper development
of the law.’”); Thomas O. Gorman, SEC Publishes a Memo on Forum Selection, SEC ACTIONS
(May 10, 2015, 7:48 PM), http://www.secactions.com/sec-publishes-a-memo-on-forumselection/ (“[T]his memorandum misses the mark. It offers virtually no insight into what
can only be viewed as a ‘black box’ process used by the agency to make these critical decisions.”).
Joseph A. Grundfest, Fair or Foul? SEC Administrative Proceedings and Prospects for Reform
Through Removal Legislation, 13–14 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance, Working Paper No.
212, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2695258.
SEC Approach, supra note 74.
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Id. at 842–43.
See, e.g., Ceresney Keynote Speech, supra note 27 (“If a contested matter is likely to raise unsettled and complex legal issues under the federal securities laws, or interpretation of the
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B. The CFTC Follows the Leader
The narrative of the CFTC’s use of administrative proceedings differs in important respects from that of the SEC. From its inception in
the mid-1970s to 1992, the CFTC was authorized to impose civil pen84
alties for violations of the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”)
through administrative proceedings and to commence proceedings
85
in federal court to enjoin violations. But it was not until the CEA
86
was amended by the Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992 and fed87
eral courts were authorized to impose civil penalties that the CFTC
had an effective choice of forum. Historically, the CFTC was significantly more likely to choose an administrative forum than a federal
one. During the 1990s, for example, the CFTC filed more administrative actions than district court actions every year, with the annual
88
percentage ranging between 55 and 80% of the CFTC’s filings.
Thereafter, the CFTC abandoned the use of contested administrative
proceedings. Prior to 2016, the last contested enforcement case filed
89
before a CFTC ALJ was in 2001. In late 2014 the CFTC reversed
course again when it announced its intent to follow the SEC’s lead
90
and move a portion of its contested enforcement docket in-house.
What factors explain the CFTC’s shifting strategy? The CFTC’s
Division of Enforcement (“CFTC Division”) has never publicly explained why it abandoned contested administrative proceedings in

84
85

86
87
88

89
90

Commission’s rules, it may make sense to file the case as an administrative proceeding so
a Commission decision on the issue, subject to appellate review in the federal courts, may
facilitate development of the law.”). See also William F. Johnson, Is it Time to Reconsider
“Chevron” Deference for SEC Proceedings?, N.Y. L.J. (July 2, 2015) (“The SEC has made clear
that in certain cases it specifically chooses an administrative forum to influence the development of the law.”).
7 U.S.C. §§ 1-27 (1992).
Dan M. Berkovitz, The Resurrection of CFTC Administrative Enforcement Proceedings: Efficient
Justice or a Biased Forum?, 35 FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP. 2, 5–7 (Mar. 2015),
https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Editorial/Publications/D
ocuments/the-resurrection-of-cftc-administrative-enforcement-proceedings.pdf.
Pub. L. 102-546, 106 Stat. 3590 (1992).
Id. at § 221.
Geoffrey F. Aronow, Back to the Future: The Use of Administrative Proceedings for Enforcement at
the CFTC and SEC, 35 FUTURES AND DERIVATIVES L. REP. 1–2 (Jan./Feb. 2015),
http://www.sidley.com/~/media/publications/fdlr_aa_aronow.pdf.
Berkovitz, supra note 85.
See Hoover, supra note 7 (“CFTC Enforcement Director Aitan Goelman said the agency
will ‘very soon’ follow the SEC’s shift to litigating enforcement actions in-house . . . .”);
Stephanie Russell-Kraft, Cash-Strapped CFTC Faces Troubled Return to Admin Court, LAW360
(Nov. 14, 2014, 3:28 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/595182/cash-strapped-cftcfaces-troubled-return-to-admin-court (reporting that the CFTC would soon bring enforcement actions in administrative forum).

Oct. 2016]

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

61

2001, but it is widely believed that its almost decade-long losing streak
91
before one of its own ALJs prompted it to throw in the towel. The
CFTC’s late-2014 announcement that it plans to resume administrative enforcement appears to be primarily a function of the agency’s
limited resources. While Dodd-Frank greatly expanded the CFTC’s
responsibilities, Congress has failed to provide the agency with the re92
sources it requires to fulfill its mandate. In 2015 the CFTC Division
had fewer staff than it did in 2002, when the agency’s responsibilities
did not include over-the-counter foreign currency transactions or the
93
94
$400 trillion swaps market.
The CFTC’s enforcement staff and
budget are both much smaller than their counterparts at the SEC—
even though the futures, options, and swaps markets regulated by the
CFTC are much larger than the securities market regulated by the
95
96
SEC —and the CFTC’s budget remained flat for fiscal year 2016.

91

92

93

94

95

Todd Mullins & Chris McEachran, Adjudication of FERC Enforcement Cases: “See You in
Court?”, 36 ENERGY L.J. 261, 289 (2015) (“The CFTC did not have the best success rate before its administrative courts, and has not brought an enforcement action administratively in over ten years . . . .”); Berkovitz, supra note 85; Ben James, Outgoing CFTC Judge Blasts
Colleague, Alleges Bias, LAW360 (Oct. 15, 2010, 6:54 PM), http://www.law360.com/
articles/201915/outgoing-cftc-judge-blasts-colleague-alleges-bias (recounting prior report
that in nearly 180 cases during an eight-year period, CFTC ALJ Bruce Levine ruled
against investors every time, except in a handful of cases in which defunct firms defaulted).
See, e.g., Sharon Bowen, Commissioner, CFTC, Speech Before the Futures Industry Association Expo 2014 (Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/
opabowen-1 (“[T]he Commission continues to face a crisis that has lasted for years:
chronic under-funding compared to the scope of its mission. . . . Our budget is insufficient, and the Commission and staff consistently have to make difficult choices about how
to allocate scarce resources amongst our many regulatory priorities.”); Ed Beeson, CFTC’s
Paltry Budget Spurs Quick End to Forex Probe, LAW360 (Nov. 12, 2014, 7:30 PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/595407/cftc-s-paltry-budget-spurs-quick-end-to-forexprobe (reporting that the budget crunch at the CFTC helped force the agency’s hand in
quickly settling with five banks concerning the manipulation of foreign currency exchange rates).
Timothy G. Massad, Chairman, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Testimony Before
U.S. Senate Comm. on Agric., Nutrition & Forestry (May 14, 2015), http://www.cftc.gov/
PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opamassad-22 (stating that the U.S. swaps market exceeds $400 trillion, measured by notional amount).
Sung-Hee Suh & Amanda Jawad, The ABCs of CFTC Enforcement Actions, 46 BLOOMBERG
BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1447 (Jul. 28, 2014) (explaining the scope of CFTC jurisdiction);
Paul M. Architzel et al., CFTC Enforcement Alert: 2014 CFTC Enforcement Year-in-Review, and a
Look Forward, WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE & DORR, LLP (Feb. 10, 2015),
https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Editorial/Publications/
WH_Publications/Client_Alert_PDfs/2014-cftc-enforcement-year-in-review.pdf.
See Zach Brez & Jon Daniels, The New Financial Sheriff: CFTC Anti-Fraud Authority After DoddFrank, 44 BLOOMBERG BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1209 (2012) (“The CFTC has received only a fraction of the resources that have been provided to the SEC.”).
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This unresolved resource issue helps explain the low level of en97
forcement activity at the CFTC —during the period 2000–2013 the
agency initiated a mere fifty-seven enforcement actions per year on
98
average, and in fiscal year 2015 the number increased only to sixty99
nine. The resource deficit also is driving the CFTC’s enforcement
shift. The CFTC’s Division Director has stated that the overwhelming
reason for the move to administrative enforcement is the agency’s
100
lack of resources and “bandwidth for discovery-intense litigation.”
Administrative enforcement typically is much cheaper for an agency
101
than federal litigation. But it is quite likely that the CFTC also has
been encouraged by the SEC’s excellent track record on its home
102
court.
More than a decade after the CFTC abandoned contested administrative enforcement it also ceased to employ ALJs. The agency last
103
employed an ALJ in 2012.
The CFTC has stated that when it resumes in-house enforcement it will use ALJs borrowed from other
104
agencies.
Initially, it appeared likely that the CFTC would borrow
ALJs from the SEC, at least in part because those judges are familiar
with the fraud standard provided to the CFTC in Dodd-Frank—a
standard very similar to the one used in SEC enforcement proceed-

96

97

98

99

100

101
102
103

104

Daniel Siegel, CFTC Chair Slams Congress for Denying Budget Bump, LAW360 (Aug. 17, 2015,
8:24 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/740471/cftc-chair-slams-congress-for-denyingbudget-bump.
See, e.g., John Kennedy, Slim CFTC Staffing Delays Enforcement Reviews, Report Says, LAW360
(Aug. 17, 2015, 9:43 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/691617/slim-cftc-staffingdelays-enforcement-reviews-report-says (reporting that inadequate staffing has hampered
CFTC enforcement reviews of derivatives exchanges).
Gregory S. Kaufman & Lillian A. Forero, Return to Normal? Dodd-Frank Authority Has Not
Resulted in More Enforcement Actions . . . Yet!, 47 BLOOMBERG BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. 605
(Mar. 23, 2015).
Ed Beeson, CFTC Enforcement Earns New Stripe After Besting SEC Haul, LAW360 (Nov. 6,
2015, 10:43 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/724227/cftc-enforcement-earns-newstripe-after-besting-sec-haul.
Hoover, supra note 7; Stephanie Russell-Kraft, Cash-Strapped CFTC Faces Troubled Return to
Admin Court, LAW360 (Nov. 14, 2014, 3:28 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/
595182/cash-strapped-cftc-faces-troubled-return-to-admin-court.
Jean Eaglesham, CFTC Turns Toward Administrative Judges, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 9, 2014, 5:49
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/cftc-turns-toward-administrative-judges-1415573398.
Kaufman & Forero, supra note 98 (“How could the CFTC not be attracted to a process
that has seen the SEC win 219 decisions before its ALJs?”).
See Stephanie Russell-Kraft, Cash-Strapped CFTC Faces Troubled Return to Admin Court,
LAW360 (Nov. 14, 2014, 3:28 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/595182/cashstrapped-cftc-faces-troubled-return-to-admin-court (noting that, unlike in the 1990s, the
CFTC no longer employs ALJs).
Id. (“[T]he CFTC will be ‘renting’ or ‘borrowing’ ALJs from other agencies that have
‘extra bandwidth.’”).
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105

ings.
The CFTC would not have been the only federal agency to
borrow SEC ALJs. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(“CFPB”)—another product of Dodd-Frank—has the option of
commencing enforcement actions in state or federal court or as ad106
ministrative proceedings before an ALJ, but it has no ALJs of its
107
own and thus it has borrowed from the SEC.
However, by late 2015 the CFTC was stymied. It had not been
able to borrow SEC ALJs, as a collateral consequence of constitutional attacks on the SEC’s enforcement program, and thus the CFTC
108
had not resumed administrative proceedings.
The situation remains static in 2016.
C. Home Court Advantage?
The SEC has enjoyed its home court advantage. It has been considerably more successful in administrative proceedings than in federal court. During the period October 2010 to September 2015, the
SEC prevailed against 86% of respondents in contested cases in ad109
ministrative proceedings, whereas it had a much lower success rate
110
The SEC’s inof 70% in federal court during the same period.
105

106

107

108

109

110

Kaufman & Forero, supra note 98; Zach Brez & Jon Daniels, The New Financial Sheriff:
CFTC Anti-Fraud Authority After Dodd-Frank, 44 BLOOMBERG BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1209
(June 18, 2012), (“The Dodd-Frank Act significantly strengthened the CFTC’s authority
to prohibit fraudulent and manipulative behavior by adopting an approach similar to
Rule 10b-5.”).
LATHAM & WATKINS, LLP, Client Alert White Paper No. 1782: CFPB Enforcement by the Numbers
(Dec. 22, 2014), https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/lw-cfpb-enforcement-bynumbers.
Jon Eisenberg, We’ve Only Just Begun—Lessons from the CFPB’s First 35 Enforcement Cases,
K&L GATES, LLP (Mar. 5, 2014), http://www.klgates.com/weve-only-just-begun-lessonsfrom-the-cfpbs-first-35-enforcement-cases-03-05-2014/ (“[T]he CFPB will request the SEC
to assign one of the three SEC administrative law judges to preside over the CFPB administrative proceeding.”).
Ed Beeson, CFTC Enforcement Chief Bemoans Lack of In-House Judges, LAW360 (Oct. 16, 2015,
8:10 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/715444/cftc-enforcement-chief-bemoanslack-of-in-house-judges (“‘It became much more difficult to source ALJs from other agencies because [of] all the sturm und drang around the SEC’s program . . . .’”) (quoting Aitan Goelman, Director of Enforcement, CFTC).
Eaglesham, supra note 8. But cf. Jean Eaglesham, SEC Judges are Finding Against Agency
More Often Lately, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 22, 2015, 9:01 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/secjudges-are-finding-more-often-for-agency-lately-1448243785 (reporting that the SEC’s success rate in APs declined in 2015 to 67%, with some cases still undecided); Joshua M.
Newville & Samantha Springer, Who Wins in Administrative Proceedings?, NAT’L L. REV.
(Aug. 8, 2016), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/who-wins-sec-administrativeproceedings (“Our analysis of ALJ opinions from October 2014 through the present reveals the SEC had only an 81% win rate in contested ALJ matters, while it prevailed in
91% of federal court trials over the same period.”).
Eaglesham, supra note 8.
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house success rate is not purely a recent phenomenon—the SEC prevailed in fifty-eight out of sixty-two administrative proceedings con111
ducted during the period 1983–1988. The recent statistics concerning appeals also are glaring. As noted, the first level of appeal in an
SEC administrative proceeding is to the SEC Commissioners. They
found in the agency’s favor in 95% of appeals during the period Oc112
tober 2010 to March 2015.
The raw statistics set forth above overstate the case, in a couple of
respects. First, the SEC records as a trial victory any case in which it
secures a finding of liability on any claim against any respondent,
even if it fails to secure such a finding with regard to the majority of
113
claims. Second, many of the SEC’s victories occur in such routine
114
matters as delisting proceedings. In calendar year 2014, SEC ALJs
issued 183 initial decisions, 119 of which terminated the registration
of public companies for failure to file periodic reports. The SEC pre115
vailed in all 119 of these APs, which means that 65% of the SEC’s
success rate in 2014 APs is attributable to its success in routine delisting actions.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is undeniable that the SEC enjoys considerably more success on its home court than it does in fed116
eral court. The same cannot be said of the CFTC. As noted, since
the early 2000s the CFTC has filed all of its contested enforcement
cases in federal court, and one common explanation is that the
Commission had become discouraged by its long losing streak in

111
112

113

114
115
116

Comm. on Fed. Reg. of Sec., Report of Task Force on the SEC Administrative Law Judge Process,
47 BUS. LAW. 1731, 1734 (1992) [hereinafter, Task Force Report].
Eaglesham, supra note 11. See also Adam M. Wolper & Heidi VonderHeide, The SEC’s Increased Use of Administrative Proceedings in Enforcement Actions: Background, Controversies, and
Future Outlook, 17 J. INVESTMENT COMPLIANCE 17, 19 (2016) (“ALJ findings against respondents who appeal to the Commission are rarely reversed; in fact, respondents are far
more likely to see their sanctions or penalties increased on appeal, rather than reduced.”).
But cf. Ceresney Remarks, supra note 19, at 3 (“I would challenge anyone to identify a case in
which an ALJ erroneously ruled for us where the Commission did not reverse the decision.”).
See Ceresney Keynote Speech, supra note 27; Davison et al., supra note 20, at 104 n.4. See also
Jean Eaglesham, Senior SEC Official Calls Claims of Advantage at In-House Tribunal ‘Garbage,’
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 19, 2016, 5:52 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/senior-sec-officialcalls-claims-of-advantage-at-in-house-tribunal-garbage-1455922322 (noting that in many
in-house cases that are not dismissed, the SEC fails to obtain all of the remedies that it
seeks).
Davison et al., supra note 20, at 104.
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness, supra note 26,
at 13.
See Aronow, supra note 88 (“[I]t would be hard to deny that, generally speaking, there is a
significant ‘home-court advantage’ to the administrative route.”).
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117

front of one of its own ALJs. Additional evidence suggests that the
CFTC has not enjoyed home court success. A 1995 study by the General Accounting Office found that the CFTC ruled on forty-eight appeals of ALJ enforcement decisions during the period 1989–1993,
modified sanctions in almost 40% of those cases, and reduced sanc118
tions in almost 80% of the cases in which modifications occurred.
Finally, one review of the CFTC’s handling of complex market manipulation cases in the 1970s and 1980s found that the record does
not support the view that the agency enjoys any home court ad119
vantage when bringing such cases.
D. SEC and CFTC Procedures
In order to understand the constitutional arguments concerning
the use of administrative proceedings by the SEC and CFTC it is essential to first understand the process used by those two agencies.
The next part of this Article examines the administrative process. As
will be seen, the agencies enjoy a number of procedural advantages.
The SEC uses its superior position as leverage during settlement dis120
cussions with potential respondents.
1. SEC
SEC administrative proceedings are governed by the SEC’s Rules
121
of Practice (“SEC RoP”), which prior to 2016 had not been amend122
ed since 2006 —four years before Dodd-Frank greatly expanded the

117
118

119
120

121
122

See text accompanying notes 88–91 supra.
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFF., ADMIN. LAW JUDGES: COMPARISON OF SEC AND CFTC
PROGRAMS 29, Report No. GGD-96-27 (Nov. 1995) [hereinafter, GAO Report],
http://www.gao.gov/assets/230/221858.pdf.
Berkovitz, supra note 85, at 8.
See, e.g., Peter Hardy, Abe Rein & Carolyn Kendall, SEC ALJs: An Enforcement Fast-Track is
Hitting the Constitutional Skids, WHITE COLLAR CRIME PROF BLOG (Aug. 13, 2015),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime_blog/2015/08/sec-aljs-anenforcement-fast-track-is-hitting-the-constitutional-skids.html (“Anecdotal reports also
strongly suggest that the SEC has invoked its perceived advantages before ALJs during settlement negotiations with potential respondents.”); Stephanie Russell-Kraft, Ceresney Defends In-House Courts to Skeptical Lawmakers, LAW360 (Mar. 19, 2015, 3:47 PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/631232/ceresney-defends-in-house-courts-to-skepticallawmakers (“[T]he SEC has threatened defendants with administrative proceedings before settling.”).
Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The SEC RoP are codified at 17 C.F.R. §§
201.100 et seq. (2006).
See Securities and Exchange Commission, Adoption of Amendments to the Rules of Practice and Related Provisions and Delegations of the Authority of the Commission, Release
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SEC’s authority to use an administrative forum. Neither the Federal
123
Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) nor the Federal Rules of Evi124
dence (“FRE”) apply.
The SEC administrative procedures outlined below governed APs
initiated on or before September 27, 2016. Amendments to the SEC
RoP took effect the next day, and they made incremental changes to
the process, as described in Part IV.D below. The SEC commences an
administrative proceeding with an Order Instituting Proceedings
(“OIP”), which contains the Division’s allegations against the respondent(s) and serves as the charging document. A respondent has
thirty days from service of the OIP to file an answer.
There is no provision in the SEC’s RoP for making a motion to
dismiss, asserting a counterclaim, or moving for summary judgment.
The closest analogue to a summary judgment is a motion for sum125
mary disposition under Rule 250(b). Either side may make such a
motion, but in general the facts alleged in the pleadings of the party
126
against whom the motion is made “shall be taken as true” and the
comment to Rule 250 suggests that summary disposition prior to
127
hearing would rarely be appropriate.
The SEC disfavors summary
disposition even where the sole question presented is legal, rather
128
In practice, respondents’ motions are very rarely
than factual.
129
granted.
Summary disposition in favor of the Division is often
granted in uncontested proceedings or in a follow-on action by the
Division seeking such relief as an industry bar, after a respondent has
130
already been enjoined or convicted. Apart from a Rule 250 motion,

123
124
125
126
127
128
129

130

Nos. 34-52846, File No. S7-05-05 (Nov. 29, 2005), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/3452846.pdf (indicating effective date of Jan. 4, 2006).
Davison et al., supra note 20, at 109 (“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply
in SEC administrative hearings.”).
Id. at 110 (“The Federal Rules of Evidence also do not apply in SEC administrative hearings.”).
SEC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.250(b) (2016).
Id. at § 201.250.
SEC Rules of Practice, 60 Fed. Reg. 32,767, 32,768, cmt. (June 23, 1995) (codified as 17
C.F.R. 201.250).
DORFMAN & WINER, supra note 22, at § 19.04(12).
Theodore B. Olson, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule on Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 14, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER, LLP (Dec. 4, 2015),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-18-15/s71815-8.pdf (noting that since 1995 ALJs have
granted only a handful of motions for summary disposition filed by respondents); Luke
T. Cadigan, Litigating an SEC Administrative Proceeding, 58 BOSTON BAR J., Winter 2014,
http://bostonbarjournal.com/2014/01/07/litigating-an-sec-administrative-proceeding/
Cadigan, supra note 129.
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there is very little other motion practice in SEC administrative pro131
ceedings.
The SEC RoP provide that an administrative proceeding can be
heard by the Commission or by a hearing officer duly designated by
132
the Commission. In virtually all cases the OIP specifies that the case
133
134
is assigned to an SEC ALJ. There is no right to a jury trial. The
2003 amendments to the SEC RoP require the OIP to state whether
the SEC ALJ has 120, 210, or 300 days from the OIP service date in
which to complete his or her initial decision. There are no other options. The selection of one of the three options is based on the “na135
ture, complexity, and urgency of the subject matter.” The majority
of contested SEC administrative proceedings are sufficiently complex
136
to warrant the 300-day timeline.
When that timeline does apply,
the ALJ is required by the SEC RoP to schedule the hearing for a date
approximately four months from service of the OIP. If the timeline is
210 days then the hearing must be scheduled for a date approximately two and a half months from service of the OIP, and if it is 120 days
then the hearing must occur within approximately one month from
137
service.
There is very limited discovery during an SEC administrative proceeding. In general, neither interrogatories nor discovery deposi138
tions are allowed. This is true even in complex cases where the Division may have conducted dozens of on-the-record examinations of
131

132
133
134
135
136

137
138

Id. (“[M]ost motions are disfavored or not even permitted . . . .”). One exception is that a
respondent may file a motion for a more definite statement with an answer. SEC Rules of
Practice, 17 C.F.R. 201.220(d) (2016).
SEC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. 201.100 (2016) (specifying procedures when an ALJ has
been selected as the hearing officer).
DORFMAN & WINER, supra note 22, at § 19.04(1).
Ironridge Global IV, Ltd. v. SEC, 146 F. Supp. 3d 1294, 1298 (N.D. Ga. 2015).
SEC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. 201.360(a)(2) (2016).
Cadigan, supra note 129. One review found that the SEC has largely reserved the 120-day
track for proceedings designed to suspend or revoke the registration of stock where the
issuer had failed to file annual or periodic reports, whereas the 210-day track has been
utilized by the SEC for follow-on APs to sanction brokers or investment advisers previously found liable for securities laws violations. See Christian J. Mixter, Defending an SEC Administrative Proceeding, ALI-ABA BUSINESS L. COURSE MATERIALS J. 51, 53 (June 2008),
http://files.ali-aba.org/thumbs/datastorage/lacidoirep/articles/CMJ0806Mixter_thumb.pdf.
SEC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. 201.360(a)(2) (2016).
DORFMAN & WINER, supra note 22, at § 19.04(6) (2014); SEC Rules of Practice, 60 Fed.
Reg. 32,738, 32,765, cmt. (June 23, 1995) (codified as 17 C.F.R. § 201.233) (depositions
“are not allowed for purposes of discovery”). Rule 221(c) of the SEC RoP, which concerns subjects to be discussed at the prehearing conference, suggests the possibility that
written interrogatories could be authorized, but this is not a matter of right. U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness, supra note 26, at 59 n.74.
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fact witnesses before the OIP was filed. Depositions upon oral or
written examination may be allowed after the OIP has been filed if a
party believes the witness will be unable to attend or testify at the
139
hearing, but the ALJ retains discretion to deny such requests. ALJs
140
seldom allow depositions.
The scope of permissible discovery is primarily defined by Rule
230(d), which requires the Division to commence turning over its investigative files to respondents within seven days of service of the
141
OIP. The Division may withhold four categories of documents, including documents protected by a privilege or by the attorney work
product doctrine and documents disclosing the identities of confi142
143
dential sources. Pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, which the SEC has
chosen to apply in administrative proceedings, the Division may not
withhold documents containing material exculpatory evidence. In
addition, Rule 232 provides for the pre-hearing production of docu144
ments pursuant to subpoena.
A party may serve subpoenas for
documents on anyone, including a third-party or the SEC. The SEC
RoP require issuance unless the subpoena is “unreasonable, oppres145
sive, excessive in scope, or unduly burdensome,” but in practice
ALJs often decline to issue subpoenas or choose to significantly nar146
row their scope.
As noted, the FRE do not apply to SEC administrative proceedings. The FRE serve as a general guide for the admission of evi147
dence, but SEC ALJs are expected to admit all evidence which “can
148
conceivably throw any light upon the controversy.”
Hearsay is ad-

139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146

147
148

SEC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.233 (2016).
Arthur F. Mathews, Litigation and Settlement of SEC Administrative Enforcement Proceedings, 29
CATH. U. L. REV. 215, 253 (1980).
SEC Rules of Practice, 60 C.F.R. §201.230(d) (2016).
Id. at § 201.230(b); SEC Rules of Practice, 60 Fed. Reg. 32,738, 32,762, cmt. (b), (1995).
373 U.S. 83, 91 (1963).
SEC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.232 (2016).
Id.
See U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness, supra note
26, at 20 (“[T]he rigorous deadlines for completion of a proceeding often result in ALJ
reluctance to delay a hearing by approving the issuance of subpoenas.”); Ryan S. Stippich,
Constitutional and Strategic Considerations Regarding SEC Enforcement Actions Following DoddFrank, ASPATORE (Apr. 2016), 2016 WL 2989433, at *6 (“[S]ubpoenas are often limited
strictly to information limited by the allegations in the charging document. It is common
for ALJs to limit the scope of document subpoenas on their own accord, even without objection by the Division or the subpoenaed party.”). But see DORFMAN & WINER, supra note
22, at § 19.04(10) (describing issuance of subpoenas by SEC ALJs as “liberal”).
GAO Report, supra note 118, at 19.
Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1302 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (citations and quotations omitted), vacated on other grounds, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016).
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missible and can provide the basis for a finding that a securities viola149
tion has occurred. ALJs are required to exclude all evidence that is
150
“irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious,” but this restriction
has no practical significance—ALJs “tend to admit the vast majority of
151
evidence offered by the parties,” with most evidentiary battles con152
cerning credibility and weight, rather than admissibility.
The ALJ issues the initial decision on the merits and the requested
relief approximately two months after post-hearing briefing is com153
pleted. Any party may appeal the initial decision. The first level of
154
appeal is to the SEC itself, and this is known formally as a petition
for Commission review. The Commission has the discretion to de155
cline to grant most petitions for review, but apparently it has never
156
denied a timely petition.
Alternatively, it can decide sua sponte to
157
review an initial decision even if no party seeks review. There is no
statutorily prescribed standard for Commission review of ALJ deci158
sions.
In practice, the Commission conducts a de novo review of
159
both conclusions of law and findings of fact and may accept or hear
160
additional evidence. Because the review is de novo the Commission
161
may make its own credibility determinations.
In short, under the
162
APA, the SEC is omnipotent when it comes to ALJ decisions. The
ALJ’s initial decision becomes final if no appeal has been filed, the
149

150
151
152
153
154
155
156

157
158
159
160
161

162

See, e.g., Guy P. Riodan, Securities Act Release Nos. 33-9085, 34-61153, 97 SEC Docket
1337, 1348 (Dec. 11, 2009); Scott Epstein, Exchange Release No. 34-59328, 95 SEC Docket 285, 295 (Jan. 30, 2009).
SEC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.320 (2016).
Davison et al., supra note 20, at 110.
Id.
Cadigan, supra note 129.
See Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 12–13 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (explaining the SEC AP process).
SEC Rules of Practice § 201.411(b)(2) (2016) (stating that the Commission may decline
all petitions for review other than those listed in § 201.411(b)(1)).
See Raymond J. Lucia Cos., Inc., Admin. Proc. File No. 3-15006, Securities Exchange Act
Rel. No. 75837, at 30 (Sept. 3, 2015), pet. denied, Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, No. 151345, 2016 WL 4191191 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 9, 2016) (“[W]e are unaware of any cases which
the Commission has not granted a timely petition for review.”).
SEC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.410, 201.411(c) (2016).
GAO Report, supra note 118, at 20.
DORFMAN & WINER, supra note 22, at § 19.06(2).
SEC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.411(a), 201.452 (2016).
Davison et al., supra note 20, at 112. However, the SEC will accept the ALJ’s credibility
finding, absent overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Ironridge Global IV, Ltd. v. SEC,
146 F. Supp. 3d 1294, 1298 (N.D. Ga. 2015).
James E. Moliterno, The Administrative Judiciary’s Independence Myth, 41 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1191, 1225 (2006). In practice, however, the Commission typically does not secondguess credibility determinations by ALJs. See, e.g., Robert Thomas Clawson, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-48143, 80 SEC Docket 1767, 1769 (July 9, 2003) (“We accept a fact finder’s credibility finding, absent overwhelming evidence to the contrary . . . .”).
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Commission has not ordered review on its own initiative, and the
163
Commission has issued an order of finality.
The Commission alone possesses the authority to issue a final or164
der.
When review by the Commission does occur it is not unduly
delayed. For the six-month period ending March 31, 2016, the median age of initial decisions by ALJs was 385 days at the point of disposi165
tion by the Commission.
This represented a slight improvement
166
from the 399 days for the comparable period in 2015.
Any respondent may appeal an adverse final order by the Commission to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
or for the circuit in which the respondent resides or has his or her
167
principal place of business. An initial appeal to the Commission is
168
a prerequisite to a subsequent judicial appeal. The Division cannot
169
seek judicial review of an adverse ruling. On appeal, the findings of
fact by the Commission are conclusive if supported by substantial evi170
dence. This means that the findings need only be supported by ev171
idence sufficient to support a reasonable fact-finder’s decision.
172
The
This is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.
173
standard is “extremely deferential,” requires an appellate court to
uphold the Commission’s findings unless the evidence presented
174
would compel a reasonable finder of fact to reach a contrary result,

163
164
165

166
167

168
169
170
171
172
173

174

SEC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.360(d)(2) (2016).
Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 12–13 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Bennett v. SEC, 151 F. Supp. 3d 632,
641 (D. Md. 2015) (noting that the SEC alone possesses authority to issue a final order).
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Report on Administrative Proceedings for the Period
October 1, 2015 through March 31, 2016, Rel. No. 77733 (Apr. 27, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/special-studies/34-77733.pdf.
Id.
See Jarkesy, 803 F.3d at 13 (stating that according to the Exchange Act, review may be
sought in the D.C. circuit, or the circuit court where defendant either resides or has a
principal place of business); Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765, 768 (7th Cir. 2015); 15 U.S.C. §
78y(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77i (2012).
SEC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.410(e) (2006).
DORFMAN & WINER, supra note 22, at § 19.06(1).
15 U.S.C. § 80b-13(a) (2012); Montford & Co., Inc. v. SEC, 793 F.3d 76, 81 (D.C. Cir.
2015).
Birkelbach v. SEC, 751 F.3d 472, 478 (7th Cir. 2014).
Gebhart v. SEC, 595 F.3d 1034, 1043 (9th Cir. 2010).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Russell G. Ryan, The Equity Façade of SEC
Disgorgement, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE (2013), http://www.hblr.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/11/Ryan__The-Equity-Fa%C3%A7ade-of-SEC-Disgorgement.pdf (describing appellate review of SEC administrative enforcement as limited and deferential). The
appellate court’s review is slightly less deferential where the Commission has reached a
conclusion contrary to that of the ALJ. Flannery v. SEC, 810 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2015).
Gebhart, 595 F.3d at 1043.
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and helps explain why successful appeals are rare.
The Commis176
sion’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo and may be set aside
only if they are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or other177
wise not in accordance with law.
The penalties imposed by the
Commission also are reviewed under an abuse of discretion stand178
ard. The court of appeals has the option to remand for further fac179
tual development.
2. CFTC
The SEC’s RoP have served as a model for other federal agencies,
180
including the CFPB, and they are similar to the CFTC’s Rules of
181
Practice (“CFTC RoP”), which govern CFTC administrative pro182
ceedings and were last amended in 1998.
CFTC APs begin with a
complaint and notice of hearing, authorized by the CFTC Commis183
The CFTC RoP
sioners on recommendation of the CFTC staff.
permit depositions only if the prospective witness will be unable to attend or testify at a hearing, the testimony is material, and it is neces184
sary to take the deposition in the interests of justice. Any party may
apply to a CFTC ALJ for issuance of a subpoena requiring testimony

175

176
177
178
179

180

181
182

183
184

Russell G. Ryan, The SEC as Prosecutor and Judge, WALL. ST. J. (Aug. 4, 2014),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/russell-g-ryan-the-sec-as-prosecutor-and-judge-1407195362
(“But appeals rarely succeed because the law requires courts to defer to the agency’s
judgment, especially on disputed facts.”).
Gebhart, 595 F.3d at 1040.
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012); Rapoport v. SEC, 682 F.3d 98, 103 (D.C. Cir. 2012); KPMG,
LLP v. SEC, 289 F.3d 109, 121 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
World Trade Fin. Corp. v. SEC, 739 F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 2014).
See, e.g., Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (explaining that in the event that
an appellate court finds the administrative record inadequate it always has an option of
“remanding to the agency for further factual development”); John Doe, Inc. v. DEA, 484
F.3d 561, 569–70 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (stating that “where an insufficient administrative record is crippling, a court of appeals always has the option of . . . remanding to the agency
for further factual development”).
The CFPB release adopting its Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings references
the SEC RoP sixty-six times. Jon Eisenberg, We’ve Only Just Begun—Lessons from the CFPB’s
First 35 Enforcement Cases, K&L GATES LLP (Mar. 5, 2014), http://www.klgates.com/weveonly-just-begun-lessons-from-the-cfpbs-first-35-enforcement-cases-03-05-2014/.
The CFTC RoP appear in 17 C.F.R. §§ 10.1-10.114 (2010). The CFTC’s Rules relating to
Investigations appear in 17 C.F.R. §§ 11.1-11.8 (2015).
See 63 Fed. Reg. 55784 (CFTC Oct. 19, 1998) (indicating the amendments adopted in
1998 were intended to facilitate communication and enhance other administrative duties
of the CFTC).
ALAN R. BROMBERG, LEWIS D. LOWENFELS & MICHAEL J. SULLIVAN, 6 BROMBERG &
LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES FRAUD § 12:157 (2d ed. database updated Nov. 2014).
17 C.F.R. § 10.44(a) (2015).
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at hearing or the production of documents, but the CFTC lacks in185
dependent authority to enforce subpoenas.
The AP is conducted before an ALJ, with staff members (usually
186
187
from the CFTC Division) acting as prosecutors. There is no jury.
Although the CFTC is not bound to follow the FRE, it looks to those
rules for guidance in determining whether certain evidence is admis188
sible. Any party may appeal a final disposition by an ALJ. The first
level of appeal is to the CFTC Commissioners, who determine sanc189
tions de novo.
A further appeal may be taken to a federal court of appeals if the
proceeding results in an order for the imposition of a civil penalty,
the suspension of trading privileges, or the suspension or revocation
190
of a registration. Pre-Dodd-Frank the standard of review for factual
findings by the CFTC was whether they were supported by the weight
of the evidence. This standard, which was set forth in Section 6(c) of
the CEA, was deleted when Congress amended 6(c) with Dodd191
Frank.
Post-Dodd-Frank the standard of review is likely to be sup192
plied by the APA, which sets forth a substantial evidence standard.
193
The standard of review for legal questions is plenary, subject to
Chevron deference for those questions within the CFTC’s area of ex194
pertise.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ATTACKS ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
Defendants have launched a broad array of constitutional attacks
on the use by the SEC and CFTC of administrative proceedings. Five
of the primary areas of attack concern due process, equal protection,
the Seventh Amendment, and two distinct aspects of Article II of the
U.S. Constitution. The multiple areas of attack are examined separately below.

185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194

Berkovitz, supra note 85.
BROMBERG ET AL., supra note 183, at § 12:157.
Id.
Berkovitz, supra note 85, at 6.
In re Grossfeld, CFTC No. 89-23, 1996 WL709219 at ¶26,921 (Dec. 10, 1996).
7 U.S.C. § 9(11) (2012).
Berkovitz, supra note 85.
Id.
See, e.g., Lehoczky v. CFTC, 125 F.3d 844, at *1 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Armstrong v. CFTC,
12 F.3d 401, 403 (3d Cir. 1993).
See, e.g., DiPlacido v. CFTC, 364 Fed. App’x 657, 661 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[W]here a question
implicates Commission expertise, we defer to the Commission’s decision if it is reasonable.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Oct. 2016]

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

73

A. Due Process
1. Combination of Functions
Due process arguments against the use of administrative proceedings by the SEC have taken several forms. One common form is that
the vesting of investigative, prosecutorial, and adjudicative functions
195
in a single agency constitutes a due process violation. Criticism of
196
the SEC’s combination of functions has been asserted for decades,
but the constitutional argument has no merit. To begin, the combination of functions does not create a statutory violation. The APA
prohibits agency staff from combining prosecutorial and adjudicative
functions in the same case, but it expressly exempts both the agency
197
and agency members from this prohibition. The original rationale
for this carve-out was that, in order to set agency-wide policy, agency
governing bodies must be able to weigh in on both prosecutions and
198
adjudications.
The absence of a statutory violation is mirrored by the absence of
a constitutional violation. Both the Supreme Court and federal appellate courts have repeatedly held that the vesting of multiple functions in a single agency does not, without more, constitute a due pro199
cess violation. The leading case is Withrow v. Larkin, decided in
1975. In Withrow the Supreme Court rejected a claim that a state
agency’s power to investigate and adjudicate the same matter created
a due process violation. The Court stated: “The initial charge or determination of probable cause and the ultimate adjudication have
different bases and purposes. The fact that the same agency makes
them in tandem and that they relate to the same issues does not re200
sult in a procedural due process violation.” Withrow either strongly
195

196
197
198
199
200

See Stephen Bainbridge, Should the SEC be Prosecutor, Judge, Jury, and Executioner?,
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM, Oct. 21, 2014, http://www.professorbainbridge.com/
professorbainbridgecom/2014/10/should-the-sec-be-prosecutor-judge-jury-andexecutioner.html (suggesting that the combination of functions may constitute a due
process violation). See also John Falvey & Daniel Tyukody, Duka Will Slow, Not Stop, SEC’s
In-House Court Trend, LAW360 (Sept. 8, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/699283/
duka-will-slow-not-stop-sec-s-in-house-court-trend (“[D]efendants have complained that in
its in-house courts, the SEC acts as prosecutor, judge, jury, and the first line of appellate
review.”).
See Walfish, supra note 10 (noting intermittent criticism for nearly seventy years).
5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2012).
Walfish, supra note 10.
421 U.S 35, 36–37 (1975).
Id. at 58. See also Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 1231, 1249 (1994) (“The post-New Deal Supreme Court has never seriously questioned the constitutionality of this combination of functions in agencies.”); Kevin M.
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suggested or settled the permissibility of the APA-sanctioned multiple
function regime under the U.S. Constitution. In Blinder, Robinson &
201
Co. v. SEC, the D.C. Circuit, citing Withrow, rejected a due process
202
challenge to the SEC’s use of administrative proceedings.
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) is another federal agency
which serves as an investigator, prosecutor, and judge. Apart from
requests for preliminary injunctions filed in federal district court to
203
enjoin proposed mergers pending administrative adjudication,
204
most of the FTC’s cases are adjudicated by an FTC ALJ, whose findings may be appealed to the five FTC Commissioners, who also au205
thorize investigations and the issuance of complaints.
The FTC’s
multiple roles have prompted criticism very similar to that which has
206
been leveled against the SEC, but judicial challenges have failed. In
207
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, the Tenth Circuit rejected a due process challenge to the FTC’s structure. The court noted that Congress
designed the FTC to combine the functions of investigator, prosecutor, and judge and “the courts have uniformly held that this feature
does not make out an infringement of the due process clause of the
208
Fifth Amendment.”
The D.C. Circuit also has rejected a due pro209
cess challenge to the FTC’s multiple roles.

201
202
203

204
205

206

207
208
209

Stack, Agency Independence After PCAOB, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2391, 2397 (2011) (“The
Court has consistently rejected challenges to combination of functions in federal administrative agencies as violating due process.”).
837 F.2d 1099, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
Id. at 1104–07.
See Neal R. Stoll & Shepard Goldfein, The FTC: Court of the Star Chamber?, N.Y. L.J. (July 15,
2008), https://www.skadden.com/insights/ftc-court-star-chamber (describing generally
the merger challenge process).
Bert Foer, The Fairness Debate in the U.S., at 2 (June 28, 2014),
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/content/foer-presents-ascola-conference-warsaw).
See, e.g., David A. Balto, The FTC at a Crossroads: Can it Be Both Prosecutor and Judge?, 28 (No.
12) LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, 1, 1–3 (Aug. 23, 2013), http://www.dcantitrustlaw.com/0823-13Balto_LB.pdf (“The FTC acts as both prosecutor and judge in administrative litigation. . . . [T]he FTC’s almost two decade history of always ruling in its own favor creates a
strong impression of unfairness.”). The FTC’s decisions can be appealed to the federal
court of appeals. Shepard Goldfein & James A. Keyte, Merger Review at FTC and Department
of Justice, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 9, 2014), https://www.skadden.com/sites/default/files/
publications/070121417Skadden.pdf.
See, e.g., Nicole Durkin, Essay, Rates of Dismissal in FTC Competition Cases from 1950–2011
and Integration of Decision Functions, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1684, 1686 (2013) (“One criticism in particular has persisted throughout the years: that the FTC’s role as both prosecutor and adjudicator compromises the fairness of its adjudicatory functions.”).
Kennecott Cooper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67, 79 (10th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 79.
FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Schs., 404 F.2d 1308, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (“It is
well settled that a combination of investigative and judicial functions within an agency
does not violate due process.”); see also J. Thomas Rosch, Commissioner, Federal Trade
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Given the settled nature of this issue, it is unsurprising that the
combination in a single administrative authority of rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudicative power is the most common regulatory
210
scheme of the federal government.
In short, the initial aspect of
the due process attack on SEC administrative proceedings should fail.
There are, however, other aspects. Due process arguments have also
been made concerning specific administrative procedures used by
the SEC and CFTC in adjudications by the agencies. This Article next
considers those arguments.
2. Limited Discovery
One contentious aspect of the SEC RoP that has prompted due
process arguments is the very narrow discovery allowed in SEC administrative proceedings. The Administrative Conference of the
United States (“ACUS”), an independent federal agency established
211
in 1968 and dedicated to improving the agency process, has advocated for broader discovery in SEC administrative proceedings for
212
213
more than forty years but the SEC has vigorously resisted.
There are a number of key points regarding the discovery argument, which cut in different directions. First, it is well established
that there is no constitutional right to discovery depositions—or any
214
other pretrial discovery—in administrative proceedings.
Second,

210

211

212
213

214

Commission, Remarks Before the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Fall Forum,
Three Questions About Part Three: Administrative Proceedings at the FTC 12 n.34 (Nov. 8, 2012),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/three-questionsabout-part-three-administrative-proceedings-ftc/121108fallforum.pdf (“The federal appellate courts have likewise repeatedly recognized that, by functioning in a quasiprosecutorial, quasi-judicial dual role, the FTC does not violate litigants’ procedural due
process.”).
See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 152–53 (1991)
(noting predominance of this regulatory scheme). See also William Scherman, John
Shepherd & Jason Fleischer, The New FERC Enforcement: Due Process Issues in the Post-EPACT
2005 Enforcement Cases, 31 ENERGY L.J. 55, 70 (2010) (noting that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission “is the prosecutor, judge, and jury”).
See ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, About the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS), https://www.acus.gov/about-administrativeconference-united-states-acus (explaining mission of the ACUS).
Mathews, supra note 140, at 250–51, 251 n.162.
See Peter J. Henning, New Criticism Over the S.E.C.’s Use of In-House Judges, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (July 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/21/business/dealbook/
new-criticism-over-the-secs-use-of-in-house-judges.html?_r=0 (quoting Andrew Ceresney,
Director, SEC Enforcement Division, for the proposition that expanded discovery in SEC
APs “would significantly weaken the commission’s ability to protect investors through
strong and effective enforcement of the federal securities laws”).
Kelly v. EPA, 203 F.3d 519, 523 (7th Cir. 2000); Myers v. Norfolk Livestock Mkt., 696 F.2d
555, 557 (8th Cir. 1982); Sims v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 662 F.2d 668, 671–72 (10th Cir.
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limited discovery is not unique to SEC administrative enforcement.
The APA, which is applicable to all federal administrative agencies,
contains no provision for pretrial discovery in the administrative pro215
cess. The result is that discovery is generally denied by agencies in
216
federal administrative proceedings.
Third, the SEC RoP’s restrictions on discovery apply equally to all
parties to SEC proceedings. Both respondents and the SEC are generally unable to pursue discovery once the OIP has been filed, and a
feasible outcome is that the SEC will be saddled with a seriously in217
complete investigative record. Conversely, before the OIP has been
filed, the SEC has enjoyed the luxury of conducting unilateral discov218
ery for months or even years during the course of its investigation.
The luxury is not theoretical. Approximately 40% of the SEC’s cases
are filed more than two years after the agency begins an investiga219
tion and during those years the SEC—aided by an expansive sub220
poena power —is able to take sworn testimony from dozens of wit221
This aspect of the
nesses and collect millions of documents.

215
216

217

218

219
220

221

1981); Silverman v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 549 F.2d 28, 33 (7th Cir.
1977).
Kelly, 203 F.3d at 523.
See, e.g., William J. Scherman, Brandon C. Johnson & Jason J. Fleischer, The FERC Enforcement Process: Time for Structural Due Process and Substantive Reforms, 35 ENERGY L.J. 101, 118
(2014) (under rules of Federal Energy Regulatory Commission the “subjects of investigations have no discovery rights at all”).
Davison et al., supra note 20, at 108 (“[O]nce the OIP is filed, the Enforcement Division
trial lawyers face the same constraints; to the extent they discover holes in their case after
the OIP is filed, they too are limited in their efforts to fill them.”); see also SHEARMAN &
STERLING, LLP, Securities Enforcement 2014 Year-End Review, Jan. 2015, at 1, 4
http://www.shearman.com/en/newsinsights/publications/2015/01/securitiesenforcement-2014-year-end-review (noting that absence of discovery in SEC APs may
“equally impact both sides”).
See Bromberg et al., supra note 183, at § 12.55 (“The SEC staff has had the benefit of discovery through its extensive investigative powers.”); see also Falvey & Tyukody, supra note
195, at 2, 4 (“[T]he SEC will often have developed its investigative record, including extensive witness testimony, over a period of years.”).
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness, supra note 26,
at 39 (“This statistic likely understates the length of a typical investigation.”).
See Adam L. Sisitsky, Fear is Not Sufficient Grounds to Duck SEC Subpoena, LAW360 (Sept. 3,
2015, 10:57 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/698673/fear-is-not-sufficient-groundsto-duck-sec-subpoena (“[T]here are few restrictions on the SEC’s subpoena power.”).
See Stippich, supra note 146, at 5 (“[T]he Division will, in most cases, collect tens or hundreds of gigabytes of data comprising millions of pages of documents.”); see also Richard
Foster, Comment Letter from the Financial Services Roundtable regarding the SEC’s
Rules of Practice, to Brent J. Fields, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, Dec.
4, 2015, at 4 https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-18-15/s71815.shtml (“In the course of an
investigation, the Division frequently collects millions of pages of electronic documents
spanning many years from multiple parties.”); and Gretchen Morgenson, Crying Foul on
Plans to Expand the S.E.C.’s In-House Court System, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2015),
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discovery process may be most objectionable to respondents. One
review noted: “The lack of pre-hearing discovery adversely affects the
respondent rather than the SEC staff. . . . In effect, the staff is able to
conduct its pre-hearing discovery before beginning the proceed222
ing.”
Fourth, the SEC has supported the propriety of narrow discovery
in administrative proceedings by comparing the process to criminal
cases. Whereas the prosecutor has the benefit of grand jury discov223
ery, strictly limited discovery is available to criminal defendants.
The SEC is factually correct but its analogy is flawed. The Supreme
Court has repeatedly emphasized that there is no general constitu224
tional right to discovery in criminal cases. Depositions are allowed
225
in such cases but they are not intended as discovery devices.
Rule
15(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes the
court to grant a motion for a deposition only to preserve for use at
226
trial the testimony of a prospective witness, and this is the same isolated scenario in which depositions are allowed by the SEC RoP.
However, the SEC’s analogy is undercut because criminal defendants enjoy certain protections unavailable to respondents in SEC enforcement actions—in particular, no adverse inference can be drawn
from the assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self227
incrimination, the government has the burden of proving its case

222

223

224
225
226

227

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/business/secs-in-house-justice-raisesquestions.html?_r=0 (noting recent AP in which the SEC’s investigation lasted five years
and the agency collected 2.4 million pages of documents and took sworn testimony from
nineteen witnesses).
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness, supra note 26,
at 15. Accord Adam M. Wolper & Heidi VonderHeide, The SEC’s Increased Use of Administrative Proceedings in Enforcement Actions: Background, Controversies, and Future Outlook, 17 J. INV.
COMPLIANCE 17, 19 (2016) (“By the time the OIP is filed, the SEC has its case virtually
complete.”).
See, e.g., Ceresney Remarks, supra note 19, at 5 (“The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
allow for depositions only in ‘exceptional circumstances,’ which is similar to what the
Commission’s Rules of Practice allow. If that approach is acceptable when someone’s liberty is on the line, then it is hard to see how due process requires more for respondents
in administrative proceedings.”).
See, e.g., Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977) (“There is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one.”).
In re Application of Eisenberg, 654 F.2d 1107, 1113 n.9 (5th Cir. 1981).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(a)(1). To demonstrate that exceptional circumstances necessitate a
Rule 15 deposition, the party seeking the deposition must show the materiality of the testimony and the unavailability of the witness to testify at trial. United States v. Kelley, 36
F.3d 1118, 1124–25 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
See, e.g., Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976) (permitting adverse inference to
be drawn in civil action); LiButti v. United States, 107 F.3d 110, 121 (2d Cir. 1997)
(“[W]hile the Fifth Amendment precludes drawing adverse inferences against defendants
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beyond a reasonable doubt, and defendants have the right to a jury
228
trial.
Fifth, the discovery problem is compounded because the SEC of229
ten makes broad assertions of both the work product doctrine and
230
the deliberative process privilege, and those assertions are typically
231
upheld. The Division discloses as part of the investigative file only
232
transcribed testimony and invokes the work product doctrine to jus233
tify non-disclosure of its staff notes of informal witness interviews.
The SEC invokes the deliberative process privilege—the most fre234
quently invoked governmental privilege —to justify non-disclosure
of a range of pre-decisional and deliberative documents concerning

228

229

230

231

232

233
234

in criminal cases, it does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions
when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Kenneth B. Winer & Laura S. Kwaterski, Assessing SEC Power in Administrative Proceedings,
LAW360 (Mar. 24, 2011, 1:47 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/233299/assessingsec-power-in-administrative-proceedings.
Randall R. Lee & Timothy C. Perry, A “Cop on the Beat”?: Why the SEC Should Adopt the Brady
Standard, 83 U.S.L.W. 1097 (Jan. 27, 2015) (“[T]he SEC asserts a work product protection
that is, as a practical matter, broader than what even a criminal prosecutor can claim.”).
See WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE & DORR, LLP, Securities Litigation and Enforcement
(Mar. 14, 2013), https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Edito
rial/Publications/WH_Publications/Client_Alert_PDfs/Securities-Litigation-Enforce
ment-Update.pdf. (“[T]he SEC often invokes privilege—particularly deliberative process
privilege—as a complete bar to discovery of its internal documents.”).
See, e.g., Lee & Perry, supra note 229 (noting that courts “have generally supported the
SEC’s assertion of work product protection”). But see SEC v. Kovzan, No. 11-2017-JWL,
2012 WL 4819011, at *6 (D. Kan. Oct. 10, 2012) (rejecting the SEC’s blanket assertion of
deliberative process privilege); SEC v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 256 F.R.D. 403, 415–17
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (same); Jonathan Tuttle, How to Level the Playing Field in SEC Civil Actions,
LAW360 (Jan. 8, 2013, 12:34 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/403848/how-to-levelthe-playing-field-in-sec-civil-actions (“The rejection [in Kovzan] of the SEC’s overly broad
and oft-asserted claims of deliberative process and work product privileges should give
those facing SEC civil actions some comfort that there are potential ways to ensure a level
playing field and to discover the factual bases for the SEC’s asserted claims.”).
Barry R. Goldsmith, SEC Proposed Amendments to Rules for Administrative Proceedings, HARV.
LAW SCH. F. ON CORP. GOV. & FIN. REG. (Oct. 15, 2015), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2015/10/15/sec-proposes-amendments-to-rules-for-administrative-proceedings/; Why the
SEC’s Proposed Changes to its Rules of Practice are Woefully Inadequate—Part II, SEC. DIARY
(Nov. 5, 2015), http://securitiesdiary.com/2015/11/05/why-the-secs-proposed-changesto-its-rules-of-practice-are-woefully-inadequate-part-ii/ (“The SEC staff is rarely required
to provide access to its non-transcribed interviews . . . .”).
Davison et al., supra note 20, at 107; SEC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.230(b) (2016).
Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Government’s Increasing Reliance on—and Abuse of—the Deliberative Process Evidentiary Privilege: “[T]he Last Will be First”, 83 MISS. L.J. 509, 512 (2014) (“In
the short period of its existence, the deliberative process doctrine has become the most
frequently invoked governmental privilege.”).
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235

agency policies. An off-setting factor is that SEC ALJs may be willing to grant respondents’ requests that the SEC produce relevant ma236
terials that are outside the investigative file.
A sixth key point concerns Brady. The SEC often attempts to deflect the due process argument by noting that when it discloses to respondents material exculpatory evidence under Brady the Division
provides more expansive discovery in administrative proceedings
237
than it does in federal court. In Brady the Supreme Court held that
the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused violates due process where the evidence is material either to
238
guilt or punishment.
The Supreme Court has never considered
239
whether Brady should apply to the government in civil cases. A few
240
lower courts have held that Brady does apply civilly, but the SEC
does not impose Brady obligations on its staff in civil cases. The SEC
241
does impose such obligations in administrative proceedings, as does
242
243
the CFTC, even though most other federal agencies do not and
courts have held that due process does not require application of

235

236

237

238

239
240

241
242
243

See Michael N. Kennedy, Comment, Escaping the Fishbowl: A Proposal to Fortify the Deliberative
Process Privilege, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1769, 1772–73 (2005) (identifying elements of the privilege).
See, e.g., Harding Advisory, LLC, Admin. Proc. Rulings Rel. No. 1256, 2014 SEC LEXIS
636 at *6 (Feb. 24, 2014) (granting in part respondents’ requests for documents outside
the SEC’s investigative file).
See, e.g., Ceresney Remarks, supra note 19, at 5 (“We also have affirmative Brady obligations
to disclose material, exculpatory information and Jencks Act obligations to turn over
statements of our witnesses—neither of which apply in our district court proceedings.”);
Dennis K. Berman, Mary Jo White Explains the New SEC Rules, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 24, 2015,
7:28
AM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/mary-jo-white-explains-the-new-sec-rules1448302777 (quoting SEC Chairman Mary Jo White for proposition that whereas SEC
must turn over Jencks and Brady material in APs, there is no similar requirement in federal district court).
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Brady was extended ten years later by Giglio v.
United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972), which held that Brady requires prosecutors to
disclose evidence affecting the credibility of witnesses.
United States ex rel. Redacted v. Redacted, 209 F.R.D. 475, 481 (D. Utah 2001) (collecting
cases).
See Brodie v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 951 F. Supp. 2d 108, 118 (D.D.C. 2013)
(“With only three exceptions . . . courts uniformly have declined to apply Brady in civil
cases.”).
17 C.F.R. § 201.230 (2014).
See, e.g., In re First Guar. Metals Co., CFTC No. 79-55, 1980 WL 15696, at *9 (July 2, 1980)
(adopting Brady rule by decision of CFTC ALJ).
See Justin Goetz, Note, Hold Fast the Keys to the Kingdom: Federal Administrative Agencies and
the Need for Brady Disclosure, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1424, 1431 (2011) (“[M]ost agencies do not
include the [Brady] rule in their procedures for formal adjudication.”).
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245

Brady in APs. Pursuant to Rule 231(a) the SEC also makes available documents that could be used to impeach a trial witness, in ac246
cord with the principles of the Jencks Act, even though the Jencks
247
Act applies only to discovery in criminal cases.
The SEC’s Brady argument has superficial appeal. By applying
Brady in their administrative proceedings the SEC and CFTC provide
more expansive disclosure than do many other agencies. The FTC,
for example, has declined to apply Brady in its administrative pro248
ceedings. Similarly, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”)
and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), whose
proceedings are treated as the equivalent of administrative agency ac249
tion, have chosen not to apply Brady. Indeed, a recent survey found
that the SEC and CFTC are two of only five federal agencies that have
250
adopted Brady.
Nevertheless, the SEC’s argument ultimately is unconvincing.
First, the Division and defense counsel may have widely divergent
views of what constitutes Brady material, with the possible result that
251
some or even much material exculpatory evidence is withheld. The
experience of the few other federal agencies that have adopted the
case suggests that this is a common problem. A recent review of the
adoption of Brady by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
244

245
246

247
248
249

250

251

See, e.g., NLRB v. Nueva Eng’g, Inc., 761 F.2d 961, 969 (4th Cir. 1985) (“[W]e find Brady
inapposite and hold that the ALJ properly denied Nueva’s demand for exculpatory materials.”).
17 C.F.R. § 201.231 (2016).
18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2012). The Jencks Act is a statute that applies in criminal proceedings,
but “the SEC has imported its basic principles to administrative proceedings.” DORFMAN
& WINER, supra note 22, at § 19.04(6) n.34. Cf. Silverman v. CFTC, 549 F.2d 28, 34 (7th
Cir. 1977) (holding that Jencks Act does not apply to CFTC AP).
Campbell v. Eastland, 307 F.2d 478, 486 (5th Cir. 1962).
Amrep Corp., 102 F.T.C. 1362, 1371 (1983).
See, e.g., Mister Disc. Stockbrokers, Inc. v. SEC, 768 F.2d 875, 878 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding
no right to exculpatory evidence in proceedings of National Association of Securities
Dealers, which was predecessor to FINRA); NLRB v. Nueva Eng’g, Inc., 761 F.2d 961, 969
(4th Cir. 1985) (holding the Brady rule inapplicable to NLRB proceedings); Zandford v.
Nat’l Ass’n Sec. Dealers, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1, 22 n.12 (D.D.C. 1998) (“NASD procedures do
not require the disclosure of exculpatory evidence.”).
See Goetz, supra note 243, at 1425 n.11 (identifying the SEC, CFTC, Federal Maritime
Commission, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission).
See Why the SEC’s Proposed Changes to its Rules of Practice are Woefully Inadequate—Part IV, SEC.
DIARY (Dec. 3, 2015), http://securitiesdiary.com/2015/12/04/why-the-secs-proposedchanges-to-its-rules-of-practice-are-woefully-inadequate-part-iv/ (“[T]he SEC staff’s determination of what is Brady and Jencks material is notoriously narrow. In the staff’s view,
if a document does not itself say that the respondent is innocent, it is not exculpatory—
which leaves out many documents that are building blocks in proving the respondent’s
innocence . . . .”).
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(“FERC”) found that FERC enforcement staff “routinely fails to produce exculpatory documents, either in response to general requests
for Brady materials or in response to requests for particular categories
252
of documents.” Second, the SEC has adopted a relaxed form of the
Brady rule. As applied in criminal cases, Brady requires that prosecutors disclose exculpatory or potentially exculpatory materials known
to them and it imposes an affirmative duty on prosecutors to search
253
for such evidence in their own files.
But whereas SEC RoP
230(b)(2) prohibits the Division from withholding documents that
contain material exculpatory evidence, the rule does not impose an
254
affirmative duty to identify or disclose such evidence.
Overall, while the major arguments concerning limited discovery
in SEC (and CFTC) APs cut in different directions, the bottom line is
that such limitations are not unconstitutional but they are unfair.
Possibly the most salient issue is that whereas before the OIP has
been filed the SEC has enjoyed the luxury of conducting unilateral
discovery for many months during the course of its investigation, a
reciprocal opportunity is unavailable to respondents. This seems
fundamentally unfair, especially when considered in conjunction with
the SEC’s AP timeline.
3. Compressed Timeline
A common argument is that the strict timeline for completion of
an SEC administrative proceeding denies due process to respond255
ents.
The specific point is that the Division often commences an

252

253
254
255

William S. Scherman, Brandon C. Johnson & Jason J. Fleischer, The FERC Enforcement Process: Time for Structural Due Process and Substantive Reforms, 35 ENERGY L.J. 101, 117 (2014).
Accord William Scherman & Jason Fleischer, 2014 FERC Enforcement Year in Review, LAW360
(Dec. 22, 2014, 11:52 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/605676/2014-fercenforcement-year-in-review (noting that FERC “has a poor, virtually nonexistent, record
of producing exculpatory information to the subjects of investigations.”). See also Todd
Mullins & McEachran, supra note 91, at 279 (observing that when FERC staff produces
documents that arguably constitute Brady material, it does so too late in the investigative
process for subjects of investigation to effectively use the material). But see Allison Murphy, Todd Hettenbach & Thomas Olson, The FERC Enforcement Process, 35 ENERGY L.J. 283,
308–09 (2014) (“It is not uncommon for counsel representing investigative subjects to
characterize many categories of information as Brady material when, in fact, such information does not fall within the Brady doctrine and counsel are attempting to use
[FERC’s] policy as a discovery device.”).
United States v. Brooks, 966 F.2d 1500, 1502 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
Goetz, supra note 243, at 1436–37. But cf. Mixter, supra note 136, at 57 (“Nevertheless,
Rule 230(b)(2) is treated in practice as granting full-fledged Brady rights.”).
See, e.g., Dearlove v. SEC, 573 F.3d 801 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (rejecting due process claim);
Chau v. SEC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 417, 426–27 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (noting due process claim that
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enforcement proceeding after it has spent years investigating the facts
and collecting documents, whereas respondents have only a few short
months after the OIP is filed to review potentially millions of pages of
256
documents.
In fiscal year 2015 the mean time between the commencement by the SEC of an investigation and the commencement
257
And as noted,
of an enforcement action was twenty-four months.
under the commonly used 300-day timeline, the hearing must be
scheduled for a date approximately four months from service of the
OIP. Extensions may be granted, but the SEC has adopted an explicit policy of strongly disfavoring extensions, postponements, or ad258
journments.
Several points are key. First, the D.C. Circuit has examined and
rejected the due process argument concerning the SEC’s compressed
259
time frame. In Dearlove v. SEC the court rejected a claim, asserted
by an accountant debarred from practice before the SEC, that he was
denied due process because (a) he had only four months in which to
review a massive record compiled by the Commission during several
years of investigation and (b) his request for a sixty-day postpone260
ment of his administrative hearing had been denied.
Second, it is inaccurate to state that respondents in SEC administrative proceedings have only the few months between the filing of an
OIP and the date of the hearing in which to review relevant documents and ascertain the relevant facts. Respondents do not receive
their first inkling of an enforcement action with the filing of an OIP.
Rather, first notice usually is received during the Wells submission
261
process, which has been described as the SEC’s “central due process
262
mechanism in enforcement matters.” For more than forty years the
SEC has had a policy requiring, in most cases, that Division staff con-

256
257

258
259
260
261
262

SEC dumped 22 million documents on respondents in a 300-day case), aff’d, No. 15-461,
2016 WL 7036830 (2d Cir. Dec. 2, 2016).
See Aronow, supra note 88, at 4 (“While the staff has often taken years, the defendants seldom have more than months to prepare.”).
Jonathan N. Eisenberg, 13 Observations About the SEC’s Enforcement Program, HARV. L. SCH.
F. ON CORP. GOV. AND FIN. REG. (Apr. 18, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/
04/18/13-observations-about-the-secs-enforcement-program/. See also Choi & Pritchard,
supra note 71, at 14 (“[M]ost investigations will last more than a year, and several years is
not uncommon.”).
17 C.F.R. § 201.161 (2016).
573 F.3d 801 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 807.
DORFMAN & WINER, supra note 22, at § 19.04(1).
Paul S. Atkins, Commissioner, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks Before the Security
Traders Ass’n of New York 71st Annual Conference (Apr. 19, 2007),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch041907psa.htm.
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ducting an investigation give notice to prospective defendants of the
staff’s plan to recommend that they be sued and of the potential
263
264
charges. The so-called Wells notice, which typically is cursory, also advises prospective defendants of their opportunity to respond by
making a written Wells submission to tell their side of the story and
argue against charges or for a reduction of charges before the SEC
265
decides whether to commence an adjudicative proceeding.
The
Wells process also provides for the discretionary disclosure to the subjects of an investigation of non-privileged portions of the Division
266
staff’s investigative file.
In addition to disclosures made during the Wells process, Division
staff will usually notify prospective respondents when the SEC has au267
thorized the OIP filing and the initiation of settlement discussions.
The Wells process and this advance notice can expand the actual
time frame that respondents in SEC APs have for reviewing key evidence, if the SEC shares such evidence during the Wells process. In
any event, respondents may already be familiar with much of the critical evidence, especially in the form of testimony from their own em268
ployees provided to the SEC during the pre-filing investigation.

263
264

265

266

267
268

Marc J. Fagel, Reassessing the SEC Wells Submission, 47 REV. SEC. & COMMOD. REG. 17, 17
(2014).
Stephanie Russell-Kraft, Law360’s SEC Survival Guide: The Wells Notice and Beyond, LAW360
(July 31, 2014, 7:26 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/561108/law360-s-sec-survivalguide-the-wells-notice-and-beyond.
Jean Eaglesham, SEC Drops 20% of Probes After ‘Wells Notice,’ WALL ST. J. (Oct. 9, 2013, 8:02
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304500404579125633137423664;
see also Joshua A. Naftalis, Note, “Wells Submissions” to the SEC as Offers of Settlement Under
Federal Rule of Evidence 408 and Their Protection from Third-Party Discovery, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 1912, 1913 (2002) (“Prospective defendants use . . . ‘Wells Submissions’ . . . after the
conclusion of a staff investigation but before the [SEC] brings formal charges.”).
OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL, SEC DIV. OF ENF’T, Enforcement Manual, at 21 (June 4, 2015),
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf (“On a case-by-case basis, the staff has discretion to allow the recipient of the notice to review portions of the investigative file that are not privileged.”).
See DORFMAN & WINER, supra note 22, § 19.04(1) (explaining that prospective respondent
will ordinarily receive advance notice of OIP).
Ceresney Remarks, supra note 19 (“[I]n many cases respondents know full well what the important evidence is, either because they produced it to us themselves, because it was testimony from their own employees or someone else to whom they have access before the
hearing, or because we have shared it with them in testimony or in the course of Wells
discussions.”); see also Stephanie Russell-Kraft, Ceresney Rebuts Rakoff’s Critique Of SEC Admin. Actions, LAW 360 (Nov. 7, 2014, 3:30 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/594489/
ceresney-rebuts-rakoff-s-critique-of-sec-admin-actions (citing Ceresney for the propositions that “the SEC’s evidence in administrative proceedings often comes from the defense,” and that “[b]y the time defendants get to trial, ‘they know almost exactly what our
case is going to be . . . .’”).
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The same is true with regard to the CFTC. The CFTC has infor269
mal procedures for providing notice of charges that are very similar
270
in substance, but not identical, to the SEC’s Wells process. Histori271
cally, the CFTC Division viewed its Wells process as discretionary,
but in recent years that view has changed so now prospective CFTC
respondents can more safely assume that Wells notice will be provid272
ed to them.
The SEC and CFTC Wells processes, and advance notice of filings,
can help moderate the harsh effect of the compressed AP timelines,
but they fail to solve the problem. First, the expanded window in
which to learn the relevant facts has an upper limit of six months, because Dodd-Frank requires an enforcement action to be brought, if at
all, within 180 days after submission of a written Wells notice to a pro273
spective defendant. Second, the disclosure by the SEC staff of the
non-privileged portions of its investigative file is entirely discretion269

270
271

272

273

In 1986 the CFTC rejected a petition to adopt a rule that would have assured parties under investigation of the right to make Wells submissions. Charles R. Mills & Benjamin J.
Oxley, Comparing the “Wells Processes” of the SEC, CFTC, and FERC: Is There Room for Improvement?, A.B.A. COMM. ON REG. OF FUTURES & DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS (Jan. 31-Feb. 2,
2008), at 9 n.26, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/business_law/
2008/1/derivatives/enforcement-developments-200801.authcheckdam.pdf.
The CFTC’s “Wells process” is outlined in Informal Procedures Relating to the Recommendation of Enforcement Proceedings, 17 C.F.R., pt. 11, app. A (2016).
See Mills & Oxley, supra note 269, at 9 (“[T]he CFTC Wells process has suffered in a
number of cases from a seeming aversion of the Enforcement staff to identify and share
the evidentiary basis for and legal theories that support a contemplated enforcement recommendation.”).
See Deborah Heilizer, Gregory Kaufman & Jae Yoon, The CFTC Flexes its Enforcement Muscles: Some Tips for Handling CFTC Administrative Proceedings, BLOOMBERG L. REPS. (Jan. 9,
2012), http://www.sutherland.com/portalresource/lookup/poid/Z1tOl9NPluKPtDNIqL
MRV56Pab6TfzcRXncKbDtRr9tObDdEv0JEo0!/fileUpload.name=/Heilizer%20-%20
Bloomberg%20Securities%20Law%2001.09.2012.pdf (indicating that CFTC’s Division of
Enforcement did not make Wells notices available to prospective respondents as a matter
of course); Amanda Jawad & Sung-Hee Su, The ABC’s of CFTC Enforcement Actions, 46
BLOOMBERG BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1447, 1447 n.2 (July 28, 2014) (noting that historically CFTC Wells notices have not always been provided as a matter of course).
MARC I. STEINBERG & RALPH C. FERRARA, 25 SEC. PRAC. FED. & STATE ENFORCEMENT § 3.56
(database updated Sept. 2015). However, the Division may obtain one or more extensions of the six-month period if an investigation is sufficiently complex. 15 U.S.C. § 78d5(a)(2) (2012). Another relevant factor is that increasingly the Division makes greater
use of voluntary “white paper” submissions by defense counsel which frequently focus on
specific factual or legal questions that are significant to the investigation. See Ronald S.
Betman & Scott M. Ahmad, Understanding and Navigating the Use of Pre-Wells Notice White
Papers in Formal SEC Investigations, 2014 BANKING L.J. 444, 446–47 (discussing differences
between white papers and Wells submissions). The Division does not treat white papers
as subject to the 180-day time limit for commencing proceedings after submission of a
written Wells notice, a document which is not defined in either Dodd-Frank or the federal securities laws. U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness, supra note 26, at 22.
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ary, and the informal CFTC Wells process does not provide for any
disclosure. The SEC Enforcement Manual identifies three factors to
guide the exercise of discretion: (1) whether access would be productive for assessing the strength of evidence, (2) whether the person has
been cooperative in providing evidence, and (3) the stage of the investigation, with respect to testimony from other witnesses or the
274
pendency of criminal investigations or prosecutions.
Some evidence suggests a recent trend by SEC staff to deny requests for access
275
to the investigative file. Third, while SEC staff typically provides defense counsel with advance notice of the date when settled actions will
be filed, “[t]here is no comparable presumption for filing litigated
276
actions.”
4. Evidence Rules
Another due process argument is that process is denied because
the FRE do not apply in SEC administrative proceedings. This argument is unpersuasive for multiple reasons. First, the SEC is not
unique in this regard—the FRE generally do not apply to federal ad277
ministrative proceedings.
Second, agencies enjoy no specific advantage simply because the FRE are inapplicable. No party to an SEC
administrative proceeding has an inherent advantage regarding the
admission or exclusion of evidence, and the SEC’s evidentiary mo278
tions are often denied.
As noted, the SEC RoP permit the admission of hearsay, and such evidence can furnish the basis for finding a
violation of securities law. Critics of SEC administrative enforcement
279
highlight this fact. The use of hearsay evidence has a long history

274
275
276
277

278

279

OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL, SEC DIV. OF ENF’T, supra note 266, at 22.
See U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness, supra note
26, at 24 (“[T]he trend in recent years has been away from providing access.”).
Id.
See, e.g., William Scherman, John Shepherd & Jason Fleischer, The New FERC Enforcement:
Due Process Issues in the Post-EPACT 2005 Enforcement Cases, 31 ENERGY L.J. 55, 69 (2010)
(“It has long been the case at the FERC that the [FRE] do not apply . . . .”).
See, e.g., Thomas C. Gonnella, Admin. Proc. Rulings Release No. 1579, 2014 SEC LEXIS
2349, at *5–6 (July 2, 2014) (denying SEC’s motion to exclude testimony of character
witnesses).
See, e.g., Joel M. Cohen, Mary Kay Dunning & Darcy Harris, SEC Plans to Play InsiderTrading Cases on Home Court, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 16, 2014 (“[E]vidence deemed too unreliable to be admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence—most notably hearsay evidence—is admissible in administrative proceedings. This, too, plays unfairly to the SEC’s
advantage.”); AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD, LLP, SDNY Judge Berman Enjoins SEC
Administrative Proceeding as “Likely Unconstitutional,” Litigation Alert (Aug. 14, 2015),
https://www.akingump.com/en/news-insights/sdny-judge-berman-enjoins-sec-
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in administrative proceedings, but this history began in an era when
agencies—including the SEC—used APs for more limited, largely
regulatory purposes. Nevertheless, critics may be overstating the impact of hearsay’s admissibility, because in practice SEC ALJs often
conclude that hearsay statements are unreliable, especially where
280
CFTC ALJs also
they lack traditional indicia of trustworthiness.
281
have required that hearsay statements be reliable. In any event, the
less formal evidentiary practice in APs can operate to respondents’
advantage, by permitting the admission of helpful evidence that
282
might have been excluded under the FRE.
In summary, federal courts have generally rejected due process
challenges used by the SEC and CFTC in adjudications by the agen283
cies. These outcomes have been appropriate, for the reasons noted
above. But certain aspects of the process are fundamentally unfair.
The next Part of this Article considers a different line of attack by respondents—that the selective use of APs constitutes an equal protection violation.
B. Equal Protection
A number of respondents in SEC administrative proceedings have
alleged that they received uniquely unfavorable treatment compared
with other similarly situated defendants who were sued by the SEC in
284
federal court, rather than on the SEC’s home turf.
This “class-ofone” equal protection argument was first litigated by a defendant
285
The SEC had issued an
sued by the SEC in 2011 in Gupta v. SEC.
OIP against Rajat K. Gupta, alleging that he had knowingly disclosed
material, nonpublic information about Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.

280

281

282

283
284
285

administrative-proceeding-as.html (asserting that introduction of hearsay during SEC APs
places respondents at a disadvantage).
Davison et al., supra note 20, at 110. But cf. Olson, supra note 129, at 10 (“[R]eliability is a
‘malleable’ concept. Practice and precedent suggest that ALJs will construe it loosely so
that it will fail to offer meaningful protection.”).
See, e.g., In re Abrams, CFTC No. 88-10, 1995 WL 455791, at *6–7 (July 31, 1995) (holding
that evidence of trader’s activities was double hearsay and there was insufficient basis for
establishing its reliability).
See Aronow, supra note 88, at 4 (“The less formal, less rule-bound procedures of the administrative hearing can often facilitate defendants’ efforts to introduce into evidence potentially relevant information that might be more problematic under a strict application
of the Federal Rules of Evidence.”).
See, e.g., Berkovitz, supra note 85, at 8 (analyzing unsuccessful due process challenges to
CFTC administrative proceedings).
See, e.g., Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765, 768 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting equal protection and due
process arguments raised by respondent).
796 F. Supp. 2d 503 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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and Procter & Gamble Co.—on whose boards he served—to Raj Rajaratnam, the principal of Galleon Management, LP, who then traded
286
on the basis of Gupta’s inside information. In the eighteen months
prior to filing the OIP the SEC filed complaints in federal district
court against twenty-one other individuals and seven entities accused
of Galleon-related insider trading (many of whom were subject to direct regulation by the SEC), using language substantially similar to
the language in the OIP and seeking remedies similar to the relief it
287
sought against Gupta. The Galleon scheme has been described as
288
the largest-ever insider trading scheme.
Gupta sued the SEC in federal district court for the Southern District of New York, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. He alleged, inter alia, that the SEC’s decision to deprive him, alone, of the
opportunity to contest the SEC’s insider trading allegations in federal
court singled him out for uniquely unfavorable treatment in violation
289
of the Equal Protection Clause.
Gupta further alleged that the
SEC’s administrative action deprived him of the procedural safe290
guards of federal court, including the right to a trial by jury.
The SEC moved to dismiss Gupta’s complaint, but Judge Jed
291
Rakoff denied the motion, writing: “[W]e have the unusual case
where there is already a well-developed public record of Gupta being
treated substantially disparately from 28 essentially identical defendants, with not even a hint from the SEC, even in their instant papers,
292
as to why this should be so.”

286

287
288

289
290
291

292

Joan E. McKown, Administrative Proceeding against Rajat Gupta Marks a Turning Point in SEC
Enforcement Actions, 5 BLOOMBERG L. REP. (2011). The SEC could have pursued the administrative action against Gupta even if its authority had not been expanded by DoddFrank, because he was charged as someone associated with a regulated entity (Goldman
Sachs). Id.
Gupta, 796 F. Supp. 2d at 506.
See Lawrence J. Zweifach & Eric M. Creizman, Defending Parallel Proceedings: Basic Principles
& Tactical Considerations, SEC. LITIG. REP., Feb. 2010, at 1, 3 (noting that prosecutors have
deemed Galleon’s insider trading scheme the “largest-ever insider trading scheme”).
Gupta, 796 F. Supp. 2d at 506–07.
Id. at 507.
Porter Wright, Gupta Complaint Against the SEC Survives Motion to Dismiss On Equal Protection Grounds, FED. SEC. L. SOURCE (July 12, 2011), http://www.fedseclaw.com/2011/07/
articles/sec-news/gupta-complaint-against-the-sec-survives-motion-to-dismiss-on-equalprotection-grounds/.
Gupta, 796 F. Supp. 2d at 514. Prior to issuing his decision Judge Rakoff characterized
the SEC’s disparate treatment of Gupta as “bizarre.” Patricia Hurtado, Gupta Administrative Action by SEC is “Bizarre,” Judge Says, BLOOMBERGBUSINESS (Mar. 16, 2011, 6:05 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-03-16/galleon-case-judge-calls-bizarresec-decision-not-to-sue-insider-gupta.
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The SEC did not seek reconsideration and—possibly fearing an
adverse appellate ruling on the equal protection issue—did not seek
certification to take an interlocutory appeal. Understandably reluctant to sit for depositions in Gupta’s federal action, the SEC instead
opted to dismiss the administrative proceeding against Gupta, who in
293
exchange agreed to dismiss his federal action against the agency.
Gupta was subsequently indicted on several counts of securities fraud.
Gupta was convicted following a jury trial before Judge Rakoff in June
2012, sentenced to twenty-four months in prison, fined $5 million,
294
and ordered to pay restitution of $6.2 million.
Gupta’s criminal
295
conviction was affirmed on appeal and the Supreme Court denied
296
certiorari.
The day after Gupta was indicted, the SEC filed a civil complaint
against Gupta and Rajaratnam in federal court, based on the same insider trading scheme described in the indictment. The SEC successfully moved for summary judgment against Gupta. Judge Rakoff imposed a civil penalty of $13.9 million and granted a permanent
injunction barring Gupta from serving as an officer or director of a
public company, associating with brokers, dealers or investment advi297
sors, and further violating securities law.
The Second Circuit af298
299
firmed and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.
A number of defendants—probably emboldened by Judge
Rakoff’s denial of the SEC’s motion to dismiss in Gupta—have since
asserted similar equal protection claims based on class-of-one theo300
ries. These claims are defective, and denial of the SEC’s motion to
dismiss in Gupta likely constituted a rare misstep by Judge Rakoff.
The class-of-one doctrine provides that a plaintiff can assert an
equal protection claim alleging discrimination against her in her in-

293
294
295
296

297
298
299
300

U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness, supra note 26,
at 13–14.
United States v. Gupta, 925 F. Supp. 2d 581, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); United States v. Gupta,
904 F. Supp. 2d 349, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
United States v. Gupta, 747 F.3d 111, 140 (2d Cir. 2014).
Gupta v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1841 (2015). Judge Rakoff subsequently denied a habeas corpus motion by Gupta to vacate his sentence and the judgment. United States v. Gupta, 111 F. Supp. 3d 557, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
SEC v. Gupta, No. 11 Civ. 7566 (JSR), 2013 WL 3784138, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2013).
SEC v. Gupta, 569 F. App’x 45 (2d Cir. 2014).
SEC v. Gupta, 135 S. Ct. 976 (2015).
See, e.g., Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (describing appellants’ class-of-one
theory alleging that appellee’s decision to charge appellants in agency proceeding was
motivated by animus); Chau v. SEC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 417, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (remarking
that plaintiffs do not purport to belong to a protected class but instead raise a class-of-one
claim), aff’d, No. 15-461, 2016 WL 7036830 (2d Cir. Dec. 2, 2016).
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dividual capacity, in contrast to the standard template in which a
plaintiff alleges discrimination based on her group status—for example, as a member of a particular racial group or as a member of the
female sex. The theory has been recognized, but not fully articulated, by the United States Supreme Court in two cases—Village of Wil301
lowbrook v. Olech (decided in 2000) and Engquist v. Oregon Department
302
of Agriculture (decided in 2008). In those cases the Court held that
a class-of-one equal protection claim is cognizable where an individual alleges that she has been “intentionally treated differently from
others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the dif303
ference in treatment.”
The Seventh Circuit has noted that the law concerning class-of304
one equal protection claims “is in flux.”
This is charitable. The
305
However,
theory has also been described as a “doctrinal morass.”
some aspects of the theory are clear. In order to establish a class-ofone equal protection violation, a plaintiff must first show that she was
306
intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated. Appellate courts have strictly construed this requirement by holding that
plaintiff and her comparators must be “prima facie identical in all rel307
evant respects or directly comparable . . . in all material respects.”
Plaintiff also must show that there was no rational basis for the differ308
ential treatment. This second prong has generated confusion and
conflicting opinions. Some appellate panels have held that a plaintiff
must show both that defendant acted irrationally and that defendant
309
acted with illegitimate animus.
Other appellate panels have held

301
302
303
304
305

306
307

308
309

528 U.S. 562 (2000) (per curiam).
553 U.S. 591 (2008).
Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam).
Del Marcelle v. Brown Cty. Corp., 680 F.3d 887, 888 (7th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
Christian Heritage Acad. v. Okla. Secondary Sch. Activities Ass’n, 483 F.3d 1025, 1043
(10th Cir. 2007) (McConnell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also William D. Araiza, Flunking the Class-of-One/Failing Equal Protection, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV.
435, 441 (2013) (noting “extensive confusion in the lower courts” following Olech and
Engquist, and concluding that “the Supreme Court continues to flunk the class-of-one”).
See, e.g., Andy’s BP, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 605 F. App’x 617, 618 (9th Cir. 2015).
United States v. Moore, 543 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Racine Charter One,
Inc. v. Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 424 F.3d 677, 680 (7th Cir. 2005)); accord Ruston v.
Town Bd. for Town of Skaneateles, 610 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Clubside, Inc.
v. Valentin, 468 F.3d 144, 159 (2d Cir. 2006)) (“[C]lass-of-one plaintiffs must show an extremely high degree of similarity between themselves and the persons to whom they
compare themselves.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See, e.g., Andy’s BP, Inc., 605 F. App’x at 618.
See Racine Charter One, Inc. v. Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 424 F.3d 677, 684 (7th Cir.
2005) (citing collected Seventh Circuit cases requiring proof of illegitimate animus).
Other circuits also have concluded that animus or impermissible motive is an element of
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that plaintiff must prove that the differential treatment was either ir310
rational or motivated by illegitimate animus.
Notwithstanding the doctrinal confusion, the theory can be discussed with reference to Gupta. Gupta probably was intentionally
treated differently from others similarly situated. Specifically, he was
treated differently from the other twenty-eight individuals and entities accused of Galleon-related insider trading who were sued by the
SEC in federal court. These other defendants probably were directly
comparable in all material respects. But Gupta’s claim still was defective, and the SEC’s motion to dismiss should have been granted, for
the reasons explained below.
In Engquist, the Supreme Court noted that the class-of-one theory
is a poor fit when the challenged governmental action is the product
311
of a broadly discretionary decision-making process. The Court refused to apply the theory to claims concerning public employment
312
decisions.
The Supreme Court’s holding was limited to the employment
313
context, but numerous courts have since extended Engquist by underscoring that class-of-one claims are an especially poor fit in criminal justice cases involving the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, parole board determinations, and police officers’ decisions to cite or
314
arrest particular individuals.
For example, in United States v.
315
Moore, the Seventh Circuit noted that an exercise of prosecutorial
discretion cannot be successfully challenged on the ground that it is
arbitrary—in the realm of prosecutorial charging decisions, only in316
vidious discrimination is forbidden.
The Seventh Circuit further
noted that where a challenge to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is premised on irrationality, rather than invidious discrimination,

310
311
312

313

314
315
316

the claim. See Del Marcelle v. Brown Cty. Corp., 680 F.3d 887, 892 (7th Cir. 2012) (per
curiam) (citing collected cases from First, Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits).
See Racine Charter One, 424 F.3d at 684 (citing collected Seventh Circuit cases requiring
proof of irrationality or illegitimate animus).
Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 603–04 (2008).
Id. at 607; see also Papas v. Leonard, 554 F. App’x 764, 764 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he ‘classof-one’ theory is not cognizable with regard to discretionary actions.”); Towery v. Brewer,
672 F.3d 650, 660 (9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (quoting Engquist) (“The class-of-one doctrine does not apply to forms of state action that ‘by their nature involve discretionary decisionmaking based on a vast array of subjective, individualized assessments.’”).
Cf. Alex M. Hagen, Mixed Motives Speak in Different Tongues: Doctrine, Discourse, and Judicial
Function in Class-of-One Equal Protection Theory, 58 S.D. L. REV. 197, 226 (2013) (“Engquist
was not so narrowly written, nor was it intended to be so narrowly read.”).
Robert C. Farrell, The Equal Protection Class of One Claim: Olech, Engquist, and the Supreme
Court’s Misadventure, 61 S.C. L. REV. 107, 131 (2009).
543 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 900.
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the challenge is doomed to failure and a class-of-one equal protection
317
claim is foreclosed for the same reason. Other courts have agreed
and rejected class-of-one attacks on the exercise of prosecutorial dis318
cretion.
Cases holding that class-of-one claims are not cognizable with respect to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion should have been fatal to Gupta’s equal protection claim and should be fatal to subsequent similar equal protection claims asserted by respondents in SEC
administrative proceedings. A decision by the SEC (or CFTC) to
proceed in an administrative forum rather than in a judicial forum is
a clear analog to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in criminal
cases. Such decisions are based on a multiplicity of discretionary factors, many of which were formally identified by the Division in the
guidance it released in May 2015 and informally acknowledged by the
319
Division even earlier.
The specific facts concerning the SEC’s initial decision to issue an
OIP against Gupta and utilize an administrative forum provide an excellent illustration of the broadly discretionary nature of that decision-making process. It appears that the SEC was motivated in large
part by the goal of investor protection when it decided to pursue an
action against Gupta, who was serving on the boards of three public
companies—including Procter & Gamble and American Airlines parent AMR Corp. Gupta resigned from these boards after the OIP was
320
filed.
But why did the SEC initially file administratively against Gupta,
rather than in federal court? At the time that the SEC filed the OIP
the criminal action against Gupta was in the pre-indictment stage.
321
Parallel civil and criminal proceedings are common, and the SEC

317
318

319

320
321

Id.
See, e.g., Wade v. Collier, 783 F.3d 1081, 1089 n.5 (7th Cir. 2015) (remarking that plaintiff’s “class-of-one equal protection claim is not a good fit in the context of a harm caused
by the State’s Attorney’s Office’s exercise of its prosecutorial discretion”); Donahoe v. Arpaio, 869 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1073–74 (D. Ariz. 2012) (rejecting class-of-one challenge arising from discretionary prosecutorial decisions).
See, e.g., Jenna Greene, The SEC’s on a Long Winning Streak; Criticism Rises over the Agency’s
In-House Forum, NAT’L L.J. (Jan. 19, 2015) (listing factors identified by Andrew Ceresney,
Director, SEC Enforcement Division).
Michael Rothfeld, Susan Pulliam & Jean Eaglesham, Focus on Goldman Ex-Director, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 21, 2011, at C1.
Derelle Janey, Parallel Proceedings: Staying the Civil Action, N.Y. L.J. (Sept. 2, 2014),
http://www.gottliebgordon.com/site/files/parallel_proceedings.pdf;
MORRISON
&
FOERSTER, LLP, A Primer on SEC Investigations and Enforcement Actions Relating to Financial
Reporting and Accounting Cases, 11 (2014), http://media.mofo.com/files/Uploads/
Images/140122-SEC-Investigation-Handbook.pdf (“In cases in which criminal activity has

92

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 19:1
322

and DOJ have a long history of cooperation with one another, but a
parallel civil proceeding can jeopardize a criminal action. Defendants can obtain discovery in an SEC civil action that is not available
under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, while simultaneously
denying the government reciprocal discovery by invoking the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and compromising
323
cooperating witnesses in the criminal case. The U.S. Attorney’s Office can seek to stay a parallel civil action commenced by the SEC, but
whereas such stay motions used to be regularly granted, in recent
324
years they have been frequently denied. And Judge Rakoff has not
325
been sympathetic to motions to stay SEC civil actions.
The factors noted above likely were dispositive in the SEC’s decision to file an OIP against Gupta. The SEC, simultaneously sensitive
to investor protection and the litigation strategy of the U.S. Attorney
for the Southern District of New York, opted for the proceeding that
posed the least risk of interference with the criminal trial of Raja326
ratnam, as well as any future criminal case against Gupta.
An administrative proceeding would have involved significantly less discovery than would have a civil action in federal court, and thus it would
have been considerably less likely to jeopardize the criminal prosecutions. In short, as noted by Professor J. Robert Brown, Jr., “the decision to bring an administrative proceeding rather than an injunctive
proceeding was eminently reasonable and entirely appropriate given
327
the competing pressures.”

322

323

324

325

326
327

occurred, the SEC will often work in parallel with the Department of Justice or, less frequently, state criminal authorities.”).
Eli J. Richardson, Patterns in Parallel Proceedings: SEC Actions, DOJ Tools, LAW360 (Jan. 17,
2012,
1:18
PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/298489/patterns-in-parallelproceedings-sec-actions-doj-tools.
Walter P. Loughlin, Parallel Civil and Criminal Proceedings, PRACTICAL LITIGATOR, Mar.
2011, at 19, 22–23; Zweifach & Creizman, supra note 288, at 9. See also Braden Campbell,
Discovery Halted in SEC Hacking Suit Amid Criminal Case, LAW360 (Feb. 1, 2016, 8:08 PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/753300/discovery-halted-in-sec-hacking-suit-amidcriminal-casee (reporting that New Jersey federal judge stayed discovery in SEC civil action because such discovery could have undermined two related criminal cases).
Zweifach & Creizman, supra note 288, at 9. See also Stewart Bishop, Once Assured, An SEC
Stay as DOJ Acts is No Longer A Lock, LAW360 (Oct. 31, 2016, 5:08 PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/857032/once-assured-an-sec-stay-as-doj-acts-is-no-longera-lock (noting that some federal judges “are increasingly eschewing blanket civil discovery
stays”).
See, e.g., SEC v. Saad, 229 F.R.D. 90, 92 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (Rakoff, J.) (denying government
application for stay of discovery in SEC enforcement action which had been filed in tandem with parallel criminal case).
Rothfeld, Pulliam & Eaglesham, supra note 320.
J. Robert Brown, Jr., Gupta, Business Roundtable, and the Need for a New Approach at the SEC,
THERACETOTHEBOTTOM.ORG
(Sept.
27,
2011,
6:00
AM),
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The foregoing discussion demonstrates why class-of-one equal
protection claims asserted by defendants in SEC administrative proceedings should fail. Choices by the SEC (or CFTC) to proceed administratively are the product of broadly discretionary decisionmaking and as such should be insulated from attack, absent a showing of invidious discrimination. Gupta’s case, which no doubt inspired subsequent defendants to assert equal protection claims, is a
very good example of why such claims are defective.
C. Seventh Amendment
A third common line of attack is that SEC and CFTC administrative proceedings deny the right to a jury trial in violation of the Sev328
Gupta asserted this claim in his federal action
enth Amendment.
329
against the SEC and numerous respondents in SEC proceedings
330
have followed his lead. It is true that respondents in such proceed331
ings are denied the right to a jury trial, and the availability of a jury
can be particularly beneficial to a defendant in a complex securities
332
fraud case.
Nevertheless, this denial does not violate the Seventh
Amendment, for the reasons explained below.
The Supreme Court has addressed the question of congressional
power to provide for non-jury trials in a series of cases that split into
two categories. In the first category, Congress has created a statutory
cause of action and provided that assertion of the claim must proceed
in a specialized statutory proceeding or in a specialized tribunal, such
as an administrative tribunal utilizing ALJs. The Supreme Court has
never held that the Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to a ju-

328

329
330

331
332

http://www.theracetothebottom.org/securities-issues/gupta-business-roundtable-and-theneed-for-a-new-approach-at.html. But see Michael Dvorak, Note, SEC Administrative Proceedings and Equal Protection “Class of One” Challenges: Evaluating Concerns About SEC Forum
Choices, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1195, 1218 (2015) (arguing that defendants like Gupta
should be able to challenge the SEC’s choice of forum under a class-of-one equal protection argument).
The Seventh Amendment provides: “In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved. . . .” U.S.
CONST. amend. VII.
Gupta v. SEC, 796 F. Supp. 2d 503, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, 3, 18–20, Ironridge Global
IV, Ltd. v. SEC, 146 F. Supp. 3d 1294 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (No. 1:15-cv-02512-LMM) (alleging
that administrative proceedings violate the constitutional right to a trial by jury).
See, e.g., Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765, 768 (7th Cir. 2015) (explaining that a respondent
“has no right to a jury trial before the SEC”).
Peter J. Henning, The S.E.C.’s Use of the “Rocket Docket” is Challenged, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK
(Aug. 25, 2014, 11:48 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/08/25/the-s-e-c-s-use-ofthe-rocket-docket-is-challenged/?_r=0.
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ry trial in a proceeding conducted by an administrative tribunal. In
the second category, which is of minimal concern here, Congress has
provided for the statutory right to be enforced in federal district
334
court.
The leading case controlling the first category is Atlas Roofing Co.
335
In Atlas Roofing
v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission.
petitioners alleged that the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
336
1970 (“OSH Act”) violates the Seventh Amendment because it provides for civil penalties for OSH Act violations to be levied by the Secretary of Labor and contested assessed penalties to be adjudicated by
the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
337
(“OSHRC”).
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected this argument. The Court held:
At least in cases in which “public rights” are being litigated—e.g. cases in
which the Government sues in its sovereign capacity to enforce public
rights created by statutes within the power of Congress to enact—the
Seventh Amendment does not prohibit Congress from assigning the fact
finding function and initial adjudication to an administrative forum in
338
which the jury would be incompatible.

Atlas Roofing relied on National Labor Relations Board v. Jones &
339
Laughlin Steel Corp., a New Deal-era case in which the Supreme
Court first encountered a Seventh Amendment objection to administrative adjudication. In Jones & Laughlin the Court upheld a provi340
sion of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) empowering the
341
NLRB to award back pay as a remedy for unfair labor practices. At342
las Roofing also relied on Curtis v. Loether, decided in 1974, in which
the Supreme Court explained that Jones & Laughlin “stands for the
proposition that the Seventh Amendment is generally inapplicable to
343
administrative proceedings . . . .” Collectively, the three cases establish that Congress has wide latitude in creating administrative mechanisms for adjudicating statutory or public rights, and the Seventh

333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343

Paul K. Sun, Jr., Note, Congressional Delegation of Adjudicatory Power to Federal Agencies and the
Right to Trial by Jury, 1988 DUKE L.J. 539, 545.
See text accompanying notes 366–373 infra.
430 U.S. 442 (1977).
Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (1970).
Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S. at 450.
Id.
301 U.S. 1 (1937).
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-52 (2012).
Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 21.
415 U.S. 189 (1974).
Id. at 194.
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Amendment does not compel a jury trial in these situations.
The
Supreme Court’s resolution of the three cases—particularly Atlas
345
Roofing—has drawn criticism, but the Court has never retreated
from their primary holdings.
Atlas Roofing strongly suggested—but did not hold—that Congress
is free to assign fact finding and initial adjudication to an administra346
tive forum only where a public right is involved.
In a subsequent
347
case, Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, the Court defined a public
right as a right arising between the federal government and others, or
one where Congress, acting for a valid legislative purpose pursuant to
its constitutional powers under Article I, has created a “seemingly
‘private right’ that is so closely integrated into a public regulatory
scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency resolution with lim348
ited involvement by the Article III judiciary.”
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the public-private distinc349
tion has been described as a “confusing morass” and the precise
350
contours of the two categories remain in dispute. The enforcement
of federal securities laws would appear to be an obvious example of
351
the enforcement of public rights, but the absence of a bright divid344
345

346

347
348

349
350

351

CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 9 FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 2302.2 (3d ed. database updated Apr. 2016).
See, e.g., Roger W. Kirst, Administrative Penalties and the Civil Jury: The Supreme Court’s Assault
on the Seventh Amendment, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1281, 1338 (1978) (“The attempt in Atlas to
carve out a new exception to the [S]eventh [A]mendment to permit administrative factfinding in public rights cases poses a serious threat to a fundamental guarantee of the Bill
of Rights.”).
Cf. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 458
(1977) (“Our prior cases support administrative factfinding in only those situations involving ‘public rights,’ e.g., where the Government is involved in its sovereign capacity
under an otherwise valid statute creating enforceable public rights.”).
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
Id. at 54 (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 586, 593–94
(1985)). See also Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2613 (2011) (“[W]hat makes a right
‘public’ rather than private is that the right is integrally related to particular federal government action.”).
Mila Sohoni, Agency Adjudication and Judicial Nondelegation: An Article III Canon, 107 NW. U.
L. REV. 1569, 1584 (2013).
Id. at 1587. See also Mark I. Greenberg, The Right to Jury Trial in Non-Article III Courts and
Administrative Agencies After Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 479, 481
(1990) (“[T]he Supreme Court has never provided a workable definition of public
rights.”); Paul K. Sun, Jr., Note, Congressional Delegation of Adjudicatory Power to Federal Agencies and the Right to Trial by Jury, 1988 DUKE L.J. 539, 553 (“[T]he Court has offered no
firm definition of public rights . . . .”).
See, e.g., Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1314 (N.D. Ga. 2015), vacated on other grounds,
825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Because the SEC is acting as a sovereign in the performance of its executive duties when it pursues an enforcement action, the Court also
agrees that this is a public rights case.”); SEC v. Petrofunds, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 958, 960
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ing line has provided some ammunition for parties asserting Seventh
Amendment challenges to SEC and CFTC administrative enforcement. To date, those challenges have failed, whether asserted in
court or in administrative proceedings.
One of the earliest cases to consider the Seventh Amendment argument in the context of CFTC administrative enforcement was My352
ron v. Hauser. In that case, decided in 1982, the Eighth Circuit relied on Atlas Roofing to reject an argument that the award by the
CFTC of reparations following an administrative hearing by a CFTC
353
ALJ violated the Seventh Amendment.
In the course of holding
that no Seventh Amendment violation had occurred, the Eighth Circuit rejected the argument that the CFTC’s reparations procedures—
which provide a simplified mechanism for the resolution of customer
354
claims against commodity brokers —do not involve public rights.
The court noted that even though it was the customer who was
awarded reparations, the case in a functional sense was between the
355
government and the regulated commodity options broker.
One
356
year later, in Swiers v. Rosenthal & Co., a CFTC ALJ also rejected a
claim that CFTC reparations proceedings violate the Seventh
Amendment.
Arguments that administrative enforcement by the SEC violates
respondents’ Seventh Amendment rights have been similarly unsuccessful. Both the SEC (acting as the first level of appeal from an ALJ

352

353
354

355

356

(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (“Indeed, the entire purpose and thrust of an SEC enforcement action is
expeditiously to safeguard the public interest by enjoining recurrent or continued violations of the securities acts.”). In Petrofunds, the federal district court granted the SEC’s
motion to strike defendant’s demand for a jury trial. Id. Cf. SEC v. Kopsky, 537 F. Supp.
2d 1023, 1028 (E.D. Mo. 2008) (denying defendants’ motion to strike SEC’s demand for a
jury trial).
673 F.2d 994 (8th Cir. 1982). The same argument was raised four years earlier in Rosenthal & Co. v. Bagley, 581 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1978), but in that case the Seventh Circuit
declined to decide the issue because plaintiff had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies by appealing from an adverse order of the CFTC in the reparations proceeding being challenged. Id. at 1259, 1261.
Myron, 673 F.2d at 1003 (“Atlas Roofing refutes [plaintiff’s] seventh amendment challenge.”).
See
Commodity
Futures
Trading
Commission,
Reparations
Program,
http://www.cftc.gov/ConsumerProtection/ReparationsProgram/index.htm (explaining
the reparations procedures).
Myron, 673 F.2d at 1004–05. But see Jerry W. Markham, The Seventh Amendment and the
CFTC Reparations Proceedings, 68 IOWA L. REV. 87, 120–22 (1982) (arguing that CFTC reparations proceedings involve disputes between private parties).
Commod. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶21,817, at 27,396 (C.F.T.C. 1983).
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358

decision) and Article III judges have cited Atlas Roofing and rejected Seventh Amendment arguments.
359
In Hill v. SEC, Charles Hill—the respondent in an SEC administrative proceeding—sued the SEC in federal district court in 2015 alleging constitutional violations, including the denial of his Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial. Hill conceded that the SEC’s en360
forcement action against him involved a public right, but he argued
that under Atlas Roofing and Granfinanciera the public right must be
new or novel to be excluded from the Seventh Amendment’s ambit
and the SEC’s claims against him were neither. According to Hill,
Dodd-Frank did not create any cause of action. Rather, it simply authorized the SEC to institute in an administrative forum a pre-existing
type of enforcement action that previously had been the exclusive
361
province of Article III courts.
Additional respondents in SEC ad362
ministrative proceedings have advanced the same argument.
Both Atlas Roofing and Granfinanciera contain language that at first
glance appears to support the foregoing argument. In Atlas Roofing
the Supreme Court stated that when Congress creates new statutory
public rights it may assign their adjudication to an administrative
363
agency without violating the Seventh Amendment.
And in Granfinanciera the Court stated that Congress may devise novel causes of action involving public rights free from the strictures of the Seventh
Amendment if it assigns their adjudication to administrative tribu364
nals. Nevertheless, the district court in Hill properly rejected plaintiff’s argument on the basis that it elevates form over substance and
misconstrues the Supreme Court’s language. The district court stated: “Congress does not tie its hands when it initially creates a cause of
action. Plaintiff cites no authority which specifically holds that Congress may not change its mind and reassign public rights to adminis365
trative proceedings.”
357
358
359
360
361
362

363
364
365

Vladlen “Larry” Vindman, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-11247, Rel. No. 8679, at *11 (Apr. 14,
2006).
Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1315–16 (N.D. Ga. 2015), vacated on other grounds, 825
F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016).
Id.
Id. at 1314.
Id.
See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 19, Ironridge Global IV, Ltd.
v. SEC, 146 F. Supp. 3d 1294 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (No. 1:15-cv-02512-LMM) (alleging that
Dodd-Frank did not create a new cause of action).
Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 455
(1977).
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 51 (1989).
Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1315.
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As noted above, there is a second Supreme Court line of Seventh
Amendment jurisprudence, covering situations where Congress has
provided for a statutory right to be enforced in federal court. Some
respondents in SEC administrative proceedings have erroneously relied on this line of cases to bolster their Seventh Amendment claims.
In particular, respondents have erroneously relied on Tull v. United
366
States.
In that case the government successfully sued a real estate
367
developer for violations of the Clean Water Act in federal court.
The developer alleged a violation of his Seventh Amendment rights
368
after the district judge denied his timely demand for a jury trial.
On appeal the Supreme Court held that the Seventh Amendment
grants the right to a jury trial on all issues relating to liability for civil
penalties, but not on the amount of penalties, when the federal gov369
ernment seeks relief in federal court under the Clean Water Act.
Tull is inapposite to the use by the SEC and CFTC of administrative enforcement, because it sets forth a rule applicable only in the
second line of Supreme Court cases. That is, Tull merely stands for
the proposition that when the federal government seeks to impose
penalties under the Clean Water Act in a judicial forum, rather than
in an administrative forum, the defendant is entitled to a jury trial on
the issue of liability. Tull does not stand for the proposition that the
Seventh Amendment prohibits the federal government from seeking
the imposition of penalties under the Clean Water Act in an administrative forum, or the imposition of penalties under any other federal
370
statute in an administrative forum. The Clean Water Act expressly
371
authorizes the imposition of administrative penalties, that provision
has never been deemed unconstitutional, and the Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”) annually files exponentially more admin-

366

367
368
369
370

371

481 U.S. 412 (1987). See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 18–19,
Ironridge Global IV, Ltd. v. SEC, 146 F. Supp. 3d 1294 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (No. 1:15-cv02512-LMM) (citing Tull).
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1376 (2012).
Tull, 481 U.S. at 415.
Id. at 425–27.
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce recently issued a report criticizing the SEC’s expanded
use of APs and asserting that “[t]he Supreme Court has held that a defendant is entitled
to a jury every time the government demands a civil penalty.” See U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness, supra note 26, at 17. Whether or not
this is true, it has no bearing on the imposition of penalties in an administrative forum,
for the reasons explained above.
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (2012); Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake
Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 57–58 n.2 (1987) (“[T]he most recent Clean Water Act
amendments permit EPA to assess administrative penalties without judicial process on any
person who ‘has violated’ the provisions of the Act.”).
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istrative order penalty actions than it does civil judicial complaints.
In fiscal year 2015 the EPA filed 108 civil judicial complaints and
372
1400 administrative penalty complaints.
In short, nothing about Tull supports a Seventh Amendment challenge to the use by the SEC and CFTC of administrative enforcement.
Indeed, the Supreme Court, citing Atlas Roofing, reaffirmed in a footnote in Tull that “the Seventh Amendment is not applicable to ad373
ministrative proceedings.”
D. Article II
Respondents asserting constitutional challenges to the SEC’s use
of administrative proceedings have made their best arguments under
Article II of the U.S. Constitution. The arguments take two forms.
First, respondents argue that SEC ALJs are protected by at least two
layers of removal protection, in violation of Article II. Second, respondents argue that SEC ALJs are not appointed by the President,
the courts, or department heads, in violation of the Appointments
Clause of Article II. Those two arguments are examined below. As
will be seen, while the arguments are applicable to CFTC administra374
tive proceedings, there are important differences between the SEC
RoP and CFTC RoP which render the constitutional analysis somewhat different for the two agencies.
1. Multiple Layers of Removal Protection
The first argument based on Article II stems from the Supreme
Court’s 2010 decision in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Account375
In that case the Court held
ing Oversight Board (“Free Enterprise”).
that the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”)
was improperly constituted because its members, although acting
with the powers of executive officers, were insulated by statute from
the President by two layers of limitations on removal. There were two
376
layers because PCAOB members could only be removed for cause
372

373

374
375
376

ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, ENFORCEMENT ANNUAL RESULTS NUMBERS AT A GLANCE FOR FISCAL
YEAR (FY) 2015, https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/enforcement-annual-results-numbers
-glance-fiscal-year-fy-2015.
Tull, 481 U.S. at 418 n.4. See also Gregory T. Bolan, Jr. & Joseph C. Ruggieri, Exchange
Act Release No. 877, at *4 (ALJ Sept. 14, 2015) (citing Tull in rejecting Seventh Amendment challenge to SEC administrative proceeding).
Kaufman & Forero, supra note 98 (“The same challenge [regarding two layers of protection] can be made regarding a CFTC administrative proceeding.”).
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
Id. at 486.
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and those individuals who could remove the members—the SEC
377
The SuCommissioners—could also only be removed for cause.
preme Court had previously held that one level of for-cause removal
378
protection was constitutional, but in Free Enterprise it held that a se379
cond layer was one too many for the PCAOB.
Respondents in SEC administrative proceedings have seized on
the holding of Free Enterprise to argue that such proceedings are unconstitutional because SEC ALJs are insulated from removal by the
380
President by at least two layers of protection. ALJs can only be re381
moved for cause by SEC Commissioners, with the consent of the
382
Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”), and, as noted above, the
Supreme Court stated in Free Enterprise that SEC Commissioners can
only be removed for cause. Respondents’ argument is superficially
appealing but ultimately unpersuasive. To date, those federal district
courts which have examined the argument have either expressly re383
384
jected it or stated in dicta that the argument is defective.
Respondents’ argument is defective for multiple reasons and
385
First, the
those courts which have rejected it have been correct.
Supreme Court did not decide in Free Enterprise that SEC Commis377
378
379
380
381

382

383

384

385

Id. at 487.
See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
Free Enter., 561 U.S. at 492.
See, e.g., Duka v. SEC, 124 F. Supp. 3d 287, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), vacated on other grounds,
No. 15-2732 (2d Cir. June 13, 2016).
Duka v. SEC, 103 F. Supp. 3d 382, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), abrogated on other grounds by Tilton
v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2016) (“All ALJs, including SEC ALJs, are removable from
employment by their respective agency heads (in this case, the [SEC]), but only for ‘good
cause.’”). The removal of federal ALJs is rare; between 1946 and 1992 only five ALJs were
removed from federal agencies. VANESSA K. BURROWS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34607,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES: AN OVERVIEW 9 (2010). In contrast, fifteen Article III judges were impeached during the period 1803–2010. Impeachments of Federal Judges, FED. JUD.
CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges_impeachments.html (last visited June 15, 2016). Three of the impeached judges resigned before the Senate’s impeachment trials concluded. Id. Four of the impeached judges were acquitted by the
Senate. Id.
Barnett, supra note 18, at 800. The MSPB is an independent federal agency which handles appeals by federal employees of adverse employment actions. Id. Pursuant to 5
U.S.C. § 7521, such an action may be taken against an ALJ only for good cause established and determined by the MSPB. Id. at 814–15.
See, e.g., Duka, 124 F. Supp. 3d at 289–90 (declining to reconsider its previous holding
that there is no basis for concluding the restrictions on SEC ALJ removal infringes presidential authority).
See Gray Fin. Grp., Inc. v. SEC, 166 F. Supp. 3d 1335, 1354 n.10 (N.D. Ga. 2015), vacated
on other grounds by Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016) (expressing serious doubts
that two-layer removal protection for SEC ALJs is unconstitutional).
Cf. David Zaring, Enforcement Discretion at the SEC, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1155, 1191 (2016) (identifying the Free Enterprise argument as respondents’ best constitutional argument).
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sioners enjoy for-cause removal protection. Rather, the Court simply
accepted the parties’ stipulation that Commissioners can be removed
386
only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office, just
387
as lower courts have implied such protection. The foregoing implication is dubious. There is no for-cause removal provision in the federal securities laws and there is very good reason to think this was a
deliberate choice by Congress.
The constitutional status of independent federal agencies stems
388
from the 1935 case of Humphrey’s Executor v. United States. That case
arose when President Franklin D. Roosevelt attempted to remove an
FTC Commissioner based on policy disagreements between the two
389
men. The Court rejected this attempt and held that Congress can,
under certain circumstances, create independent agencies run by
principal officers appointed by the President, whom the President
390
may remove only for good cause.
In so holding, the Court endorsed the idea that when Congress creates an agency—such as the
FTC—with for-cause removal protection it “intends for the agency to
be totally free from presidential influence, aside from the President’s
391
role in appointments.”
The SEC was established in 1934 by Section 4 of the Securities Ex392
change Act (“Exchange Act”), one year before Humphrey’s Executor
was decided. When it was established, it would have been unconstitutional to make SEC Commissioners removable only for cause, under
393
the Supreme Court’s pre-Humphrey’s Executor precedent. But at no
time since Humphrey’s Executor was decided has Congress amended
the Exchange Act to create a for-cause removal provision, even
394
though the statute has been amended twelve times since then.
Moreover, in the years since Humphrey’s Executor was decided Con386

387

388
389
390
391
392
393
394

See Free Enter., 561 U.S. at 487; Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 STAN. L. REV.
1, 15 (2013) (“[T]he Court followed the parties’ briefs in assuming that SEC members
could be removed by the President only for cause.”); Neomi Rao, A Modest Proposal: Abolishing Agency Independence in Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2541,
2560 (2011) (“The parties stipulated that Commissioners could be removed only [for
cause].”).
See Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 833 (2013) (noting that lower courts have assumed that
SEC enjoys for-cause removal protection).
295 U.S. 602 (1935).
See id. at 618–19.
Id. at 630–32.
Datla & Revesz, supra note 387, at 779.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1934).
See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 547 (2010)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
Datla & Revesz, supra note 387, at 834.
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gress has created multiple agencies, some with express for-cause removal protection (such as the NLRB and the FERC) and some without such protection (such as the CFTC, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), and the Federal Election
395
Commission).
One recent review concluded: “When properly
viewed in context, the presence or absence of a removal provision
396
looks more like a deliberate choice than a drafting error.”
Overall, the reliance by respondents in SEC proceedings on Free
Enterprise is misplaced for the initial reason that the Supreme Court
did not decide that SEC Commissioners cannot be removed by the
President without a judicially reviewable showing of good cause, and
its acceptance of a stipulation concerning such removal protection is
dubious. Justice Stephen Breyer asked in dissent: “How can the
Court simply assume without deciding that the SEC Commissioners
397
themselves are removable only ‘for cause?’” There is no satisfactory
answer to this question, and as Professor Laurence Tribe observed,
absent acceptance of the parties’ stipulation, the “majority’s entire
398
house of cards collapses.”
The second reason that respondents’ reliance on Free Enterprise is
misplaced is that, assuming arguendo that SEC ALJs are protected by
two layers of protection from removal, the Supreme Court did not es399
tablish a bright-line rule that two layers are always unconstitutional.
Rather, as stated by the majority, the only issue in the case was
“whether Congress may deprive the President of adequate control
400
over the [PCAOB] . . . .”
The Court held that two layers were unconstitutional in the case of the PCAOB because its members exer-

395
396

397
398

399

400

Id.
Id.; accord David Moon, Note, When Does Dual For-Cause Removal Protection Become Unconstitutional? Exploring the Scope of Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 875, 889–90 (“[T]here is a strong historical argument that
Congress specifically intended that SEC members be removable at will by the President.”).
Free Enter., 561 U.S. at 545 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Laurence H. Tribe, Peek-A-Boo: Justice Breyer, Dissenting, 128 HARV. L. REV. 498, 505 (2014)
(“[T]he majority went out of its way to decide the case on the artificial assumption that
the Commissioners of the SEC cannot be removed by the President without a judicially
reviewable showing of good cause. Without that assumption, the majority’s entire house
of cards collapses.”).
See, e.g., Free Enter., 561 U.S. at 536 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The Court fails to create a
bright-line rule because of considerable uncertainty about the scope of its holding . . . .”);
Duka v. SEC, 103 F. Supp. 3d 382, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), abrogated by Tilton v. SEC, 824
F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Free Enterprise clearly did not establish, as Duka suggests, a categorical rule forbidding ‘two levels of “good-cause” tenure protection.’”).
Free Enter., 561 U.S. at 508.
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402

cised expansive enforcement, regulatory, and adjudicative author403
ity, and two layers of protection deprived the President of control
404
over the non-adjudicatory functions. The Court refused to consider
the applicability of its holding to other federal employees because
none of them were similarly situated to the members of the
405
PCAOB.
In Free Enterprise, the Supreme Court discussed the impact of its
decision on ALJs. The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Breyer
and joined by three other Justices, noted that ALJs are insulated from
406
removal by two layers of protection and asked: “Does every losing
party before an ALJ now have grounds to appeal on the basis that the
407
decision entered against him is unconstitutional?” The majority responded that its opinion did not decide whether federal ALJs are
constitutional, for two reasons: (1) it is not clear that ALJs are officers
of the United States, so as to raise the Article II issue, and (2) many
ALJs perform adjudicative rather than enforcement or policymaking
408
functions, or possess purely recommendatory powers.
The Appointments Clause of Article II governs the appointment
of all officers of the United States, who fall into two categories—
principal and inferior. The former, most likely those who report directly to the President, must be nominated by the President and con409
firmed by the Senate. The latter are those whose work is directed
410
and supervised by principal officers or officers of lesser importance.
Very few federal government personnel are either principal or inferior officers. Rather, almost all personnel are mere employees whose
401
402
403
404

405
406
407
408

409
410

Id. at 485 (“The Board is charged with enforcing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the securities
laws, the Commission’s rules, its own rules, and professional accounting standards.”).
Id. (“[T]he Board may regulate every detail of an accounting firm’s practice . . . .”).
Id. (“[T]he Board itself can issue severe sanctions in its disciplinary proceedings . . . .”).
Id. at 508 (“The only issue in this case is whether Congress may deprive the President of
adequate control over the Board, which is the regulator of first resort and the primary law
enforcement authority for a vital sector of our economy. We hold that it cannot.”).
Id. at 506–08.
Id. at 542 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 543 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 507 n.10 (majority opinion); see also Duka v. SEC, 103 F. Supp. 3d 382, 394 (S.D.N.Y.
2015), abrogated by Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2016) (“[T]he majority specifically
excluded ALJs from the reach of its holding.”); Patricia L. Bellia, PCAOB and the Persistence of the Removal Puzzle, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1371, 1411 (2012) (“The PCAOB Court
took pains to emphasize the narrowness of its holding—in particular, that the holding
carried no implications for the civil service or for ALJs.”).
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 670 (1988); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976)
(per curiam).
See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997) (“‘[I]nferior officers’ are officers
whose work is directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by
Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.”).
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411

appointments are not controlled by the Appointments Clause. The
SEC has consistently and vociferously argued in litigation concerning
the constitutionality of its administrative proceedings that its ALJs are
mere employees, rather than officers of the United States. As to this
issue the SEC probably is fighting a losing battle.
The Supreme Court has never articulated a bright-line test for de412
termining who can be properly identified as an inferior officer. In
413
Buckley v. Valeo the Court noted that inferior officers exercise signif414
icant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States. In Morri415
son v. Olson the Court applied a functional test based on multiple
criteria, including removal by a higher executive branch official, limi416
More recently, in Free
tations on duties, and limited jurisdiction.
Enterprise, the Court endorsed the view that inferior officers have superiors who direct and supervise their work and who are appointed
417
by the President with the Senate’s consent. But these are not definitive tests.
SEC ALJs probably are inferior officers, as opposed to mere employees. By September 2016 at least five federal district court deci418
sions had so held, on multiple grounds. First, SEC ALJs exercise
significant authority. While they lack contempt power, they conduct
trials—taking testimony and ruling on the admissibility of evidence,
among other tasks—and are empowered to enforce compliance with
419
discovery orders. Second, the authority of SEC ALJs is at least equal
411

412

413
414
415
416

417
418

419

Raymond J. Lucia Cos., Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 75837, Investment
Company Act Release No. 31806, at 29 (Sept. 3, 2015), pet. denied, Raymond J. Lucia Cos.
v. SEC, No. 15-1345, 2016 WL 4191191 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 9, 2016).
See Neomi Rao, Removal: Necessary and Sufficient for Presidential Control, 65 ALA. L. REV.
1205, 1244 (2014) (“The Court has struggled with articulating a test for who can be
properly identified as an inferior officer.”).
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
Id. at 126.
487 U.S. 654 (1988).
Id. at 671–72 (identifying potential removal by a higher executive branch official, limited
duties, and limited jurisdiction as factors leading to conclusion that independent counsel
is an inferior officer).
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 510 (2010).
Ironridge Global IV, Ltd. v. SEC, 146 F. Supp. 3d 1294, 1316 (N.D. Ga. 2015); Duka v.
SEC, 124 F. Supp. 3d 287, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), vacated on other grounds, No. 15-2732 (2d
Cir. June 13, 2016); Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1316 (N.D. Ga. 2015), vacated on
other grounds, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016); Gray Fin. Grp., Inc. v. SEC, 166 F. Supp. 3d
1335, 1353 (N.D. Ga. 2015), vacated on other grounds by Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th
Cir. 2016); Timbervest, LLC v. SEC, No. 1:15-CV-2106-LMM, 2015 WL 7597428, at *11
(N.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 2015).
Duka v. SEC, 15 Civ. 357 (RMB) (SN), at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2015); Duka v. SEC, 124
F. Supp. 3d 287, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), vacated on other grounds, No. 15-2732 (2d Cir. June
13, 2016) (“SEC ALJs are ‘inferior officers’ because they exercise ‘significant authority

Oct. 2016]

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

105

to that of thousands of other individuals who have been deemed to
be inferior officers by the Supreme Court. As noted by Professor
Kent Barnett, “[t]he Court has held that district-court clerks, thousands of clerks within the Treasury and Interior Departments, an assistant surgeon, a cadet-engineer, election monitors, federal marshals, military judges, Article I judges, and the general counsel for the
420
Transportation Department are inferior officers.” Third, SEC ALJs’
positions are established by law, and their duties, salary, and means of
421
appointment are specified by statute.
422
In August 2016, in Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, the D.C. Circuit
became the first federal appellate court to hold that SEC ALJs are
employees, rather than inferior officers, and therefore their ap423
pointments are constitutional.
In reaching its decision the D.C.
Circuit relied heavily on the logic of its 2000 decision in Landry v.
424
In Landry the D.C. Circuit held that ALJs appointed by the
FDIC.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) were employees despite exercising significant authority, because they had no statutory
425
authority to issue final opinions.
According to the court, a prior
426
Supreme Court case, Freytag v. Commissioner, was not dispositive. In
Freytag the Supreme Court held that special trial judges (“STJs”) for
the U.S. Tax Court were inferior officers at least in part because they
427
had authority to issue final decisions.
Landry distinguished Freytag
on the basis that whereas STJs had such authority, FDIC ALJs did
428
There was a concurring opinion in Landry, which joined the
not.
court’s opinion except with regard to petitioner’s claim made under

420
421
422
423
424
425

426
427
428

pursuant to the laws of the United States.’”). See also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513
(1978) (“There can be little doubt that the role of the . . . administrative law judge . . . is
‘functionally comparable’ to that of a judge. His powers are often, if not generally, comparable to those of a trial judge: He may issue subpoenas, rule on proffers of evidence,
regulate the course of the hearing, and make or recommend decisions.”).
Barnett, supra note 18, at 812.
Duka v. SEC, 15 Civ. 357 (RMB) (SN), at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2015).
No. 15-1345, 2016 WL 4191191 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 9, 2016).
Id. at *3–7.
204 F.3d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
204 F.3d at 1134. Cf. Ass’n of Am. R.R. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 821 F.3d 19, 37 (D.C. Cir.
2016) (holding that arbitrator appointed by Surface Transportation Board qualified as officer of the United States because it was the arbitrator’s responsibility to render a final
decision in disputes between Amtrak and the Federal Railroad Administration); Jody Godoy, SEC Says Amtrak Ruling Doesn’t Apply in ALJ Challenge, LAW360 (May 11, 2016, 4:03
PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/795151/sec-says-amtrak-ruling-doesn-t-apply-in-aljchallenge.
501 U.S. 868 (1991).
Id. at 882.
Landry, 204 F.3d at 1133–34.
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the Appointments Clause. The concurrence argued that Freytag’s discussion of the importance of the STJs’ authority to issue final decisions was part of an alternative holding that was unnecessary to the
429
outcome in Freytag.
According to Professor Barnett, the concur430
rence in Landry had the better argument, and it is difficult to disagree with that assessment. The discussion of finality was part of an al431
ternative holding.
Those post-Landry district courts which have held that SEC ALJs
are inferior officers have found Freytag’s primary holding to be con432
433
trolling. In Lucia, however, the D.C. Circuit followed Landry and
applied Freytag’s alternative holding to determine the status of SEC
ALJs. The Lucia court noted that its analysis of Landry’s applicability
to SEC ALJs began and ended with ALJs’ authority to issue final deci434
sions. Because the initial decisions of SEC ALJs become final only
435
when the SEC issues an order of finality, the D.C. Circuit concluded
436
that the ALJs are mere employees.
Lucia was wrongly decided for the same reason that Landry was
mistaken. Both cases erroneously rely on Freytag’s alternative holding. But even if SEC ALJs are inferior officers who are protected by
two layers of for-cause removal protection, Free Enterprise still does not
render them unconstitutional. As noted, in Free Enterprise the Supreme Court distinguished ALJs because many of them perform adjudicative rather than enforcement or policymaking functions, or because they possess recommendatory powers. The use of such a
429
430

431

432

433

434
435
436

Id. at 1142.
Barnett, supra note 18, at 813. See also Giles D. Beal IV, Note, Judge, Jury, and Executioner:
SEC Administrative Law Judges Post-Dodd Frank, 20 N.C. BANKING INST. 413, 426 (2016)
(“SEC ALJs perform almost identical duties to those performed by the STJs in Freytag
. . . .”). Cf. Choi & Pritchard, supra note 71, at 11 (“It is not clear how the Supreme Court
would interpret Freytag in the context of the SEC’s ALJs.”).
See Ironridge Global IV, Ltd. v. SEC, 146 F. Supp. 3d 1294, 1315 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (“Only
after it concluded STJs were inferior officers did Freytag address the STJ’s ability to issue a
final order: the STJ’s limited authority to issue final orders was only an additional reason,
not the reason.”).
See, e.g., Duka v. SEC, 124 F. Supp. 3d 287, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), vacated on other grounds,
No. 15-2732 (2d Cir. June 13, 2016); Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1317 (N.D. Ga.
2015), vacated on other grounds, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016). (“The Court finds that
based upon the Supreme Court’s holding in Freytag, SEC ALJs are inferior officers.”).
Thomas J. Krysa, A Key Victory for SEC in Battle Over Administrative Courts, LAW360 (Aug. 15,
2016, 4:14 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/828028/a-key-victory-for-sec-in-battleover-administrative-courts (“The panel noted they were bound by the circuit’s prior precedent, [Landry] . . . .”).
Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, No. 15-1345, 2016 WL 4191191 at *4 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 9,
2016).
Id. at *5.
Id. at *3–7.
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437

functional test is supported by Supreme Court precedent. And, in
fact, SEC ALJs perform only adjudicative functions and they possess
only the power to recommend a case disposition. While the SEC itself
combines functions, SEC ALJs do not engage in enforcement or
438
rulemaking. They only adjudicate. Likewise, the initial decision by
an SEC ALJ is only a recommendation. The initial decision does not
become final until the Commission acts, either by (1) conducting de
novo review and issuing its own decision, or (2) issuing an order of finality because no party has appealed and the Commission has not
439
decided to review sua sponte the ALJ’s initial decision. Upon review,
the Commission may affirm, reverse, modify, set aside, or remand for
further proceedings, in whole or in part, any initial decision by an
440
ALJ. And when the SEC conducts its de novo review it may hear ad441
ditional evidence.
In the foregoing respects SEC ALJs are very different from the
PCAOB members considered by the Supreme Court in Free Enter442
prise.
These differences suffice to remove SEC ALJs from any potential application of Free Enterprise’s holding that PCAOB members
cannot constitutionally be protected by dual layers of removal protec437

438

439

440

441
442

See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689–90 (1988) (“The analysis contained in our
removal cases is designed not to define rigid categories of those officials who may or may
not be removed at will by the President, but to ensure that Congress does not interfere
with the President’s exercise of the ‘executive power’ and his constitutionally appointed
duty to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed’ under Article II.”).
See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 699 n.8
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“ALJs perform only adjudicatory functions
. . . .”), rev’d, 561 U.S. 477 (2010); Duka v. SEC, 103 F. Supp. 3d 382, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2015),
abrogated on other grounds by Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2016) (“SEC ALJs perform solely adjudicatory functions, and are not engaged in policymaking or enforcement.”). But cf. Barnett, supra note 18, at 816 n.125 (“ALJs for a handful of agencies may
(but rarely do) preside over formal rulemaking proceedings . . . .”).
See, e.g., Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276, 279 (2d Cir. 2016) (“A presiding ALJ has authority to
issue an initial decision, which may become final only by order of the Commission.”);
Raymond J. Lucia Cos., Admin. Proc. File No. 3-15006, Securities Exchange Act Rel. No.
75837, at 31 n.109 (Sept. 3, 2015), pet. denied, Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, No. 15-1345,
2016 WL 4191191 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 9, 2016) (noting that SEC ALJs’ initial decisions “do
not become the final and effective decision of the agency without affirmative action on
our part—specifically, our issuance of a finality order.”); Timbervest v. SEC, Civ. Action
No. 1:15-CV-2106-LMM, 2015 WL 7599428, at *9 n.8 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 2015) (“Because
the regulations specify that the SEC itself must issue the final order essentially ‘confirming’ the initial order, the Court finds that SEC ALJs do not have final order authority.”).
Raymond J. Lucia Cos., Admin. Proc. File No. 3-15006, Securities Exchange Act Rel. No.
75837, at 31 (Sept. 3, 2015), pet. denied, Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, No. 15-1345, 2016
WL 4191191 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 9, 2016).
Id.
See Beal, supra note 430, at 434 (“SEC ALJs do not exercise the broad executive powers
that the PCAOB exercised, but, instead, act in a quasi-judicial role within the SEC.”).
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443

tion.
Several district courts have correctly used a functional ap444
proach to reach this conclusion, albeit some of them in dicta.
However, the analysis might be different with regard to CFTC ALJs.
Under the CFTC RoP, no Commission order is necessary for an ALJ’s
initial decision to become a final decision of the CFTC. Instead, if no
appeal is taken and the Commission does not take a case for review
on its own initiative, the initial decision becomes the decision of the
445
Commission thirty days after service. In this respect, the initial decision by a CFTC is not a mere recommendation. Still, CFTC ALJs
perform only adjudicative functions, and this characteristic alone
should suffice to remove them from the ambit of Free Enterprise’s holding.
2. Appointment by a Department Head
The second and much more persuasive argument advanced by respondents under Article II concerns the method of appointment for
SEC ALJs. The Appointments Clause provides the exclusive means by
446
which all officers of the United States may be appointed.
The

443

444

445
446

See Jerome Nelson, Administrative Law Judges’ Removal ”Only for Cause”: Is that Administrative
Procedure Act Protection Now Unconstitutional?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 401, 412 (2011) (“The distinctions between PCAOB members and ALJs suggest that Free Enterprise should be inapplicable to the ALJs.”). In the unlikely event that Free Enterprise is applicable to SEC ALJs
and their tenure protection is unconstitutional, the most likely consequence would be
undesirable—ALJs would become terminable at will. This was the outcome in Free Enterprise, where the Supreme Court saved the PCAOB by deeming the offending tenure provisions severable from the remainder of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002—which had created the board—and holding that PCAOB members could be removable at will going
forward. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 509
(2010); Stephen M. Juris & Barrett Johnson, Forum over Substance? Respondent Rights and
the SEC, LAW360 (July 14, 2015, 10:30 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/678526/
forum-over-substance-respondent-rights-and-the-sec (arguing that if ALJs become terminable at will they will “wind up with even less insulation from institutional pressure”).
See, e.g., Duka v. SEC, 124 F. Supp. 3d 287, 289–90 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), vacated on other
grounds, No. 15-2732 (2d Cir. June 13, 2016) (rejecting claim that two layers of removal
protection for SEC ALJs violates Article II); Duka v. SEC, 103 F. Supp. 3d 382, 394
(S.D.N.Y. 2015), abrogated on other grounds by Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2016)
(adopting functional test); Gray Fin. Grp. v. SEC, 166 F. Supp. 3d 1335, 1354 n.10 (N.D.
Ga. 2015), vacated on other grounds by Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he
Court declines to decide at this time whether the ALJs’ two-layer tenure protections also
violate Article II’s removal protections. However, the Court has serious doubts that it
does, as ALJs likely occupy ‘quasi-judicial’ or ‘adjudicatory’ positions, and thus these twolayer protections likely do not interfere with the President’s ability to perform his duties.”).
CFTC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 10.84(c) (2010).
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138–39 (1976); Duka v. SEC, 124 F. Supp. 3d 287, 289
(S.D.N.Y. 2015), vacated on other grounds, No. 15-2732 (2d Cir. June 13, 2016).
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Clause requires that inferior officers be appointed in one of three
ways: by (1) the President, (2) the courts of law, or (3) heads of de447
partments. The constitutional argument advanced by respondents
in SEC proceedings is that SEC ALJs are inferior officers who have
not been appointed in any of the three prescribed ways.
The second prong of the argument is uncontested—SEC ALJs are
448
not appointed by the SEC Commissioners.
The SEC has publicly
conceded that its ALJs are hired by the SEC’s Office of Administrative
Law Judges, with input from the Chief Administrative Law Judge,
449
human resource functions, and the OPM, with a possible exception
for current Chief ALJ Brenda Murray, who may have been hired with
450
input from the Commissioners.
In contrast, the first prong of the argument has been vigorously
contested by the SEC, which asserts that ALJs are mere employees, rather than inferior officers, and therefore the Appointments Clause
does not apply at all. The SEC is correct that the Appointments
451
Clause does not apply to employees. Nevertheless, for the reasons
explained above, the SEC probably is fighting a losing battle on the
broader issue. By September 2016 at least five federal district court
decisions—four of them by the same judge in Georgia—had expressly
rejected the SEC’s position and held that SEC ALJs are inferior officers who were not appointed in any of the prescribed means, and
452
therefore their appointments are unconstitutional.
By September

447
448
449

450

451

452

U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
Ironridge Global IV, Ltd. v. SEC, 146 F. Supp. 3d 1294, 1299 (N.D. Ga. 2015).
See, e.g., Duka v. SEC, 15 Civ. 357 (RMB) (SN), at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2015) (“There
appears to be no dispute between Duka and the SEC that the ALJs in this matter are not
appointed by the President or the SEC Commissioners.”); Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d
1297, 1319 (N.D. Ga. 2015), vacated on other grounds, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016) (noting concession by SEC that ALJ in plaintiff Hill’s administrative proceeding was not appointed by an SEC Commissioner). OPM screens the candidates and must approve a selection or provide a list of candidates, but it does not hire ALJs for other agencies. See 5
C.F.R. §§ 930.203a, 930.201 (2016).
See J. Robert Brown, Jr., Duka v. SEC and the Constitutionality of Administrative Law Judges
(Part
7),
THERACETOTHEBOTTOM.ORG
(Aug.
27,
2015,
6:00
AM),
http://www.theracetothebottom.org/home/duka-v-sec-and-the-constitutionality-ofadministrative-law-j-5.html.
See, e.g., Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 880 (1991) (“If we . . . conclude that a
special trial judge is only an employee, petitioners’ challenge fails, for such ‘lesser functionaries’ need not be selected in compliance with the strict requirements of Article II.”).
Ironridge Global IV, Ltd. v. SEC, 146 F. Supp. 3d 1294, 1316–17 (N.D. Ga. 2015); Duka v.
SEC, 124 F. Supp. 3d 287, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), vacated on other grounds, No. 15-2732 (2d
Cir. June 13, 2016); Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1319 (N.D. Ga. 2015), vacated on
other grounds, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016); Gray Fin. Grp. v. SEC, 166 F. Supp. 3d 1335,
1354 (N.D. Ga. 2015), vacated on other grounds by Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir.
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2016 no district court had accepted the SEC’s argument. As noted, in
August 2016 in Lucia the D.C. Circuit became the first appellate court
to consider the merits of the SEC’s argument, and the agency had a
decisive victory. For the reasons explained above, the D.C. Circuit’s
decision probably is erroneous, and might carry little weight in other
453
circuits.
What are the likely consequences if the SEC’s current appointment of its ALJs is determined to be unconstitutional? The SEC
could solve its Article II problem by having the Commission reappoint its ALJs, because the Supreme Court held in Free Enterprise that
454
the SEC is a department. Reappointment of the ALJs by the Commissioners as the head of the department would thus appear to pro455
vide an easy fix. Congress is not required to take any legislative action, because the SEC already has authority under Section 4(b) of the
456
In
Exchange Act to appoint “officers . . . and other employees.”
457
September 2015, the FTC, in In re LabMD, no doubt concerned
about constitutional challenges to SEC ALJs, opted to ratify the appointment of an ALJ as both its chief ALJ and as the presiding ALJ in
the LabMD AP, even though the FTC, like the SEC, maintains that its
458
ALJs are mere employees.
But to date the SEC has refused to

453

454
455

456
457
458

2016); Timbervest v. SEC, Civ. Action No. 1:15-CV-2106-LMM, 2015 WL 7597428, at *12
(N.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 2015).
See, e.g., Carmen Germaine, SEC’s Big DC Circ. Win Won’t End In-House Clash, LAW360
(Aug. 9, 2016, 10:00 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/826675/sec-s-big-dc-circ-win-won-tend-in-house-clash (concluding that Lucia will not resolve on-going debate about SEC APs).
But cf. Mark Lanpher et al., D.C. Circuit Upholds Constitutionality of SEC Administrative Proceedings, SHEARMAN & STERLING, LLP (Aug. 16, 2016), http://www.shearman.com/~/
media/Files/NewsInsights/Publications/2016/08/DC-Circuit-Upholds-Constitutionalityof-SEC-Administrative-Proceedings-LIT-081616.pdf (“[T]he D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Lucia has the potential to be an important precedent-setting decision.”).
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 511 (2010).
Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2015), vacated on other grounds, 825 F.3d
1236 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he ALJ’s appointment could easily be cured by having the SEC
Commissioners issue an appointment or preside over the matter themselves.”); DAVIS
POLK & WARDWELL, LLP, Securities Litigation Update: Constitutional Challenges to SEC’s Administrative Courts Gain Momentum (Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.davispolk.com/
publications/securities-litigation-update-constitutional-challenges-sec%E2%80%99sadministrative-courts-gain/ (“[T]he SEC may cure the deficiency by having the SEC
commissioners ratify the ALJs’ appointments.”).
See Kent Barnett, The SEC’s Inferiority Complex, YALEJREG.COM (June 11, 2015),
http://www.yalejreg.com/blog/the-secs-inferiority-complex-by-kent-barnett/.
LabMD, Inc., No. 9357, 2015 WL 5608167, at *2 (F.T.C. Sept. 14, 2015).
Lawrence Elbaum, Survey of Recent Motions to Enjoin SEC Administrative Proceedings, N.Y. L.J.
(Dec. 16, 2015), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202744911476/Survey-ofRecent-Motions-to-Enjoin-SEC-Administrative-Proceedings?slreturn=20160024165027
(noting that ratification “is perhaps a proactive step to moot any Appointments Clause
challenges by respondents in the FTC’s administrative forum”); Alison Frankel, Unlike
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acknowledge either that there is a constitutional problem or that re459
appointment should be the solution.
The SEC’s refusal to bend on the issue of whether its ALJs are inferior officers is understandable, because the potential ramifications
of a concession (or appellate finding) of unconstitutionality are quite
significant, both for the SEC and for other agencies. With respect to
the latter, whereas most ALJs utilized by other federal agencies probably have been appointed by department heads, many—especially
those utilized by agencies that are not departments (such as the CFPB
and FERC)—likely have not been, and thus they too could be uncon460
stitutional.
With respect to the SEC, the potential ramifications can be analyzed in two major categories. The first category includes parties
whose APs are final. It is unlikely that these parties will be able to
successfully assert collateral attacks, pursuant to the principle of finality. Once a judgment becomes final, it typically cannot be attacked
collaterally, absent extraordinary circumstances outweighing the pre461
sumption in favor of finality.
The absence of an adjudicator’s au462
thority to decide a case does not outweigh the presumption, which

459

460

461
462

SEC, FTC Makes a Quick Fix to Ward Off ALJ Constitutional Challenges, ON THE CASE,
REUTERS.COM (Sept. 16, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2015/09/16/
unlike-sec-ftc-makes-quick-fix-to-ward-off-alj-constitutional-challenges/.
See Alison Frankel, Why the SEC Can’t Easily Solve Its Appointments Clause Problem with ALJs,
REUTERS: ON THE CASE (June 17, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2015/
06/17/why-the-sec-cant-easily-solve-appointments-clause-problem-with-aljs/ (noting that
the SEC has avoided addressing potential consequences of proposed quick fix).
See Barnett, supra note 456; Aaron R. Crane & Justin A. Savage, Securities: The Next Hot Topic in Environmental Law, LAW360 (June 10, 2016, 4:10 PM), http://www.law360.com/
articles/805744/securities-the-next-hot-topic-in-environmental-law (“EPA ALJs, for instance, do not seem to be appointed by a ‘head of department’ any more than are those
at the SEC.”).
See Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 114 (1963) (“To be sure, the general rule of finality of
jurisdictional determinations is not without exceptions.”).
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 557 U.S. 137, 152 (2009) (“[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction . . . may not be attacked collaterally.”); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 n.9 (2004)
(same); Evans v. Bank of N.Y. Trust Co., 506 F. App’x 741, at *3 (10th Cir. 2012) (stating
that once an order has become final on direct review, “the subject-matter jurisdiction of
the court issuing the order can almost never be successfully raised.”). The RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12 (1980) describes three exceptional circumstances in which
a collateral attack on subject matter jurisdiction is permitted: “(1) The subject matter of
the action was so plainly beyond the court’s jurisdiction that its entertaining the action
was a manifest abuse of authority; or (2) Allowing the judgment to stand would substantially infringe the authority of another tribunal or agency of government; or (3) The
judgment was rendered by a court lacking capability to make an adequately informed determination of a question concerning its own jurisdiction and as a matter of procedural
fairness the party seeking to avoid the judgment should have opportunity belatedly to attack the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.” The Supreme Court has not decided wheth-
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suggests that “parties whose SEC ALJ-issued judgments are final will
be unable to successfully attack them collaterally based on a determi463
nation that the ALJs’ appointments were unconstitutional.”
The second category includes parties whose administrative determinations are not yet final. As of June 2015, the SEC had more than
100 contested proceedings open at various stages of the administra464
tive process.
These parties likely could successfully attack their
eventual adjudications, based on a determination that their ALJs’ appointments were unconstitutional. Pursuant to a long line of Supreme Court precedent, a judgment entered by an improperly appointed adjudicator is void and should be set aside by any court
465
having authority to review it. In Ryder v. United States, for example,
the Court vacated several decisions by the Coast Guard Court of Military Review because the appointments of two of the court’s officers
466
467
violated the Appointments Clause.
Other cases are similar.
In
the foregoing cases, the Supreme Court remanded for re-trial by a
properly appointed adjudicatory body. In the case of the SEC, there
will be no such body, unless the SEC reappoints its ALJs. If the SEC
does not make valid reappointments, its non-final prior decisions will
likely be vacated and dismissed without prejudice. There will be no
prejudice because the dismissals will not be adjudications on the mer468
its.
This would permit the SEC to re-try the cases, subject to any

463

464

465
466
467
468

er to adopt these exceptions. See Bailey, 557 U.S. at 154 n.6 (“This is no occasion to address whether we adopt all of these exceptions.”). FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(4) provides that
the court may relieve a party from a final judgment, order, or proceeding if the judgment
is void, but a jurisdictional error must be egregious in order for a final judgment to be
treated as void. To be egregious, and thus void under Rule 60(b)(4), “the error must involve a clear usurpation of judicial power, where the court wrongfully extends its jurisdiction beyond the scope of its authority.” United States v. Tittjung, 235 F.3d 330, 335 (7th
Cir. 2000).
Peter D. Hardy, Carolyn H. Kendall & Abraham J. Rein, The Appointment of SEC Administrative Law Judges: Constitutional Questions and Consequences for Enforcement Actions, 47
BLOOMBERG BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP 1238 (June 22, 2015). But see Peter J. Henning,
S.E.C. Finds Itself in a Constitutional Conundrum, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (June 15, 2015),
http://nyti.ms/1MFZEVD (suggesting possibility that penalties in every SEC AP that took
place before an ALJ whose appointment was unconstitutional may be improper).
Stephanie Russell-Kraft, SEC to Appeal District Judge’s Admin Court Injunction, LAW360 (June
15, 2015, 6:21 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/667995/sec-to-appeal-district-judges-admin-court-injunction.
Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177 (1995).
Id. at 180–88.
See, e.g., Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69, 83 (2003) (vacating a Ninth Circuit decision by a three-judge panel that included an ineligible Article IV territorial judge).
See, e.g., Havens v. Mabus, 759 F.3d 91, 98 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that a jurisdictional
dismissal is not on the merits).
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statute of limitations bar, in federal district court or before a properly-appointed ALJ.
The SEC can try to avoid invalidation of decisions rendered in
administrative proceedings under one of two primary theories, but
neither is likely to succeed. The SEC can argue either that application of the de facto officer doctrine precludes invalidation of decisions
by its ALJs, or that such decisions are valid because they were ratified
by the Commission.
The de facto officer doctrine confers validity upon acts performed
by a person acting under the color of title even though it is later discovered that that person’s appointment or election to office was inva469
lid. The doctrine at first glance appears to be a perfect fit for SEC
ALJs who were not properly appointed. But in Ryder, the Supreme
Court rejected application of the doctrine to the improperly constituted Coast Guard Court of Military Review. According to the Supreme Court, application of the doctrine would create a disincentive
to raise Appointments Clause challenges to questionable judicial ap470
pointments. The same may be true with regard to SEC ALJs.
Alternatively, the SEC could invoke the theory of ratification, under general principles of agency law. The Restatement (Third) of
Agency specifies that “ratification is the affirmance of an act by one
for or on behalf of another at a time when he had no authority to do
471
the act for the one in whose name it was done.”
As noted, SEC
ALJs’ decisions do not become final until the Commission approves
them, either expressly or tacitly. The SEC could argue that the decisions by its ALJs, who are its agents, were ratified by the Commission.
However, this argument is unlikely to prevail. If the argument could
succeed, it “essentially would make the Appointments Clause a nullity
for inferior officers, since there would be no need to follow the
Clause’s requirements so long as a principal officer was prepared to
472
ratify the unconstitutionally-appointed officer’s acts.”

469

470

471
472

Ryder, 515 U.S. at 180. See also Kathryn A. Clokey, Note, The De Facto Officer Doctrine: The
Case for Continued Application, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1121, 1126 (1985) (noting gradual erosion of the doctrine).
Ryder, 515 U.S. at 182–83. See also United States v. Jones, 74 M.J. 95, 96–97 (Armed Forces
Crim. App. 2015) (rejecting the application of de facto officer doctrine to retired judge
advocate colonel’s participation in judgment of United States Air Force Court of Criminal
Appeals). However, in Buckley the Court invoked the de facto officer doctrine to uphold
the acts of an improperly constituted Federal Election Commission. Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 142 (1976).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 4.02 cmt. b (Am. Law Inst. 2006).
See Hardy, Kendall & Rein, supra note 463.
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Overall, the SEC is confronted with the prospect that many of the
decisions by its ALJs could be vacated. How much of an administrative burden would this create for the SEC? In order to answer this
question it may be helpful to look at some prior situations in which
the appointments of members of an administrative agency were ruled
473
invalid. In New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, decided in 2010, the Supreme Court invalidated 595 decisions made by a two-member NLRB
board. Most of these matters settled, and ultimately only 112 were re474
decided. Disposing of all 112 cases took more than three years. The
475
vast majority of the original decisions in these cases were affirmed.
476
In Noel Canning v. NLRB, decided in 2014, the Supreme Court
477
invalidated more than 700 reported and unreported decisions by an
NLRB that included three members selected by invalid recess appointments. These 700 decisions included “a significant number of
highly controversial decisions that either modified or overruled past
478
Board precedent.”
In addition, several NLRB regional directors
whose appointments were approved by the improperly-constituted
Board were confronted with possible collateral attacks on enforce479
ment actions taken by them. Subsequently, the NLRB unanimously
ratified nunc pro tunc the appointments of three of its regional direc480
tors and five of its ALJs, and those regional directors ratified all actions taken by them or on their behalf from the dates of their initial

473
474

475

476
477

478

479
480

560 U.S. 674, 674–75 (2010). The case is discussed in Julia Di Vito, Note, The New Meaning of New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 330 (2011).
Abigail Caplovitz Field, Possible Impacts of the Noel Canning Decision, CORP. SECRETARY
(Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.corporatesecretary.com/articles/regulation-and-legal/
12682/possible-impacts-noel-canning-decision/.
Francis L. Van Dusen, Jr. & Wayne Landsverk, Employment Law Half-Day Seminar, Lost
in Space: The NLRB After Noel Canning, MILLER NASH LLP (2014),
http://www.millernash.com/files/Event/76543c0f-49af-406b-bb54-bfd6bb0fd26f/
Presentation/EventAttachment/b590f9d3-6320-4146-89b0-c0225f59fa1a/The%20NLRB
%20After%20Noel%20Canning.pdf.
Noel Canning v. NLRB, 134 U.S. 2550 (2014).
See Bryan J. Leitch, NLRB v. Noel Canning: The Separation-of-Powers Dialogue Continues,
2013–14 CATO SUPREME COURT REV. 221, 252–53 (“Between January 2012 and August
2013, the NLRB ‘recess’ appointments issued roughly 700 reported and unreported decisions while sitting on quorum-less boards.”).
G. Roger King & Bryan J. Leitch, The Impact of the Supreme Court’s Noel Canning Decision—
Years of Litigation Challenges on the Horizon for the NLRB, BLOOMBERG BNA LAW (June 27,
2014), http://www.bna.com/impact-supreme-courts-n17179891624.
Leitch, supra note 477, at 253.
NLRB OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, NLRB OFFICIALS RATIFY AGENCY ACTIONS TAKEN
DURING PERIOD WHEN SUPREME COURT HELD BOARD MEMBERS WERE NOT VALIDLY
APPOINTED (Aug. 4, 2014), https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrbofficials-ratify-agency-actions-taken-during-period-when-supreme-court.
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482

appointments. The impact of these ratifications is unclear. The
NLRB ultimately identified approximately 100 decisions that re483
quired review after being invalidated by Noel Canning, and in 2015
the board was reported to be moving through this backlog of cases,
“generally ‘rubber-stamping’ its prior opinions, even when controver484
sial.”
One final example is of interest. In 2008, Congress passed legislation which attempted to cure on a prospective basis the invalid appointments of administrative patent judges of the Board of Patent
485
Appeals and Interferences (“BPAI”).
The appointments were unconstitutional because they were made by the Director of the Patent
and Trademark Office (“PTO”), who was not a head of a depart486
487
ment. Instead, he was subordinate to the Secretary of Commerce.
The legislation, signed by President George W. Bush, provides for
488
appointments to be made by the Secretary. It also offers two alternative mechanisms to address the problem of prior decisions. First,
the statute authorizes the Secretary of Commerce to make new appointments of existing administrative patent judges that take effect at
the time when the Director of the PTO had previously purported to
489
make the appointments. Professor John Duffy, who first discovered
the BPAI appointment problem, has described the statute’s retroac490
tive appointments as “unprecedented in constitutional history.” Second, the statute states that the de facto officer doctrine shall be a defense to a challenge to the appointment of an administrative patent
judge on the basis that the judge was originally appointed by the PTO
491
Director. It is unclear what effect, if any, Congress’s alternative retroactive fixes had in this situation, because the issue has not been ful481

482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491

Seth Borden, Does the National Labor Relations Board’s Recent Ratification Announcement Have
Any Impact on Actions Invalidated by Noel Canning?, LABOR RELATIONS TODAY (Aug. 6,
2014), http://www.laborrelationstoday.com/2014/08/articles/uncategorized/does-thenational-labor-relations-boards-recent-ratification-announcement-have-any-impact-onactions-invalidated-by-noel-canning/.
Id.
Paul Kind, Putting the Rabbit Back in the Hat: Noel Canning’s Impact on Eighteen Months of
NLRB Decisions and Future Presidential Appointments, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 493, 502 (2015).
Christine Holst, Ripples of Noel Canning Continue, NAT’L L. REV. (Feb. 20, 2015),
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/ripples-noel-canning-continue.
See Pub. L. No. 110-313, 122 Stat. 3014 (2008) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 6 (2012)).
John F. Duffy, Are Administrative Patent Judges Unconstitutional?, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 904,
910-11 (2009).
Id. at 911.
35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012).
35 U.S.C. § 6(c) (2012).
Duffy, supra note 486, at 920.
35 U.S.C. § 6(d) (2012).
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492

ly litigated. But insofar as the statute has not been deemed unconstitutional, it might serve as a model in some respects for a solution to
the SEC’s ALJ problem.
III. NORMATIVE ARGUMENTS
For the reasons set forth above, the bulk of the constitutional arguments advanced in opposition to use by the SEC and CFTC of administrative proceedings are defective. The sole exception is that the
SEC’s appointment of its ALJs may be unconstitutional. The SEC
should revise its appointments process so that its ALJs are appointed
by the Commission. But this is not the end of the debate, because
there are strong normative arguments in favor of reforming the AP
493
process.
The next Part of this Article examines the normative debate.
A. Impaired Development of Federal Securities Law
An initial normative argument against the use of administrative
enforcement is that such use impairs the development of federal securities laws, insofar as the cases are adjudicated by ALJs rather than
federal district judges. Judge Rakoff has forcefully advanced this argument. He stated: “[T]he judiciary and the public should be concerned about any trend toward preferring the S.E.C.’s internal administrative forum to the federal courts [because] it hinders the
494
balanced development of the securities laws.” Rakoff has noted that
most of the significant SEC enforcement actions are brought under
495
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Section 17(a) of the Securi496
ties Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”), and the development of the law
497
under these provisions has been mostly judge-made.
Judge Rakoff provided the example of insider trading: “[A]lmost
all the major advances in the development of the law of insider trad492

493
494

495
496
497

See, e.g., In re DBC, 545 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[W]e take no position on the
constitutionality of the [de facto officer] defense.”); Stryker Spine v. Biederman Motech
GmbH, 684 F. Supp. 2d 68, 84 (D.D.C. 2010) (noting issue but not deciding it).
See Cox, supra note 24, at 2 (“The most interesting and practical questions about APs are
not constitutional in nature, however, but normative.”).
Rakoff, supra note 16, at 7. Others share Judge Rakoff’s concern. See, e.g., William F.
Johnson, Is it Time to Reconsider “Chevron” Deference for SEC Proceedings?, N.Y. L.J., July 2,
2015, at 1 (“[O]ne consequence of bringing more administrative cases is that the SEC can
have a greater influence than federal judges in interpreting the securities laws.”).
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2012).
Rakoff, supra note 16, at 8.
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ing . . . have occurred in federal courts, usually either the Supreme
498
Judge Rakoff’s concern is that as
Court or the Second Circuit.”
administrative creep continues at the SEC, federal courts will have
fewer and fewer opportunities to shape the law of insider trading and
other aspects of federal securities law. He noted that while federal
courts review decisions of SEC ALJs, those decisions on otherwise undecided issues of statutory interpretation are entitled to Chevron def499
erence and thus are unlikely to be reversed.
According to Judge
Rakoff, this is unfair in the short-run to litigants who are given less
balanced, careful, and impartial decisions than they would receive in
federal court, and it is unfair in the long-run to the SEC, whose repu500
tation for impartiality will continue to decline.
Judge Rakoff’s argument is compelling, but it has some flaws.
First, the argument ignores the countervailing benefit of administrative adjudication by agency ALJs who develop an expertise in the federal securities laws and subsequent de novo review by SEC and CFTC
501
commissioners who are widely regarded as subject matter experts.
Second, Judge Rakoff’s selection of insider trading to illustrate his
argument is questionable, in a couple of respects. To begin, SEC APs
have made a major positive contribution to the development of insider trading law. As Professor Donald Langevoort has noted, “a sizable
number of well-known insider trading cases . . . have arisen through
502
administrative proceedings.”
These include the seminal cases of

498
499
500

501

502

Id.
Id. at 10–11.
Id. at 11. Cf. Alexander I. Platt, SEC Administrative Proceedings: Backlash and Reform, 71 BUS.
LAWYER 1, 44 (2015–16) (“APs hinder balanced development of the securities laws not
because of Chevron deference, but because they too often keep respondents out of the
process, thereby depriving adjudicators of input from the regulated industry.”).
See, e.g., Ceresney Remarks, supra note 19, at 5 (noting that the SEC’s expanded use of APs
“furthers the balanced and informed development of the federal securities laws,” because
“SEC commissioners have great expertise” in this field). But see Elliott v. CFTC, 202 F.3d
926, 940 (7th Cir. 2000) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (“Ever since Congress began to establish independent agencies in 1887, it has been customary to refer to a commission’s
‘expertise.’ This is a figure of speech, an honorific, rather than a description of commissioners’ backgrounds and skills. It would be more accurate to call commissioners of the
CFTC (and other agencies) ‘specialists.’”). In this case, only one of the four commissioners who participated in the order under review had any trading experience, and he dissented. Id.
18 DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING: REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT &
PREVENTION § 8:17 (2012). See also Stephanie Russell-Kraft, Ceresney Rebuts Rakoff’s Critique
of SEC Admin. Actions, LAW 360 (Nov. 7, 2014, 3:30 PM ET), http://www.law360.com/
articles/594489/ceresney-rebuts-rakoff-s-critique-of-sec-admin-actions (citing SEC Enforcement Director for proposition that SEC’s ALJs have contributed their expertise to
develop various areas of securities law, “including the prosecution of insider trading”).
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504

Dirks v. SEC and In re Cady, Roberts & Co. Indeed, Cady, decided
more than fifty years ago, was the first insider trading decision ever
issued under the federal securities laws and the “vast majority” of insider trading cases decided in the decades since then have adhered to
505
its basic analysis.
In any event, it is certainly debatable whether the post-Cady judicial development of federal insider trading law has been a net positive. A recent analysis of the law began with this observation: “Federal
insider trading law seems to be a ‘theoretical mess.’ According to the
consensus view among experts, it is ‘seriously flawed,’ ‘ill-defined,’
‘inconsistent,’ ‘astonishingly dysfunctional,’ ‘enigma[tic],’ and even
506
‘an ass.’” The generally poor performance by federal courts in developing insider trading law undermines the argument that administrative creep at the SEC is disadvantageous because it impedes the
development of such law by Article III judges.
Third, the extent to which the SEC and CFTC should or do obtain
Chevron deference from the federal circuit courts with regard to interpretations presented in the course of adjudications—as opposed to
rulemaking—is a matter of some dispute. The Second Circuit has
noted that Chevron deference typically has not been afforded where
“the agency’s interpretation is presented in the course of litigation
507
and has not been ‘articulated before in a rule or regulation.’”
Moreover, it is doubtful whether issues addressed in dicta in agency
decisions that were not briefed by the parties are entitled to Chevron
deference. This situation arose in In the Matter of John P. Flannery &
508
James D. Hopkins, decided by the Commission in 2014 and subsequently appealed to the First Circuit. In Flannery the Commission—
in a 3-2 decision effectively reversing the decision of the ALJ—made

503
504
505
506
507

508

463 U.S. 646 (1983).
Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
Crimmins, supra note 35, at 332.
Sung Hui Kim, Insider Trading as Private Corruption, 61 UCLA L. REV. 928, 931 (2014) (citations omitted).
SEC v. Rosenthal, 650 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted); see also Chau v.
SEC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 417, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (noting that the Second Circuit has not definitively stated whether SEC interpretations made during adjudicatory proceedings are
entitled to deference), aff’d, No. 15-461, 2016 WL 7036830 (2d Cir. Dec. 2, 2016); Bradley
George Hubbard, Comment, Deference to Agency Statutory Interpretations First Advanced in Litigation? The Chevron Two-Step and the Skidmore Shuffle, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 447, 448 (2013)
(noting that five federal circuits deny deference to agency statutory interpretations first
advanced during litigation).
Securities Act Release No. 9689, Exchange Act No. 73840, Investment Company Act Release No. 31374, 2014 WL 7145625 (Dec. 15, 2014), vacated sub nom. Flannery v. SEC, 810
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2015).
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509

an “overt bid for Chevron deference” by offering a fifteen-page
commentary on the proper interpretation of Section 10(b) of the Ex510
change Act, companion Rule 10b-5, and Section 17(a) of the Securities Act in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Janus Capital
511
Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders. Janus held that a person is liable under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for making a false or misleading statement only if he had “ultimate authority” for that state512
ment.
Janus left numerous unanswered questions, and the
Commission, in Flannery, attempted to answer many of them, even as
to issues not briefed by the parties. On appeal, the First Circuit va513
cated the Commission’s Order in 2015, although it did not address
the Commission’s Janus interpretation. A recent review expressed
doubt that the CFTC “will continue to be afforded Chevron deference
in cases involving aggressive interpretations or applications of [Dodd514
Frank] made in the course of agency adjudications.”
The same
515
doubt may apply to the SEC and the Exchange and Securities Acts.
Fourth, and more broadly, the extent to which Chevron has any
impact on the judiciary has been widely debated. Many scholars have
concluded that Chevron, the most-cited decision in administrative
516
law, has had no substantial effect. One recent review noted:
“[E]mpiricists have had difficulty determining whether Chevron has
517
actually had an impact in the real world.” To the extent that Chevron deference is a principle more often honored in the breach than
the observance, once again Judge Rakoff’s concern seems unwarranted.
509

510
511
512
513
514
515

516
517

Andrew Vollmer, The SEC’s Expansion of Primary Liability Under Section 17(a) and Rule 10b-5,
CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Sept. 9, 2015), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/09/09/
the-secs-expansion-of-primary-liability-under-section-17a-and-rule-10b-5/.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015).
131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).
Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302.
Flannery v. SEC, 810 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2015).
Berkovitz, supra note 85, at 10.
See Matthew Martens et al., “We Intend to Resolve the Ambiguities”: The SEC Issues Some Surprising Guidance on Fraud Liability in the Wake of Janus, 47 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 220, 220
n.12 (Feb. 2, 2015) (expressing skepticism that Flannery’s dicta, issued in the absence of
briefing by the parties, “is the type of ‘formal adjudication’ the Chevron Court intended
would be afforded deference from the courts”).
Michael Herz, Essay, Chevron is Dead; Long Live Chevron, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1870
n.19 (2015).
Id. at 1878; see also Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a
Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM.
L. REV. 1727, 1817 (2010) (“Academics and practitioners alike frequently assume that
federal judges faithfully defer to agency interpretations of statutes. This untested assumption has underpinned much of the debate over the scope and extent of deference
doctrine. Our analysis finds that this assumption is unfounded.”).
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Finally, Justice Clarence Thomas and the late Justice Antonin Scalia recently suggested, in an opinion denying a petition for a writ of
certiorari, that agency interpretations of laws that are subject to both
criminal and administrative enforcement are not entitled to defer518
ence. Their suggestion, if ultimately accepted by the Court, would
encompass interpretations by the SEC of the laws it administers, because most of those laws can give rise to either civil or criminal liabil519
ity. Given that Justices Scalia and Thomas have “led major shifts in
520
criminal law jurisprudence” during the past decade, the Court’s
eventual acceptance of the position staked out by them is not farfetched.
Overall, to the extent that courts decline to grant deference to
statutory interpretations made during the course of SEC and CFTC
adjudications, concerns about impaired development of the federal
securities laws should dissipate. On the other hand, if the SEC loses
Chevron deference, it simultaneously will lose a key advantage of its
plan to pursue enforcement in-house. Recall that the fourth factor of
the Division guidance issued in May 2015 concerning choice of venue—which refers to the Commission’s “expertise” in securities matters—is a clear allusion to the SEC’s expectation that its rulings interpreting the federal securities laws are entitled to Chevron
deference. That expectation would be dashed if the late Justice Scalia’s views about laws subject to both criminal and administrative en521
forcement ultimately prevail.

518
519

520

521

Whitman v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 352 (2014).
Joseph Boryshansky et al., SEC’s Authority to Interpret the Securities Laws Comes Under Fire in
Criminal
Enforcement,
16
J.
INVESTMENT
COMPLIANCE
41,
42
(2015),
https://www.akingump.com/images/content/3/7/v2/37892/110887713-1.pdf (“Since
many of the laws the SEC enforces can give rise to criminal sanctions, the SEC could be
denied deference in a wide range of cases, leaving its rules subject to frequent challenge.”).
SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, Whitman v. United States: U.S. Supreme Court Considers Deference to Agencies’ Interpretations of Criminal Statutes, 3 (Nov. 13, 2014),
https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_Whitman_v_United_
States_US_Supreme_Court_Considers_Deference_to_Agencies_Interpretations_of_
Criminal_Statutes.pdf.
See Matthew T. Martens et al., Scalia’s Deference Argument Could Have Dramatic Effects,
LAW360 (Nov. 18, 2014, 11:57 AM), http://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/
Shared_Content/Editorial/Publications/Documents/Scalias-Deference-Argument-CouldHave-Dramatic-Effects-Law360.pdf (“[W]ere Justice Scalia’s position to become the law, it
would eliminate one of the major tactical advantages for the SEC when it brings an enforcement action in an administrative proceeding, rather than in district court.”).
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B. Perception of Unfairness and Absence of Independence
A second normative argument is that the SEC’s administrative
process is unfair or creates a perception of unfairness, even if it does
not result in a statutory violation or a denial of due process or equal
protection. Closely related is the argument that SEC ALJs lack the
requisite degree of independence. Allegations of bias in APs are
common, but federal courts have consistently rejected such allega522
tions by respondents in CFTC APs.
Other observers have had differing opinions. More than twenty years ago an American Bar Association Task Force (“ABA Task Force”) concluded that the
combination of prosecutorial and adjudicative functions in the SEC
“adversely affects in a fundamental way the perceived and actual fair523
This concern may be even more salient
ness of the process . . . .”
today, in light of the SEC’s greatly expanded use of APs. But the criticism is not universal. For example, the ACUS examined the amalgamation of functions of federal agencies and concluded that the
model “appears, on the whole, to have worked satisfactorily in provid524
ing fair and impartial factfinding . . . . ”
An examination of the fairness argument requires an understanding of the ALJ selection process. The SEC currently employs five
ALJs. As noted, most or all of them were hired by the SEC’s Office of
Administrative Law Judges, with input from the Chief Administrative
Law Judge, human resource functions, and the OPM. Each of the
current ALJs served as a law judge at another agency before transferring to the SEC staff. None of the current SEC ALJs were part of the
SEC staff in any capacity or had practiced securities law extensively
525
prior to becoming an ALJ.
This situation differs from historical
practice. During the period 1964–1994 a majority of the SEC’s ALJs
526
were members of the agency’s staff prior to becoming ALJs.
Prior
service produced the benefits of expertise concerning both federal
securities laws and the securities industry. But prior service came at a
potential cost, which was bias in favor of the SEC.
522
523
524

525

526

See JERRY W. MARKHAM, 13A COMMODITIES REG. § 20:32, Westlaw (database updated Apr.
2016) (collecting cases).
Task Force Report, supra note 111, at 1733.
ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION 86-4: THE SPLIT-ENF’T MODEL FOR
AGENCY ADJUDICATION 1, (Dec. 4, 1986) https://www.acus.gov/recommendation/splitenforcement-model-agency-adjudication.
DORFMAN & WINER, supra note 22, at § 19.04(1); U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Center for
Capital Markets Competitiveness, supra note 26, at 17 (“During the past 30 years, the SEC
has not hired a single ALJ who had directly relevant experience or expertise related to
the federal securities laws.”).
DORFMAN & WINER, supra note 22, at § 19.04(1).
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What has the elimination of prior service accomplished? One obvious effect is that the ALJs’ collective expertise has been significantly
reduced, at least with respect to new judges. Two of the five ALJs
employed by the SEC in 2016 began service in 2014, and whatever securities expertise they now have has been acquired only since then.
But this does not necessarily mean the SEC ALJs’ overall competence
is less than it was when they always had prior staff service. Prominent
defense counsel acknowledge that they “have no reason to believe
these [current SEC] ALJs are anything other than capable, fair, and
527
evenhanded jurists.” Moreover, the elimination of prior service and
the commensurate reduction in expertise may merely mean that respondents’ counsel have been placed on a more even playing field
528
with SEC staff in their interactions with SEC ALJs.
Has the reduction of prior service solved the problem of actual or
perceived bias? One SEC ALJ, in office from 1995–2007, alleged that
she was pressured by Chief ALJ Brenda Murray to find more often in
529
favor of the SEC. In June 2015 the SEC’s Office of Inspector General (“OIG”) launched an investigation at the request of SEC Chair
530
Mary Jo White concerning claims that SEC ALJs are biased.
The
OIG issued an Interim Report of Investigation in August 2015 which
advised that the Inspector General “has not developed any evidence
to support the allegations of bias in ALJs’ decisions in the Commis531
sion’s administrative proceedings.”
The OIG issued a final Report
of Investigation in January 2016 which confirmed the interim findings. The Report noted, inter alia, that the OIG did not develop any
evidence to support the allegations of improper influence or the al-

527

528
529
530

531

Davison et al., supra note 20, at 106–07; see also U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Center for
Capital Markets Competitiveness, supra note 26, at 58 n.60 (“[A]ttorneys in private practice uniformly praise[] the expertise, experience, professionalism, and integrity of the
two [SEC] ALJs who have served for an extended period of time . . . .”).
See DORFMAN & WINER, supra note 22, at § 19.04(1) (noting the more level playing field).
Eaglesham, supra note 11 (discussing allegations of pressure by Chief Judge Murray).
Ed Beeson, SEC Inspector General Probes in-House Judge Bias Charges, LAW360 (Aug. 10, 2015,
1:02 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/689115/sec-inspector-general-probes-inhouse-judge-bias-charges.
SEC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., INTERIM REPORT OF INVESTIGATION, Case #15-ALJ-0482-1,
at 4 (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/oig/reportspubs/oig-sec-interim-reportinvestigation-admin-law-judges.pdf. See also William McLucas & Matthew Martens, How to
Rein in the SEC, WALL ST. J. (June 2, 2015, 6:55 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-torein-in-the-sec-1433285747 (“Whatever the complaints about the administrative process,
there is no evidence that the ALJs harbor bias.”); Cox, supra note 24, at 6 (concluding
that SEC ALJs “unfailingly strive to be independent”); Walfish, supra note 10 (noting that
SEC ALJs “strive to be fair to all parties”).
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legation that SEC ALJs were pressured to shift the burden of proof to
532
respondents.
Even in the absence of actual bias the perception problem remains, and it extends to appeals. Recall that the Commissioners authorize all enforcement actions and subsequently act as the first level
of appeal. The Commission’s decision to proceed with an enforcement action reflects a substantive judgment about the strength and
merit of a case. If the Commissioners ultimately side with the Division on appeal, they may “not have done so with the disinterestedness
533
required for credibility and legitimacy.” Many respondents in SEC
534
APs believe they do not receive fair hearings or appeals, and that
this unfairness manifests in the SEC’s record of home court success.
Indeed, the Commissioners almost never dismiss a case after they
535
have authorized issuance of an OIP. In this context the perception
of bias or unfairness may be almost as important as the presence of
536
bias.
And the perception is magnified by the adverse SEC and
CFTC procedures described above.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A number of solutions to the problems identified above have been
proposed. The next part of this Article considers the merits and disadvantages of some of the most common proposals.
A. Establishment of a Federal ALJ Corps
One proposal is that the federal government should establish and
utilize for agency adjudication a corps of independent ALJs who are

532
533
534
535

536

SEC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION, Case #15-ALJ-0482-1, at 21–22
(Jan. 21, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/oig/reportspubs/Final-Report-of-Investigation.pdf.
Walfish, supra note 10.
See, e.g., Cox, supra note 24 (“At a minimum, it appears to [respondents] and to the outside world that the process is much less fair.”).
David Zornow, Comment Letter on Proposed Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of
Practice (Dec. 2, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-18-15/s71815-6.pdf (“[I]f it
has ever occurred, it is extremely rare for a Commissioner to dismiss a case after having
already been persuaded to approve the very institution of those proceedings.”).
See, e.g., Task Force Report, supra note 111, at 1734 (“Even if the inference of bias from the
number of cases decided for the [SEC] Staff is not warranted in fact, the public perception to this effect may be every bit as damaging to the public confidence in the integrity
and fairness of the process.”); Henning, supra note 213 (“[T]his battle is more about the
perception that the administrative process is flawed, not whether there is actually a significant home court advantage.”); Olson, supra note 129 (“The perception that administrative proceedings are fundamentally unfair has damaged the credibility of the SEC’s enforcement system.”).
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not employees of any specific agency. Such a corps has been widely
used at the state level—and to a much lesser extent at the local lev537
el —in the form of central panels. Central panels vary greatly in
538
their organization, but in general a panel is an agency of ALJs estab539
lished to conduct administrative adjudications for other agencies.
These ALJs are independent of, and not subject to control or influence by, the agencies for which they conduct administrative hearings.
540
Instead, the ALJs report to a chief ALJ or central panel director.
Central panels have existed since the 1940s. A Model Act for their
541
adoption has been drafted, at least twenty-seven states and three
542
major cities have established such panels, and at least eleven states
543
have adopted them since 1990. No state that has adopted a central
544
panel has returned to decentralization.
The adoption of central
panels has been described as the most significant development in
545
U.S. administrative law and a substantial body of research and
commentary on many aspects of this development has been published. Central ALJ panels offer several advantages, including an en546
547
hanced perception of fairness, improved efficiency, and lower
548
costs.
537

538
539

540
541
542
543

544
545
546

547

Allen C. Hoberg, Ten Years Later: The Progress of State Central Panels, 21 J. NAT’L ASS’N
ADMIN. LAW JUDICIARY 235, 246 (2001) (“The central panel system is slowly gaining popularity amongst large cities too.”).
See Moliterno, supra note 162, at 1230.
Barnett, supra note 18, at 828 (“Perhaps the most popular remedial proposal is for a unified ALJ corps (sometimes referred to as an ALJ central panel) appointed and supervised
by an existing or newly created independent agency.”).
Larry J. Craddock, Final Decision Authority and the Central Panel ALJ, 33 J. NAT’L ASS’N
ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 471, 477 (2013).
See House of Delegates of American Bar Ass’n, Model Act Creating a State Central Hearing
Agency, 17 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. LAW JUDICIARY 313 (1997) (reprinting the Model Act).
John Hardwicke & Thomas E. Ewing, The Central Panel: A Response to Critics, 24 J. NAT’L
ASS’N ADMIN. LAW JUDGES 231 (2004).
James F. Flanagan, An Update on Developments in Central Panels and ALJ Final Order Authority,
38 IND. L. REV. 401, 402–04, 403 nn.13–14 (2005) (listing states and municipalities which
have adopted central panels).
Id. at 404–05 (noting that no state had decentralized at least up until 2005).
Michael Asimow, The Fourth Reform: Introduction to the Administrative Law Symposium on State
Administrative Law, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 395, 396–99 (2001).
See, e.g., Michael Asimow, The Administrative Judiciary: ALJs in Historical Perspective, 20 J.
NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. LAW JUDICIARY 157, 164 (2000) (“Central panels have some very important advantages, particularly in giving private parties the sense their cases are being
heard by an independent judge.”); Ryan Jones, Comment, The Fight Over Home Court: An
Analysis of the SEC’s Increased Use of Administrative Proceedings, 68 SMU L. REV. 507, 536
(2015) (“[T]he SEC could remove a perception of in-house bias . . . by using independent ALJs who work from outside of the agency.”).
See, e.g., Moliterno, supra note 162, at 1228 (“There is, in fact, significant evidence in support of the proposal of many administrative judges that a central panel would increase
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Is the central panel model suitable for the federal government?
Congress considered but rejected central panels when the APA was
549
drafted in the 1940s and an ALJ corps option was proposed repeat550
edly in Congress between 1983 and 1995. The ACUS examined the
issue during this latter period and recommended against a central551
ized approach at the federal level. The published recommendation
of the ACUS did not explain its rationale, but there are clear potential disadvantages to establishing and operating a federal central ALJ
panel.
Perhaps the major potential disadvantage to operation of a federal
central panel—and its use as a source of ALJs for SEC and CFTC administrative proceedings—is the loss of agency expertise that the cur552
rent decentralized approach provides.
As noted, none of the current SEC ALJs have prior SEC staff experience and two of them have
553
In addition, the CFTC has no
served at the SEC only since 2014.
ALJs of its own, and it is likely to borrow from other agencies when it
resumes contested administrative enforcement. Nevertheless, SEC
ALJs develop substantial securities law and industry expertise as their
554
tenure continues at the agency, and this expertise is likely to be
transferable to CFTC cases. The acquired expertise might be lost if

548
549
550

551

552

553

554

the efficiency of administrative adjudication as well as the impartiality of administrative
adjudicators.”).
Hardwicke & Ewing, supra note 542, at 233 (“Experience has shown that a central panel is
inherently more cost-effective than separate, independent hearing units.”).
Moliterno, supra note 162, at 1227.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-14, RESULTS-ORIENTED CULTURES: OFFICE OF
PERS. MGMT. SHOULD REVIEW ADMIN. LAW JUDGE PROGRAM TO IMPROVE HIRING AND
PERFORMANCE MGMT. 22 (2010), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-14. One bill
passed the Senate in 1993 but never came to a vote in the House of Representatives. Id.
at 23.
Moliterno, supra note 162, at 1228. See also Paul R. Verkuil et al., ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF
THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION 92-7: THE FED. ADMIN. JUDICIARY (Dec. 10, 1992),
https://www.acus.gov/recommendation/federal-administrative-judiciary
(“Congress
should not at this time make structural changes more extensive than those proposed
here, such as those in recent legislative proposals to establish a centralized corps of
ALJs.”).
See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 18, at 829 n.20 (“[A] common criticism of the ALJ corps is
that agencies lose the efficiency and specialized knowledge that exists when ALJs are
housed within individual agencies.”).
The five ALJs employed by the SEC in 2016 were Brenda Murray, Carol Foelak, Cameron
Elliott, James Grimes, and Jason Patil. Murray has served as an SEC ALJ since 1988, Foelak since 1996, Elliott since 2011, Grimes since June 2014, and Patil since September
2014. Murray has served as the Chief ALJ since 1994. See Davison et al., supra note 20, at
106–07 n.29 (listing the five SEC ALJs and their experience at the SEC).
See, e.g., Ceresney Remarks, supra note 19 (“[SEC] ALJs are focused on hearing and deciding
securities cases, year after year. They develop expert knowledge of the securities laws,
and the types of entities, instruments and practices that frequently appear in our cases.”).
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SEC and CFTC administrative proceedings were to be staffed by ALJs
sourced from a central panel at the federal level.
The foregoing argument concerning loss of expertise has been
rebutted—at least with regard to state central panels—by state ALJs
and other observers. The rebuttal notes the following: (1) the chief
ALJs in states using central panels endeavor to make ALJ assignments
based on the expertise of particular judges, (2) in many cases subject
matter expertise is non-essential, and (3) empirical evidence from
some states where central panel ALJs have no authority to make final
decisions without agency review shows that the decisions by ALJs are
overwhelmingly affirmed on review, which suggests that the theorized
555
crippling loss of expertise is a false assumption.
The foregoing rebuttal may be valid with regard to central panels
at the state level. But it is not at all clear that the rebuttal retains its
validity with regard to a federal central panel. Cases at the federal
556
level are likely to be more complex —perhaps considerably more
so—and this increased complexity may very well render a federal central panel unfeasible. In any event, as noted by Professor Barnett,
“Given the ACUS’s lack of support for an ALJ corps and the proposal’s failure to gain political traction after more than sixty years,
557
the proposal to create a federal ALJ corps appears moribund.”
B. Adoption of the NLRB Model or a Split-Enforcement Model
The ABA Task Force recommended more than twenty years ago
that the SEC’s authority to initiate an administrative enforcement
proceeding be vested in an independent General Counsel’s office, in
558
conformity with the long-standing practice at the NLRB. This rec559
ommendation was recently revived.
The NLRB’s current enforcement structure has been in place
560
since 1947. That year Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act, which
amended the NLRA and, among other things, restructured the NLRB
by creating the office of the General Counsel. Before Taft-Hartley,
555
556

557
558
559
560

Hardwicke & Ewing, supra note 542, at 23–39.
See, e.g., Ceresney Remarks, supra note 19 (noting that many cases decided by SEC ALJs involve complex and novel legal issues); Stephanie Russell-Kraft, CFTC Whistleblower Head
Forecasts Big Things to Come, LAW360 (May 1, 2015, 2:35 PM), http://www.law360.com/
articles/649672/cftc-whistleblower-head-forecasts-big-things-to-come (noting highly technical nature of cases brought by CFTC).
Barnett, supra note 18, at 830.
Task Force Report, supra note 111, at 1737.
See, e.g., Walfish, supra note 10 (recommending adoption by SEC of NLRB enforcement
model).
Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166).
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the NLRB simultaneously occupied the roles of investigator, prosecu561
This amalgamation of functions was widely
tor, jury, and judge.
562
criticized on the basis that it was unfair to defendants. Since TaftHartley the NLRB’s functions have been split, with the General
Counsel acting independently of the NLRB, but in its name and on
its behalf, in the pre-filing investigation, issuance, and prosecution of
563
unfair labor practice complaints.
The five members of the NLRB
564
This bifurretain only adjudicative and policy-making functions.
cated structure reflects the intent of Congress to differentiate between the final authority of the General Counsel and the NLRB along
565
a prosecutorial versus adjudicative line.
A similar but non-identical model is the split function or splitenforcement model, wherein Congress splits a major area of regulatory activity between two separate and independent agencies, granting rulemaking and prosecutorial authority to one of them and adju566
dicatory authority to the other.
One example of this model is the OSH Act, which splits enforcement by assigning responsibility for setting and enforcing health and
safety standards to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and responsibility for adjudicating alleged violations of those
567
The OSHRC employed twelve ALJs in
standards to the OSHRC.
568
2016 and they decide cases at the trial level. The three-member
OSHRC, appointed by the President, provides administrative appel569
late review on a discretionary basis.
561
562
563
564

565
566
567

568
569

Int’l Ladies’ Garment Workers Union, Local 415–75, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 501 F.2d 823,
828, 828 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Id. at 828.
Id.
See Innovative Commc’ns Corp. v. NLRB, 39 F. App’x 715, 719 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)
(“[T]here is a clear division between the [NLRB’s] adjudicative functions and the General Counsel’s prosecutorial functions . . . .”); Francis M. Dougherty et al., 22 FED. PROC.,
L. ED. § 52:251 (database updated Mar. 2015) (“The General Counsel . . . functions in investigative and prosecutory roles, and in so doing acts as an independent unit, with the
NLRB itself retaining only its adjudicative and policymaking functions.”).
NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 124 (1987);
NLRB v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 613 F.3d 275, 278 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
32 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
JUDICIAL REVIEW § 8217 (1st ed. database updated Apr. 2015).
George Robert Johnson, Jr., The Split-Enforcement Model: Some Conclusions from the OSHA
and MSHA Experiences, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 315, 315 (1987); Amanda Shami, Note, Three
Steps Forward: Shared Regulatory Space, Deference, and the Role of the Court, 83 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1577, 1594 (2014).
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REVIEW COMM’N, Administrative Law Judges,
http://www.oshrc.gov/about/ALJ_bios.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2016).
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMM’N, Fiscal Year 2017 Performance Budget
and Justification 1 (Feb. 2016) (noting trial function of ALJs, as well as Presidential ap-

128

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 19:1

A second example of split-enforcement at the federal level is the
570
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (“Mine Act”), which
amended prior statutes concerning coal, metal, and non-metal mine
safety and health and is modeled closely on the OSH Act’s adminis571
trative structure. The Mine Act requires the Secretary of Labor to
develop, promulgate, and enforce safety and health standards for the
nation’s mining industry through the Mine Safety and Health Admin572
istration (“MSHA”) and assigns the adjudication of contested enforcement actions to the independent Federal Mine Safety and
573
Health Review Commission (“FMSHRC”). The FMSHRC employed
574
fifteen ALJs in 2016 and they decide cases at the trial level. The
575
five-member FMSHRC provides administrative appellate review.
The administrative structure of both the OSH Act and the Mine
Act is similar to the NLRA’s, insofar as all three reflect an internal
separation of function beyond what the APA mandates. Recall that
while the APA prohibits agency staff from combining prosecutorial
and adjudicative functions in the same case, it expressly exempts both
the agency and agency members from this prohibited combination.
The NLRA, OSH Act, and Mine Act administrative models all exceed
the APA parameters. But the NLRA model differs from the other
two. Whereas the General Counsel’s role at the NLRB is limited by
Taft-Hartley to the investigation and prosecution of cases, Congress
assigned to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration broad
policy-making authority, which is implemented through the promulgation of occupational health and safety standards and the making of
576
prosecutorial decisions. The Mine Act is similar to the OSH Act in
this regard.

570
571
572
573

574
575

576

pointment
of,
and
discretionary
review
by,
OSHRC
Commissioners),
http://www.oshrc.gov/budget/fy17_budget.pdf.
Pub. L. No. 95-164, 91 Stat. 1290 (1977) (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-961
(2012)).
Benjamin W. Mintz, Administrative Separation of Functions: OHSA and the NLRB, 47 CATH.
U. L. REV. 877, 886 (1998).
Johnson, supra note 567, at 316.
Patrick R. Baker, Stuck Between a Lump of Coal and a Hard Place: The Mine Safety and Health
Administration’s Struggle with Due Process and America’s Coal Industry, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 625,
626, 633 (2014) (noting that the Mine Act’s split-enforcement model was “designed to
prevent regulatory capture”); Johnson, supra note 567, at 316.
FED. MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMM’N, Administrative Law Judges,
https://www.fmshrc.gov/about/aljs (last visited Aug. 1, 2016).
FED MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMM’N, JUSTIFICATION OF APPROPRIATION
ESTIMATES FOR CONG. APPROPRIATIONS: FISCAL YEAR 2016, 1 (Feb. 2, 2015),
https://www.fmshrc.gov/plans/FMSHRC%20FY2016%20CBJ.pdf.
Mintz, supra note 571, at 886–87.
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Are the NLRB or split-enforcement models more equitable than
the enforcement models used by the SEC and CFTC? The ACUS examined the split-enforcement model of the OSH Act and the Mine
Act but was “unable to conclude whether this model achieves greater
577
fairness in adjudication than does the traditional structural model.”
The ACUS therefore took no position on whether the splitenforcement model is preferable to a structure in which responsibilities for rulemaking, enforcement and adjudication are combined
578
within a single agency, as they are at the SEC and CFTC. Similarly,
the American Bar Association (“ABA”) assessed whether the FTC
should continue to both prosecute and adjudicate antitrust cases.
The ABA concluded that the benefits and safeguards inherent in the
FTC’s adjudicatory process outweigh any need to separate its prose579
cutorial and adjudicative functions.
Another perspective is provided by Canada, which lacks a national
580
securities regulator.
Each Canadian province and territory has its
own securities regulator, which takes one of two forms. The regulator is either a self-funded commission or an entity housed and fi581
nanced within a larger government department.
These securities
commissions have traditionally been structured as multifunctional
administrative agencies, in which they act as regulator, investigator,
prosecutor, and adjudicator. This is the SEC’s model. In 2004 Quebec opted for a bifurcated or split-enforcement model when it established the Bureau de décision et de révision en valeurs mobilières
(“the Bureau”). The Bureau, an independent adjudicative tribunal,
rendered ninety decisions between the time it began exercising juris582
diction on February 1, 2004 and June 30, 2008. Appeals were filed

577
578
579

580

581

582

The Split-Enforcement Model for Agency Adjudication (Recommendation No. 86-4), 51
Fed. Reg. 46986 (Dec. 30, 1986).
Id.
Miles W. Kirkpatrick et al., 1989 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY
THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 118 (“[T]he current unity of functions,
although troubling, is superior to the alternatives . . . .”).
See Poonam Puri, Securities Litigation and Enforcement: The Canadian Perspective, 37 BROOK. J.
INT’L L. 967, 975 (2012) (“Securities experts in Canada have been deliberating over the
transition to a national regulator for approximately forty years, with no success to date.”).
Thomas Hockin et al., Final Report and Recommendations, EXPERT PANEL ON SEC. REG.,
DEP’T OF FIN. CAN. 39 (2009), http://www.expertpanel.ca/eng/documents/Expert_
Panel_Final_Report_And_Recommendations.pdf.
Stéphane Rousseau, The Québec Experience with an Independent Administrative Tribunal Specialized in Securities: A Study of the Bureau de décision et de révision en valeurs mobilières, EXPERT
PANEL ON SEC. REG. IN CAN. 24 (2009), http://www.expertpanel.ca/documents/researchstudies/Quebec%20Independent%20Adjudicative%20Tribunal%20%20Rousseau.English.pdf.
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583

with respect to only five of these decisions, which certainly suggests
that the parties believe the Bureau’s process is fair. Quebec’s model
584
has been widely endorsed by securities experts in Canada.
At a minimum, the split-enforcement model probably enhances
585
the appearance of fairness.
Balanced against this enhanced appearance is the likely diminution of agency efficiency. Efficiency depends in significant measure on both the existence of a single internal policy-making authority and access by agency decision-makers to
586
the agency’s collective expertise and experience. One study of the
OSH Act split-enforcement model concluded that “there is little evidence that these perceived benefits [of increased fairness] outweigh
587
problems with efficiency and policy coordination.” And one indicator of FMSHRC’s inefficiency is that it began fiscal year 2016 with a
588
backlog of 4452 undecided cases.
In light of the OSH Act and Mine Act experiences, adoption by
the SEC and CFTC of a split-enforcement model likely would incur
the cost of reduced efficiency. This is especially undesirable given
589
the sharp constraints on resources confronted by both the SEC and
CFTC. But this conclusion has little or no applicability to the NLRB
model, which hinges on a General Counsel acting independently of
the NLRB, but in its name and on its behalf, in the pre-filing investigation, issuance, and prosecution of unfair labor practice complaints.

583
584

585

586

587
588

589

Id. at 26.
See, e.g., Hockin et al., supra note 581, at 30 (“We believe that an independent adjudicative tribunal should be established within a framework of a single securities act administered by a single securities regulator for Canada.”); Rousseau, supra note 582, at 35 (“To
summarize, the experience of the Bureau underscores the potential of an independent
securities tribunal. It lends support to those who advocate the bifurcated model for securities commissions.”).
See Mintz, supra note 571, at 916 (“Is OSHA’s split-enforcement arrangement more ‘fair’?
It would be difficult to say. Does it appear more fair? It seems likely.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id. at 885–86 (describing the split enforcement-model as “a political compromise designed to accommodate the need for effective administration and unified policymaking
with concerns about fairness in that administration”).
Thomas McGarity et al., Workers at Risk: Regulatory Dysfunction at OSHA, 2010 CTR. FOR
PROGRESSIVE REFORM 20, http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/osha_1003.pdf.
FED. MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMM’N, JUSTIFICATION OF APPROPRIATION
ESTIMATES FOR CONG. APPROPRIATIONS: FISCAL YEAR 2017, 11 (Feb. 9. 2016),
https://www.fmshrc.gov/plans/FMSHRC_FY%202017%20Congressional%20Justification
%202-09-2017.pdf. See also Baker, supra note 573, at 646 (“MHSA’s policies consistently
fail to address the underlying problem—inconsistency and inefficiency within the administrative structure.”).
See James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas & Dana Kiku, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical
Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 757 (2003) (“The resource limitations faced by the SEC are a
much studied and well understood problem.”).
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The NLRB model—which has been copied by the EEOC —has been
proposed intermittently for decades as an appropriate model for the
591
It is time to revisit that proposal. Congress should seriously
SEC.
consider separating the prosecutorial and adjudicative functions in
the SEC, not by creating separate agencies, but by vesting prosecutorial authority in a General Counsel whose decisions are not subject to
Commission review.
C. Creation of a Right of Removal
Some federal administrative agencies permit respondents to elect
whether to proceed administratively or in federal court. The FERC,
for example, provides this option if the alleged violations occurred
592
under Part II of the Federal Power Act (“FPA”). Before issuing an
order assessing a civil penalty against any person under FPA Part II,
the FERC issues such person notice of the proposed penalty and a
statement of the material facts constituting the violation. The notice
gives the person the option to choose between (a) an administrative
hearing before a FERC ALJ or (b) an immediate penalty assessment
by the FERC which a U.S. district court is authorized to review de no593
vo.
Analogously, the ABA Task Force recommended more than twenty years ago that respondents in SEC administrative disciplinary proceedings be granted the right to remove most such actions to the
United States district court for the district in which the respondent’s
principal place of business is located or to the U.S. District Court for
594
the District of Columbia.
This recommendation has been revived
as criticism of the SEC has recently intensified. In October 2015 the
590

591

592
593

594

See EEOC, Structure of Office of General Counsel, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/litigation/
manual/1-2-a_structure_of_ogc.cfm (last visited Aug. 4, 2016) (describing the functions
of the EEOC’s Office of General Counsel). The EEOC General Counsel recommends
cases for litigation to the Commission and approves other cases for filing. Id.
See, e.g., Task Force Report, supra note 111, at 1737 (“This approach preserves the agency’s
important role in ensuring that the law develops and is applied uniformly, while at the
same time avoiding the combination of functions that raises serious questions of fairness.”); Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE L.J. 257,
267 (“The experience of the NLRB with a general counsel who is separately subject to
presidential appointment might be a model worth emulating by agencies like the FTC
and SEC.”).
Regulation of Electric Utility Companies Engaged in Interstate Commerce, 16 U.S.C. §§
824-824v (2012).
16 U.S.C. § 823b(d)(2)(A)-(B) (2012); William J. Scherman, Brandon C. Johnson & Jason
J. Fleischer, The FERC Enforcement Process: Time for Structural Due Process and Substantive Reforms, 35 ENERGY L.J. 101, 110 (2014).
Task Force Report, supra note 111, at 1736.
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Due Process Restoration Act of 2015 was introduced in Congress.
The bill—written as an amendment to the Exchange Act—allows respondents to terminate APs (thereby forcing the SEC to either re-file
the claims in an Article III court or dismiss them) and raises the burden of proof for the SEC in administrative proceedings to require
clear and convincing evidence that a respondent has violated the se596
curities laws.
A number of observers have endorsed a right of removal, includ597
According to Cox,
ing former SEC Chairman Christopher Cox.
adoption by Congress of a right of removal likely would result in a
middle ground between the pre-Section 929P(a) world and the cur598
rent environment of significantly expanded use by the SEC of APs.
Cox is wrong. Creating a right of removal is unlikely to result in a
middle ground. Rather, vesting respondents with the option to remove would create a situation in which most of them, when confronted with the prospect of administrative enforcement, probably
would threaten to exercise the option as leverage in settlement dis599
cussions with the SEC and CFTC.
And given the resource constraints faced by the agencies, that threat would be powerful enough
to disrupt the settlement calculus in hundreds of cases every year.
Granting a right of removal also is likely to have the unintended negative consequence of multiplying the already taxing case load burden
on the federal judiciary. Overall, removal is ill-advised.
595

596
597

598
599

H.R. 3798, 114th Cong. (2015); Cara Salvatore, Bill Aims to Cut In-House Proceedings for SEC
Violations, LAW360 (Oct. 22, 2015, 8:38 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/717392/
print?section=assetmanagement.
H.R. 3798, 114th Cong. (2015).
See Cox, supra note 24, at 8 (recommending adoption of right of removal). Accord U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness, supra note 26, at 20
(recommending adoption of right of removal); Joseph Quincy Patterson, Note, Many Key
Issues Left Unaddressed in the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Attempt to Modernize its Rules
of Practice, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1675, 1702 (2016) (same).
Cox, supra note 24, at 8.
See Henning, supra note 213 (“The Chamber of Commerce’s suggestion that defendants
be allowed to take a case to federal court is unlikely to gain any support from the S.E.C.
Virtually every defendant facing potential administrative charges would threaten to use
that option as a lever to gain a more favorable settlement.”). See also Fair or Foul? SEC
Administrative Proceedings and Prosepcts for Reform Through Removal Legislation: Hearing on
H.R. 3798 Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets and Gov’t Sponsored Enterprises of the H.
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 114th Cong. 7 (2015) (statement of Joseph A. Grundfest, William A.
Franke
Professor
of
Law
and
Business,
Stanford
Law
School),
http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-114-ba16-wstate-jgrundfest20151202.pdf (noting that Due Process Restoration Act of 2015 could effectively eliminate APs as a mechanism for resolving significant securities fraud cases); Platt, supra note
500, at 47 (concluding that if respondents are granted a right of removal they “would
likely opt out of the AP system very widely”).
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D. Amendment of the SEC and CFTC Rules of Practice
In June 2014 the SEC’s General Counsel acknowledged that the
agency’s RoP were last revised “quite some time ago,” and indicated
600
In fact, prior to
the agency may be open to modernizing them.
601
2016 the SEC RoP were last amended in 2006 —four years before
Dodd-Frank greatly expanded the SEC’s authority to use administrative enforcement—and they were last materially updated in the mid602
1990s. The last material update occurred long before the modern
explosion of electronically-stored information (“ESI”). The SEC’s
failure to revise the RoP to reflect the harsher aspects of the current
enforcement regime has placed respondents at a significant litigation
disadvantage. The same is true with regard to the CFTC RoP. The
litigation disadvantage is not unconstitutional but it is unfair. A
603
number of critics have called for reform and these critics are correct.
In September 2015 the SEC announced that it had voted to pro604
pose amendments to its RoP. After receiving thirteen comment let605
ters in response to the proposal, the SEC made minor revisions and
606
adopted amendments in July 2016. The amendments—which took
effect on September 27, 2016 and apply to all APs initiated on or af-

600

601

602

603
604

605
606

Stephanie Russell-Kraft, Attys Ready to Pounce on SEC’s Outdated Admin Rules, LAW360 (June
18, 2014, 7:00 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/549549/attys-ready-to-pounce-onsec-s-outdated-admin-rules.
See SEC, ADOPTION OF AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF PRACTICE AND RELATED PROVISIONS
AND DELEGATIONS OF THE AUTHORITY OF THE COMM’N, Release Nos. 34-52846, File No. S705-05 (Nov. 29, 2005), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-52846.pdf (indicating effective date of Jan. 4, 2006); William F. Johnson, SEC Behind Times in ”Modernizing” Administrative Proceedings, N.Y. L.J. (Nov. 5, 2015) (“Indeed, the SEC’s Rules of Practice were last
updated almost ten years ago, in 2006, before the Dodd-Frank Act broadened the SEC’s
ability to bring more cases in the administrative forum.”).
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness, supra note 26,
at 16 (noting that the SEC completed its most recent “material update” of the RoP in
1994).
See, e.g., McLucas & Martens, supra note 531 (“[T]he agency should move swiftly to modernize the rules of procedure governing its in-house proceedings.”).
See Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Proposes to Amend Rules Governing Administrative Proceedings (Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/
2015-209.html.
The comment letters are located at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-18-15/s718
15.shtml.
See Securities and Exchange Commission, Press Release 2016-142, SEC Adopts Amendments
to Rules of Practice for Administrative Proceedings (July 13, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/
pressrelease/2016-142.html.
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607

ter that date —are an incremental step in the right direction, but
they fail to cure the fundamental defects in the SEC’s administrative
process. The SEC and CFTC should revise their respective Rules of
Practice in the following respects.
First, both sets of rules should be amended to permit expanded
discovery. In particular, the rules should be amended to permit additional fact and expert depositions. As noted, the CFTC currently
permits depositions only to preserve the testimony of witnesses unlikely to be available for hearing, and this was the SEC’s rule prior to
the September 2016 amendments. Expanding the scope of permissible depositions to permit respondents in SEC and CFTC administrative proceedings to cross-examine the agencies’ witnesses prior to trial could accomplish multiple goals: (1) respondents could better
assess the merits of the agencies’ cases, (2) both sides could better
evaluate settlement prospects, and (3) respondents could better formulate their own trial strategy. Expanding the scope of permissible
depositions to encompass potential witnesses the SEC and CFTC may
not have identified or pursued during their investigations could further accomplish the foregoing goals.
The SEC’s 2015 announcement included a proposed amendment
to Rule 233. The proposal provided that in matters with one respondent, each side may notice for deposition a maximum of three
persons and in matters where there are multiple respondents each
608
side may depose up to five persons.
The Division is one side and
the group of all respondents is the other side. The limitations encompassed both fact and expert witnesses. Each deposition was lim609
ited to one day of six hours, including cross-examination, although
this time could be expanded by the ALJ or Commission upon a showing—among other reasons—that more time is required to fairly examine the deponent.
After receiving comments, the SEC modified its proposed
amendment in minor respects. In the revised version, the maximum
length of each deposition was extended by one hour and each side

607

608
609

Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, LLP, The SEC Retains its House Advantage During Administrative Proceedings, NAT’L L. REV. (Aug. 5, 2016), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/sec
-retains-its-house-advantage-during-administrative-proceedings.
Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 80 Fed. Reg. 60,091, 60,102 (proposed Oct. 5, 2015).
Id. at 60,103.
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can seek leave from the ALJ to take two additional depositions upon a
610
showing of compelling need.
The SEC’s new rule is much too restrictive, in several respects. To
begin, the core limit of three depositions in single respondent cases
and five depositions in multiple respondent cases is too low, especial611
ly in complex cases.
One obvious aspect of the inadequacy concerns the mix of fact and expert witnesses. Experts can play a central
role in complex cases. If the Enforcement Division discloses two expert witnesses in a single respondent case, the respondent effectively
612
is limited to a single fact witness, assuming the ALJ fails to grant
leave. The inadequacy is further underscored by comparing amended Rule 233 to the number of depositions available in federal district
court and to the number of witnesses the Enforcement Division typically calls in administrative hearings. Parties are granted ten deposi613
tions by the FRCP and often take many more in complex cases, pur614
suant to leave of court.
The Division calls an average of eight or
615
nine witnesses in APs, and this number likely reflects a subset of the

610

611

612

613
614

615

See Daniel V. Ward, Jon A. Daniels & Alexandria Perrin, Inside SEC’s New In-House Court
Rules, LAW360 (Aug. 1, 2016, 11:54 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/823479/inside
-sec-s-new-in-house-court-rules (describing the new provisions).
See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, A Small Step in Changing S.E.C. Administrative Proceedings, N.Y.
TIMES: DEALBOOK (Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/29/business/
dealbook/a-small-step-in-changing-sec-administrative-proceedings.html?_r=0 (“[A]llowing
only three—or at most five—depositions seems like an artificially low limit that will not do
much to aid those accused of a violation in a complex case.”); GIBSON DUNN &
CRUTCHER, SEC Moves in the Right Direction with Proposed Amendments to Rules Governing Administrative Proceedings, but the Changes Do Not Go Far Enough (Sept. 28, 2015),
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/SEC-Proposed-Amendments-to-RulesGoverning-Administrative-Proceedings.aspx (“[I]n complex cases, which the Commission
has increasingly authorized to proceed in its in-house courts, three or five depositions per
side could be woefully inadequate, especially in proceedings against multiple respondents, who may have widely divergent interests and significant differences of opinion as to
which witnesses should be deposed.”).
Navistar International Corporation, Comments on Proposed Rule: Amendments to the
Commission’s Rules of Practice [Release No. 34-75976; File No. S7-18-15], 2015 WL
8489929, at *3 (S.E.C. Misc. Dec. 3, 2015).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(2)(A)(i) (providing that leave of court is necessary when taking a
deposition would result in more than ten depositions being taken).
Why the SEC’s Proposed Changes to its Rules of Practice are Woefully Inadequate—Part II, SEC.
DIARY (Nov. 5, 2015), http://securitiesdiary.com/2015/11/05/why-the-secs-proposedchanges-to-its-rules-of-practice-are-woefully-inadequate-part-ii/ (“[I]n factually challenging cases, it would not be unusual to have ten to thirty fact depositions in a federal court
case, followed by at least two expert depositions per side.”).
Johnson, supra note 601 (“[A] look at the administrative hearings held over the past year
reveals an average of eight witnesses called by the Enforcement Division.”); Richard Foster, Senior V.P. and Senior Counsel for Regulatory and Legal Affairs, Financial Services
Roundtable, Comment Letter on Proposed Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of
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much larger universe of witnesses who were deposed or interviewed
616
by the Division before the OIP was filed.
Creating symmetry by giving the Division and respondents an
equal number of deposition slots will do little or nothing to even the
playing field, because prior to filing of the OIP there is great asymmetry—the Division, with unlimited authority to subpoena witnesses
and documents, is not unlikely to take dozens of examinations under
617
oath.
The Division can do this without the participation or even
knowledge of future respondents. Moreover, where there are multiple respondents they may have widely divergent interests and views
618
about who should be deposed under the new rule. Finally, amended Rule 233 does not contemplate that SEC investigative personnel
can be deposed, or that SEC files previously not subject to discovery
could be discoverable.
At a minimum, Rule 233 should be further modified to significantly increase the capped number of deposition slots, grant SEC
ALJs the discretion to consider the complexity of a proceeding in determining the appropriate number of depositions, or treat expert
619
witnesses as a separate category. In addition, the SEC should con-

616

617

618

619

Practice (Dec. 4, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-18-15/s71815.shtml (“The
Division regularly calls nine or more witnesses in administrative proceedings.”).
See Tom Quaadman, Senior V.P., Ctr. for Capital Mkts. Competitiveness, Comment Letter
on Proposed Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 7–8 (Dec. 4, 2015),
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/documents/files/2015-12.4-rules-ofpractice-comment-letter.pdf (“Anecdotally, it is common for the staff to interview or depose literally dozens of witnesses in a typical investigation.”); Why the SEC’s Proposed Changes to its Rules of Practice are Woefully Inadequate—Part II, SEC. DIARY 2 (Nov. 5, 2015),
http://securitiesdiary.com/2015/11/05/why-the-secs-proposed-changes-to-its-rules-ofpractice-are-woefully-inadequate-part-ii/ (stating that it would not be unusual for the Enforcement Division to take testimony from fifteen to thirty witnesses during the course of
an investigation).
See Peter K.M. Chan & Amy C. Greer, Tweaking the “Home Court” Rules for SEC Administrative
Proceedings,
MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP (Sept.
28,
2015),
http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/tweaking-the-home-court-rules-for-sec-administrative
-proceedings (“The effect will be to leave the playing field tilted in favor of the Division.”).
Barry R. Goldsmith, SEC Proposed Amendments to Rules for Administrative Proceedings, HARV.
LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. 2 (Oct. 15, 2015),
http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/10/15/sec-proposes-amendments-to-rules-foradministrative-proceedings/ (noting woeful inadequacy of allowing a maximum of five
depositions per side in complex cases, especially those involving multiple respondents).
See COVINGTON & BURLING LLP, The SEC’s Proposed Modernization of its Rules for Administrative Proceedings 2 (Sept. 28, 2015), https://www.cov.com/~/media/files/corporate/
publications/2015/09/the_secs_proposed_modernization_of_its_rules_for_
administrative_proceedings.pdf (“[T]here will inevitably be cases in which arbitrary limits to the number of depositions and hearing preparation time will deprive respondents
of a fair opportunity to defend themselves.”).
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sider allowing the limited use of interrogatories and requests for admissions.
Second, both agencies should amend their rules to expressly
adopt the full version of the Brady rule. As noted, whereas SEC RoP
230(b)(2) prohibits the Division from withholding documents that
contain material exculpatory evidence, the rule does not impose an
620
affirmative duty to identify or disclose such evidence. Both the SEC
and CFTC should expressly impose such an obligation on their staffs
during the course of administrative proceedings. The SEC’s new
amendments do not address the Brady rule.
Third, the compressed timelines adopted by the SEC should be
further relaxed. As noted, most SEC APs proceed under the 300-day
timeline, which provides for a hearing to occur 120 days from filing
of the OIP. This timeline, and the two alternatives, were adopted in
2003, prior to the dramatic expansion under Dodd-Frank of the
SEC’s administrative enforcement authority. These timelines are
anachronistic and should be extended to reflect both the sea-change
wrought by Dodd-Frank and the modern explosion of ESI.
The SEC’s September 2015 announcement included a proposed
amendment to Rule 360 that would expand the foregoing timeline,
but not by much. For example, proposed amended Rule 360 would
permit an administrative hearing in a 300-day case to be scheduled
up to eight months following the service of the OIP, thereby dou621
bling the former deadline of four months.
This proposed expansion was insufficient to reduce the advantage currently enjoyed by the
622
SEC, particularly when compared with the schedules in comparably
623
For the twelve month period
complex federal district court cases.
ending June 30, 2015, the median time in federal civil cases from the

620
621
622

623

Goetz, supra note 243, at 1436–37.
Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, SEC Rel. No. 34-75976, at 54 (Sept. 24,
2015), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2015/34-75976.pdf.
See GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER, supra note 611, at 2 (“While these amendments commendably would provide respondents with additional time to prepare for their hearings,
they do not adequately remedy the discrepancy between the far longer time period the
Division of Enforcement allows itself to investigate and prepare its case, which frequently
is measured in years rather than months.”).
See Olson, supra note 129, at 3–4 (“[T]he proposed increase from four to eight months in
trial preparation time for complex matters is still far short of what is needed for the most
complicated proceedings.”). See also Breon Peace & Lisa Vicens, Fighting the SEC on its
Home
Turf,
LAW360
(Oct.
28,
2016,
11:42
AM),
http://www.law360.com/assetmanagement/articles/854404/fighting-the-sec-on-its-hometurf (noting that longer pre-hearing period under amended SEC RoP “is still much
shorter than it would be in a federal civil court”).
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time of filing a complaint to trial was twenty-six and a half months,
and the SEC’s five jury trials in fiscal year 2015 took between thirtyfour and sixty-six months from the time of filing the complaint to the
625
verdict.
In response to comments received after the amendment was proposed the SEC made slight revisions. The revised rule extends the
length of the pre-hearing period to a maximum of ten months in 300day cases, six months in 210-day cases, and four months in 120-day
626
627
This extension remains inadequate.
At a minimum, Rule
cases.
360 should be further amended to permit either longer or more flexible time periods. Rule 16 of the FRCP vests federal district judges
with the discretion to issue scheduling orders that reflect the com628
plexity of cases and the scheduling needs of the parties, and Rule
360 of the RoP should include an analogous provision.
Fourth, the RoP amendments fail to assure respondents in SEC
APs timely access to the Division’s investigative file. As noted, under
Rule 230(a), the Division must commence making its file available to
respondents no later than seven days after service of the OIP. There
is no deadline for completion, and in theory full disclosure could
take much longer. Indeed, “the Division’s production can be and often is accomplished piecemeal over time, further reducing prepara629
tion for the respondent.” Whether or not a piecemeal production
is common, the Division’s file should be made available to respondents before the OIP is filed. Such earlier disclosure could render
Wells submissions more useful, provide respondents with an enhanced ability to evaluate their case at an earlier stage of the proceedings, and prompt earlier and possibly more fruitful settlement discus630
sions.
Amended Rule 221(c) adds to the list of subjects to be
discussed at an AP’s pre-hearing conference the timing for comple631
tion of the disclosure required by Rule 230, but it does not mandate
either prompt disclosure or disclosure before the OIP is filed.
624
625
626
627

628
629
630
631

Foster, supra note 615, at 5.
Id.
Margaret A. Dale & Mark D. Harris, SEC Adopts Amendments to Rules for Administrative Proceedings, N.Y. L.J. (Aug. 10, 2016).
Id. (“[T]he disparity between the parties is still large. Ten months is a relatively short
time for respondents to prepare for a complex trial, particularly where the SEC has had
years to investigate, collect documentary evidence, and take testimony.”).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 16.
Olson, supra note 129, at 5.
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER, LLP, supra note 611, at 2.
JONES DAY, SEC Publishes Final Rules Amending the Rules of Practice for Administrative Proceedings 2 (July 2016), http://www.jonesday.com/sec-publishes-final-rules-amending-the-rulesof-practice-for-administrative-proceedings-07-19-2016/.
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Overall, the Commission’s September 2016 amendments to its
RoP fail to mitigate to any appreciable degree the unfairness inher632
ent in the current rules.
CONCLUSION
Dodd-Frank authorized the SEC to impose civil penalties in proceedings before an ALJ against any person who violated any provision
of the federal securities laws or any rule promulgated under those
statutes. This authorization has resulted in a classic case of administrative creep at the SEC. More than 80% of the SEC’s new enforcement actions in the first three quarters of fiscal year 2016 were filed
as administrative proceedings, and the CFTC plans to follow suit.
SEC ALJs are SEC employees and are paid by the agency. They
are not appointed by the President, a court of law, or the head of a
federal department, and they arguably are insulated from the President by dual layers of for-cause removal protection. If an SEC enforcement action is assigned to an ALJ, rather than to a federal judge,
there are major adverse procedural consequences for respondents.
There is very limited discovery, neither the FRE nor the FRCP apply,
there is no opportunity to assert counterclaims, there is no right to a
jury trial on any issue, and the time frame for completion of the administrative proceeding is both rigid and truncated.
The SEC has been much more successful in APs conducted on its
home court than it has been in federal court. During the time period
October 2010 to September 2015, the SEC prevailed against 86% of
respondents in contested cases heard by ALJs, whereas during the
same period the SEC had a considerably lower success rate of 70% in
federal court. The statistics concerning appeals are even starker.
The foregoing picture has prompted a number of respondents to
file constitutional challenges to SEC administrative proceedings. Five
of the most common constitutional arguments asserted by respondents are denial of due process, denial of equal protection, violation of
the Seventh Amendment, and two distinct violations of Article II of
the Constitution. Virtually none of these arguments has merit. The
only meritorious constitutional argument is that SEC ALJs have been
632

See Carmen Germaine, SEC Faces Long Road Ahead on Admin Court Reforms, LAW 360 (July
13, 2016, 9:54 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/816979/sec-faces-long-road-ahead-onadmin-court-reforms (quoting Baker Botts, LLP partner Jonathan Shapiro for the proposition that amendments to SEC RoP represent non-comprehensive “textbook incrementalism”); Elizabeth P. Gray et al., Will the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Proposed Changes
to Administrative Proceedings Quiet Critics?, 22 THE INVESTMENT LAWYER 1, 6 (Dec. 2015)
(“[T]he changes will not eliminate the due process concerns that have been raised.”).
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appointed in violation of Article II. The SEC should cure that defect
by having its Commissioners reappoint its ALJs. In addition to the
constitutional arguments, there are some core normative arguments—the process impedes the development of the federal securities laws and even if the process is constitutional it is unfair, or at least
raises a substantial perception of unfairness. The fairness argument
is much more compelling than the developmental argument. The
SEC AP process is fundamentally unfair. Congress should seriously
consider adopting the NLRB model for the SEC, whereby an independent General Counsel would make investigative and prosecutorial
decisions, and the SEC and CFTC should revise their respective Rules
of Practice.

